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Despite conspiracy theory beliefs’ potential to lead to negative outcomes, psychologists have 
only relatively recently taken a strong interest in their measurement and underlying 
mechanisms.  In this thesis I test a particularly common motivational claim about the origin 
of conspiracy theory beliefs: that they are driven by threats to personal control.  Arguing that 
previous experimental studies have used inconsistent and potentially confounded measures of 
conspiracy beliefs, I first developed and validated a new Conspiracy Mentality Scale, and 
then used it to test the control hypothesis in six systematic and well-powered studies. Little 
evidence for the hypothesis was found in these studies, or in a subsequent meta-analysis of all 
experimental evidence on the subject, although the latter indicated that specific measures of 
conspiracies are more likely to change in response to control manipulations than are generic 
or abstract measures.  Finally, I examine how perceived lack of control relates to conspiracy 
beliefs in two very different naturalistic settings, both of which are likely to threaten 
individuals feelings of control: a political crisis over Macedonia’s name change, and series of 
tornadoes in North America. In the first, I found that participants who had opposed the name 
change reported stronger conspiracy beliefs than those who has supported it. In the second, 
participants who had been more seriously affected by the tornadoes reported decreased 
control, which in turn predicted their conspiracy beliefs, but only for threat-related claims. 
Tentatively, I conclude that threats to control can motivate conspiracy ideation, but only 
under particular conditions, such as when the threat is extreme and a conspiracy theory is 
available that offers a relevant explanation, although further research is necessary to explore 
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Chapter 1: The study of conspiracy theory belief 
 
What is a conspiracy theory? 
Emperor Nero caused the great fire of Rome. The witches conspired with the Devil. 
The weather is controlled by the government. These three statements refer to events centuries 
apart, yet they belong to the same class of explanations, known as conspiracy theories. 
Despite a long history of such explanations, systematic academic research into people’s belief 
in conspiracy theories has only begun in the last decade, probably incentivized by the greater 
visibility of conspiracy theories online and the growing awareness of their negative 
consequences (Douglas et al., 2019). But what, exactly, is a conspiracy theory? How does it 
differ from a “real” conspiracy? 
 Consider the following two statements:  
 
(1) Al Qaeda members conspired to attack the World Trade Center on September 11th 
2001 in order to start a holy war against the United States.  
(2) The US government conspired to bring forth the attacks on the World Trade 
Center so that they could justify the attacks on Afghanistan.  
 
Both explanations about the attacks on 9/11 imply a conspiracy, but most researchers (and lay 
people), would agree that only the second is a “conspiracy theory.” They would not, however, 
agree on the reason: although there is consensus that conspiracy theories involve multiple 
actors working together to achieve a malevolent goal (e.g., Douglas & Leite, 2017; Lantian, 
Muller, Nurra & Douglas, 2017; Swami, 2012; van Prooijen & van Dijk, 2014; Wood, 2017; 
Wood, Douglas & Sutton, 2012), definitions vary regarding whether conspiracy theories need 
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to be false (e.g., Barron, Morgan, Towell, Altemeyer & Swami, 2014; Pipes, 1996; Swami et 
al., 2013; Swami, Weis, Lay, Barron & Furnham, 2016), implausible (e.g., Brotherton & 
French, 2014; Brotherton & French, 2015; Brotherton & Eser, 2015;), or even whether their 
epistemological status is relevant (e.g., van Prooijen, in press).  
The conceptual ambiguity surrounding conspiracy theories becomes apparent when 
examining the instruments developed to measure them, which include questions about 
corruption (e.g., The city council transferred parts of the budget to the bank accounts of 
others or Members of the city council received money from construction companies to set this 
plan in motion; van Prooijen and Acker, 2015), paranormal beliefs (e.g., Events in the 
Bermuda Triangle constitute evidence of paranormal activity; Graeupner & Coman, 2017), 
and paranoia (e.g., To what extent do you think your coworker may be connected to you not 
getting the promotion?; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008, Online Supplementary Materials).  
Thus, the first challenge in any rigorous empirical investigation of conspiracy theories 
is to demarcate the construct and to differentiate it from other, superficially similar ones. 
Before I outline my definition of conspiracy theories, I will discuss how conspiracy theories 
differ from paranormal beliefs, paranoia, and “real” conspiracies.  
 
Conspiracy, paranoia, and paranormal beliefs. 
Although people who advocate conspiracy theories are often colloquially described as 
“paranoid,” conspiratorial thinking and paranoia in fact differ in important ways. Perhaps 
most notably, conspiracy theories have an intergroup dimension that merely paranoid beliefs 
lack (Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala & Olechowski, 2015; 2016; Duran, Nicholson 
& Dale, 2017; Leone, Giacomantonio & Lauriola, 2017; Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2015; van 
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Prooijen & van Lange, 2014.1 The focus of suspicion also differs in the two phenomena: 
while paranoia is characterized by suspicion towards people in general, conspiracy theories 
reflect suspicion towards powerful people in particular (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2018). In this 
sense,  they can be considered a form of political attitude (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014). 
Moreover, unlike paranoia, conspiracy theories reflect epistemological concerns (Garrett & 
Weeks, 2017) and are embedded into a tradition of explanation (Byford, 2011) with a distinct 
narrative structure, thematic configuration and explanatory logic. Finally, as an empirical 
matter, paranoia and conspiracy beliefs are relatively independent, with only low to moderate 
correlations reported in the literature (Brotherton & Eser, 2015; Darwin, Neave & Holmes, 
2011; Wilson & Rose, 2013).  
Likewise, although there are similarities between conspiracy theories and paranormal 
beliefs, there are also important differences. For example, while conspiracy beliefs usually 
arise as a response to a conventional explanation, paranormal beliefs arise because of a lack 
of conventional explanations (Wood, 2017). Also, while conspiracy theories may be 
ideologically coloured (Lewandowsky, Gignac & Oberauer, 2013; Uscinski & Parent, 2014), 
paranormal beliefs generally are not. And, again, the two phenomena are empirically 
distinguishable: the correlation between them is only moderate  (Dagnall et al., 2017; Darwin, 
Neave & Holmes, 2011; Drinkwater, Dagnall & Parker, 2012; Lobato, Mendoza, Sims & 
Chin, 2014; Swami et al., 2011), and they are associated with different statistical biases 





1 The difference between individual vs. in-group focal points is most clearly reflected in paranoid schizophrenia, 




Conspiracy theories and plausible allegations of conspiracies  
It is more difficult to separate conspiracy theories from “real” conspiracies. Although 
scholars agree that a distinction should be made between them (Bale, 2007; Byford, 2011; 
Keeley,1999), there is disagreement about where the line should be drawn. One person’s 
“conspiracy theory” may be another person’s reasonable suspicion (Harambam & Aupers, 
2017).  
For example, when Noam Chomsky was accused of promoting a conspiracy theory 
that “blames the U.S. government for virtually every ill around the world” (Pipes, 1997), he 
argued that his analyses clearly differ from conspiracy theories, citing claims about the 
Kennedy assassination as an example of the latter.  His response aroused the ire of JFK 
conspiracy theorists, however, who argued that the investigation into who killed President 
Kennedy is clearly distinct from “bogus” conspiracy theories (Byford, 2011). Thus, each of 
the three acknowledged that their topic of inquiry conceptually similar, yet distinctive from 
conspiracy theories, but failed to agree what the category of conspiracy theories should 
actually include. 
Despite the fluid and politicized nature of conspiracy theory claims, several authors have 
attempted to differentiate them from what might be called “plausible conspiracies”  (e.g. Bale, 
2007; Barkun, 2003; Brotherton, 2015; Jane & Flemming, 2014), noting several critical 
distinguishing features: 
Apocalyptic intent. Conspiracy theories typically represent the world in Manichean terms 
and embed their claims within a broader story about good vs. evil (Bale, 2007; Barkun, 2003; 
Brotherton, 2015; Cubitt, 1989; Oliver & Wood, 2014). The actors in conspiracy theories are 
seen as Evil Incarnate – representatives of a vast, sinister, omnipotent force (Bale, 2007) with 
far reaching goals (e.g., to “destroy a way of life”; Hofstadter, 1966, p. 29).  In contrast, in 
plausible conspiracies, such as those involving bribery or corruption (Jane & Flemming, 
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2014), even if the conspiracy itself stems from evil motives, the perpetrators are generally 
viewed as flawed individuals, with both positive and negative traits, and conflicting, local 
motives for personal advancement (Bale, 2007; Uscinski & Parent, 2014).   
Omnipotence. Actors in conspiracy theories are seen as monolithic, faultless, omnipotent, 
omnipresent, and farsighted individuals who are in the process of successfully implementing 
a grand antisocial agenda (Bale, 2007; Pipes, 1996; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). Actors in 
plausible conspiracies, on the other hand, are seen as bound by geographical, temporal and 
cognitive limitations. They are human beings who may themselves disagree about the intent 
or appropriateness of their actions (Popper, 2006), and are prone to errors (Harrison & 
Thomas, 1997; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). Contrast, for example the “deep state” alleged 
by current American President Donald Trump, with the claim that president Trump himself, 
with his aides, conspired to extort politically favorable statements from Ukraine.  In the 
former, a highly competent government-within-a-government is claimed to pervade every 
level of state bureaucracy (omnipresence), with the ultimate goal of overthrowing the 
legitimately elected government (grand antisocial agenda); in the latter, the actors are flawed, 
sometimes incompetent, individuals with their own, inconsistent agendas.  
Historical driving force. Conspiracy theories are typically concerned with a single all-
encompassing plot through which history is explained (Bale, 2007; Byford, 2011; Pipes, 
1997), while the roles of chance, coincidences and unintended consequences are downplayed 
or ignored. In contrast, plausible conspiracies are generally limited in scope and revolve 
around a local issue (Bale, 2007). Moreover, things rarely unfold according to plan in 
plausible conspiracies, and thus are likely to fail, and unlikely to affect history in the way 
conspiracy theorists propose (Brotherton, 2015; Byford, 2011; Cubitt, 1993; Keeley, 1999; 
Popper, 2006). Contrast, for example, the supposed role of the Illuminati in the 9/11 attacks, 
to the role of the Nixon administration in the Watergate scandal, the latter of which is better 
6 
 
described as an opportunistic act situated in a particular time and place, than evidence of the 
workings of a deeper and more sinister force accountable for multiple historical events (Jane 
& Flemming, 2014).  
Patternicity. Because conspiracy theories tend to represent events as caused by a single, 
conspiratorial hub, believers can easily find hidden patterns, connections, and meaning 
between events that, to nonbelievers, seem unrelated (Barkun, 2003; Keeley, 1999; Shermer, 
2010). For example, Hurricane Katrina is said to be only a single instance in a much larger 
plot for weather control (Penre, 2005), which in turn is only one goal of the New World 
Order, a clandestine, sinister organization, which has, in addition, staged mass shootings in 
order to easily pass gun laws (Brotherton, 2015). By contrast, plausible conspiracies are 
usually seen as isolated events, and believers generally resist the temptation to weave a 
narrative in which all facts are accounted for.  
Unofficial explanations. Conspiracy theories represent attempts to debunk or to identify 
anomalies in official explanations of events, and are typically contrasted with them 
(Aaronovitch, 2009; Brotherton, 2013, 2015; Coady, 2006; Levy, 2007; Keeley, 1999). Thus, 
the conspiracy theory is always able to account for more data than the official explanation. By 
contrast, many plausible conspiracies are official explanations of how events unfolded and 
almost always leave some things unexplained. For example, the official explanation regarding 
the murder of JFK leaves unexplained why a man was waving an umbrella immediately prior 
to the president’s assasination. A conspiracy theory however, explains that the “umbrella 
man” was signalling to Oswald when to fire. 
Unfalsifiable claims. Conspiracy theories are essentially irrefutable and unfalsifiable 
(Brotherton, 2015; Byford, 2011; Keeley, 1999; Uscinski & Parent, 2014). Lack of evidence 
for the conspiracy theory is interpreted as support for the theory, because it purportedly 
demonstrates that the conspirator is concealing their machinations. Similarly, disconfirming 
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evidence is taken as proof of the conspiracy because it is seen as being planted by the 
conspirators (Buenting & Taylor, 2010). Thus, any argument against the conspiracy theory is 
turned in favor of it (Keeley, 1999). Indeed, Basham (2003) argues that conspiracy theories 
are unfalsiable by definition, because gaps in the evidence are exactly what the theory 
predicts. In contrast, plausible conspiracies can in principle be verified or disproven by 
providing confirming (or disconfirming) evidence, as was the case, for example, in the Enron 
scandal, when former CEO Jeffrey Skilling was convicted of conspiracy, fraud, and insider 
trading.  
Although they help to delineate key differences between conspiracy theories and 
plausible conspiracies, none of the distinctions above offers a foolproof way to assess 
whether a claim is a conspiracy theory or not. For example, an official story is not necessary 
for a conspiracy theory to arise. As Brotherton (2015) notes, only several hours after the 
Sandy Hook shootings, when no official explanations were yet offered, conspiracy theorists 
"knew" that it was a false flag operation by the government intended to gain support for gun 
control legislation. Complicating efforts to define and identify conspiracy theories is the fact 
that conspiracy theorists often merge their arguments with conventional political analysis 
(Byford, 2011). By citing, for example, gun control legislation as a motive behind the Sandy 
Hook conspiracy, or justification for the invasion over Afghanistan and Iraq as the motive 
behind the 9/11 government conspiracy, conspiracy theorists make their claims more 
plausible and acceptable (Bost & Prunier, 2013). 
It might be argued that the attempt to distinguish conspiracy theories from plausible 
conspiracies is mostly relevant to so-called world (Pipes, 1997) or systemic (Barkun, 2003) 
conspiracy theories, which are mainly concerned with global goals, such as control over the 
world’s banking system, but are less relevant for conspiracy theories concerning single events 
(Barkun, 2003), such as  the Kennedy assassination or the crash of TWA Flight 800 (Hagen, 
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2017). However, although these more limited conspiracy theories seem to stand in isolation, 
they often become drawn into global theories via the dynamics of conspiratorial inquiry. 
Postulating a conspiracy theory to explain an event typically raises more questions than it 
answers (If the conspiracy theory is true, how could a plot of such a scale not have a single 
leak? Who has the power to pull off such a crime?), and such questions are quickly answered 
by activists, global conspiracy theorists, and journalists (Byford, 2011), who often recycle 
ideas from existing theories. Thus, even standalone events, seen by conspiracy theorists 
through a wide-angle, unfalsifiable explanatory lens, may be perceived as part of a much 
bigger pattern, and incorporated into an interconnected conspiracy-related worldview. 
 
Working definition of a conspiracy theory 
Based on the foregoing considerations, I define a conspiracy theory as an implausible 
explanation of significant social or political events that postulates powerful agents colluding 
in secret to achieve a malevolent goal, and that contradicts the official explanation made by 
the relevant epistemic authority.  
By restricting conspiracy theories to implausible explanations, I exclude cases such as 
corruption or bribery, which are plausible allegations of conspiracy; by restricting them to 
significant social and political events I ensure that the conspiracy is not seen as relevant to the 
individual alone (a characteristic of paranoia). In addition, limiting the definition to events 
caused by powerful agents excludes cases that lack clear intentionality (e.g., disappearance of 
ships in the Bermuda triangle), and requiring malevolent goals omits banal explanations for 
social events (e.g. board members always have to “agree”  on a course of action behind closed 
doors (i.e. conspire), which may adversely affect its competitors: “Netflix conspired to put 
Blockbuster out of business”). Finally, by requiring that conspiracy theories contradict the 
official claim made by the relevant epistemic authorities (e.g., the U.S. President’s 
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explanation of 9/11), it excludes accepted explanations (e.g., that members of Al Qaeda 
conspired to cause the air disasters that brought down the Twin Towers and targeted other 
high-profile U.S. structures).  
The definition offered here is both more refined and more conservative than what 
appears in the literature (e.g. “…explanations that refer to hidden groups working in secret to 
achieve sinister objectives”; Lantian et al., 2017, p.160), capturing the characteristics that are 
prototypical of conspiracy theories, while excluding most causal claims that lie outside the 
phenomena researchers seek to explain.  
 
Why study belief in conspiracy theories 
Conspiracy theories appear to be a ubiquitous sociocultural and historical 
phenomenon (e.g., Baer, 2013; Dieguez, Wagner-Egger & Gauvrit, 2016; Fassin, 2011; Liu, 
2015; Mancosu, Vassallo & Vezzoni, 2017; Mezran, 2016; Ortmann & Heathershaw, 2012; 
Radnitz, 2015; Swami, 2012). Conspiracy theory beliefs have been present at least since 
classical antiquity. For example, in the speeches of the Attic orators there are stories about 
plots against the public interest, the regime, or in international affairs (Roisman, 2006). 
Similarly, when the great fire of Rome devastated most of the city in 64 CE, a conspiracy 
theory spread, blaming emperor Nero for intentionally causing the fire (Maltiz, 2008).  
A uniquely modern feature of modern conspiracy theories, however, is that they are 
spread via the internet and, especially through social media applications, at a pace that is 
difficult (if not impossible) for the relevant epistemic authorities to curtail and control 
(Sharma, Yadav, Yadav & Ferdinand, 2017). Further, because conspiracy theorists usually 
form online communities, proponents are likely to perceive an overly strong public consensus 
for their beliefs, and to be exposed to confirming messages that further bolster their own ideas 
(Warner & Neville-Shepard, 2014). With popular online social platforms such as Google, 
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Facebook, and YouTube employing algorithms providing content to consumers similar to 
what they are already engaged with, their exposure to contrasting claims, and to plausible 
explanations of the same phenomena, is reduced.  
From an applied perspective, the popularity of conspiracy theories, and their tendency 
to spread online rapidly and unchecked, are not necessarily problematic in themselves. 
However, empirical studies have revealed negative social consequences of such beliefs, such 
as decreased intention to vaccinate one’s (fictitious) child (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a), lowered 
willingness to limit one’s carbon footprint (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b), reduced intention to 
engage in politics (Butler, Koopman & Zimbardo, 1995), and decreased trust in the 
government (Einstein & Glick, 2015; Kim & Cao, 2016). Conspiracy theory endorsement has 
also been related to discriminatory behaviour (Bilewicz & Krzeminski, 2010; Bilewicz & 
Sedek, 2015, Bilewicz, Winiewski, Kofta & Wojcik, 2013). For example, in a study by 
Jolley, Meleady, and Douglas (2019) participants who were exposed to pro-conspiracy 
material about Jewish people (vs. anti-conspiracy materials) reported weaker willingness to 
vote for a Jewish political candidate, and in another study, conspiracy beliefs mediated the 
effect of relative deprivation on support for discriminatory policies against Jews, such as 
restrictions in buying land (Bilewicz & Sedek, 2015).   
Increasingly, the same phenomena have been observed outside of the laboratory, with 
individuals’ acts of violence traced to their uncritical acceptance of conspiracy theory beliefs. 
In one notorious recent case, for example, an individual held an employee at a pizza 
restaurant at gunpoint, falsely believing the establishment to be the centre of paedophilia ring 
tied to the American Democratic party  (“Pizzagate: gunman fires in restaurant at centre of 
conspiracy”, 2016).  At a group level, conspiracy theories may be even more insidious. When 
believed or endorsed by those in power, such theories can produce flawed public policies, as 
was the case with South African President Thabo Mbeki, whose belief that HIV does not 
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cause AIDS led him to deny antiretrovirals to pregnant HIV-positive women using public 
health services (Nattrass, 2007). Even without endorsing them privately, those in power might 
advocate and manipulate their followers with conspiracy theories (Nefes, 2017), directing the 
public attention towards imaginary enemies and away from genuine issues of concern (Heins, 
2007), a strategy, Gibson (2018) writes, paved the way for Trump’s presidency in 2016. 
Believing that the enemy is conspiring for world domination may lead people to adopt 
“defensive-aggressive” tactics and goals, exacerbating conflicts (Pipes, 1997) and in extreme 
cases triggering persecution or even genocide (Behringer, 2004; Cohn, 1967; Fekete, 2011; 
Uenal, 2016; Winiewski, Soral & Bilewicz, 2015).  
Further, mere exposure to conspiracy theories may increase their endorsement (Banas 
& Miller, 2013) and/or undermine the official version of events (Mulligan & Habel, 2013; 
Raab, Auer, Ortlieb & Carbon, 2013), even without participants being aware of their effects 
(Douglas & Sutton, 2008). Arguably, even the most outlandish, and therefore seemingly 
innocuous, conspiracy theories, such as that government officials are actually reptilian aliens 
(Lewis & Kahn, 2005), are potentially dangerous, in that they might prime participants to 
think in conspiratorial terms, lower their standards of evidence, or serve as “gateway” 
conspiracy theories that ultimately connect with the broader, darker conspiracy theory culture, 
for example by introducing anti-Semitic authors to new generations (Byford, 2011; 
Robertson, 2013).  
Thus, given the wide appeal of conspiracy theories and their possible negative 
consequences, it is important to establish the psychological mechanisms that do (or do not) 
underpin such beliefs. From a practical or applied perspective, this empirical approach may 





The Psychology of Conspiracy Theory Beliefs 
According to the functionalist perspective (Boden, Barenbaum, & Gross, 2016; 
Cummins, 1975, Wright, 1973), people are motivated to hold beliefs that serve particular 
functions. For example, belief in supernatural agents may stem, in part, from a universal drive 
to avoid death anxiety (Norenzayan, & Hansen, 2006), or to view the world as a just place 
(Lerner, 1980). Similarly, research on conspiracy theory beliefs has pointed to several such 
functions, linked to a suite of motives which Douglas, Sutton and Cichocka (2017, see also 
Douglas, Sutton & Cichocka, 2019) have broadly classified into three categories: epistemic, 
existential and social.   
 
Epistemic motives  
In the broadest functionalist terms, a conspiracy theory may stem from the need to 
understand the world. For example, attribution theory (Heider, 1958) suggests that people 
search for causal explanations, especially of negative and/or unexpected events (Wong & 
Weiner, 1981).  A conspiracy theory, with its inherent unfalsifiability (Brotherton, 2015; 
Keeley, 1999; Byford, 2011; Uscinski & Parent, 2014), is therefore perfectly suited to satisfy 
this causal explanatory drive. Consistent with the epistemic account, people who are high in 
cognitive closure, for whom a desire for a definitive answer, even an implausible one, is 
preferred to ambiguity (Kruglanski, 1990 a,b), are particularly likely to endorse conspiracy 
theories when the conspiracy theories are salient and no official explanation is available 
(Marchlewska, Cichocka, & Kossowska, 2018). Moreover, a recent study by van Prooijen, 
Douglas and de Inocencio (2018) revealed a relationship between adherence to conspiracy 
beliefs and proneness towards pattern perception, suggesting a tendency for conspiracy theory 




Conspiracy theories may also satisfy social motives. For example, there are some 
indications that conspiracy beliefs are endorsed to fulfil the need to feel unique or to be seen 
as having access to privileged information (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017; Lantian et al., 2017). 
Conspiracy theories may also be endorsed in an attempt to feel positive about one’s ingroup. 
For example, societally marginalized groups such as ethnic minorities (Bogart & Thorburn 
2005; Crocker, Luthanen, Broadnax & Blaine, 1999, van Prooijen, Staman & Krouwel, 2018; 
Simmons & Parsons,  2005), as well as individuals with low social status (Uscinski & Parent, 
2014), endorse conspiracy theories to a higher degree, perhaps as an attempt to narratively 
frame the ingroup as competent but sabotaged by a hostile outgroup. The need for 
belongingness has also been related to conspiracy beliefs (Graeupner & Coman, 2017; van 
Prooijen 2016). Relatedly, collective narcissists, who are hypervigilant to any indicators of 
disrespect or insult against the in-group (Grzesiak-Feldman 2015), may endorse conspiracy 
theories to attenuate their perception that the in-group is under threat from malevolent outside 
forces seeking to tear their tight-knit community apart (see Golec de Zavala & Federico, 
2018).   
 
Existential motives 
In addition to serving important epistemological and social functions, causal 
explanations also help people feel safe and secure by providing them with the feeling that 
things that happen in the social environment are controllable. According to Douglas et al.’s 
(2017), conspiracy theories make people feel safer by identifying the conspirators and the 
threats they pose (Bost & Prunier, 2013). In support of this argument, anxiety has been shown 
to be positively correlated with conspiracy theory endorsement (see Grzesiak-Feldman, 
2013). Conspiracy theory beliefs are also associated with  weaker socio-political control 
(Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah,  & Imhoff, 2013), greater anomie (Abalakina-Paap, 
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Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; Goertzel, 1994), greater death anxiety (Newheiser, Farias, 
& Tausch, 2011) and lower perceived personal control (Sullivan, Landau & Rothschild, 
2010). Such findings suggest that conspiracy theories may, at least in part, act as a buffer 
against existential threats.  
Relatedly, compensatory control theory (Laurin, Kay, & Moscovitch, 2008; Kay, 
Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008), a theoretical framework highlighted in this thesis, 
holds that when people lack instrumental control, they may believe in conspiracy theories in 
an attempt to restore the view that the world is ordered and predictable (Kay & Eibach, 2013; 
Kay, Sullivan, & Landau, 2015).  In the present thesis, I systematically investigate the 
possibility that conspiracy beliefs can be understood, in part, as an effort at compensatory 
control.   
 
Compensatory control theory 
According to compensatory control theory, having a sense of control satiates a higher 
order need to perceive the world as structured and ordered (Kay & Sullivan, 2013). If 
individuals believe that their experiences are the result of their own actions, they are more 
likely to interpret their environment as ordered and manageable.  
Although the need to believe in a nonrandom, orderly world is a chronic motivation 
(Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Landau, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Martens, 
2006), people do not always exert control, or perceive that they have it. Indeed, in some cases 
people may prefer not to have control (e.g., Burger & Cooper, 1979; Iyengar & Lepper, 1999; 
Ji, Peng & Nisbet, 2000; Wohl & Enzle, 2003). For example, if a person is concerned about 
their self-presentation, they may avoid leadership roles or be reluctant to take on 
responsibility for the performance of the group (Burger, 1989). Likewise, those who believe 
they are not good at a task will not be motivated to see themselves as effective agents who 
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can complete it (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Furthermore, socioeconomic status correlates with 
a sense of personal control (Kraus, Piff, & Keltner 2009), and some impoverished 
communities may be chronically deprived of the feeling of personal agency. Thus, although 
having a sense of control is ostensibly vital for people’s well-being, people vary in their 
control beliefs, and regularly experience a lack of control and feelings of helplessness. When 
the drive for maintaining personal control is frustrated, the world cannot be easily represented 
as an ordered, predictable place. How do people then manage to satisfy the need for a 
structured environment if their own causal role in it is unstable?  
According to compensatory control theory, although a sense of personal control is the 
primary mechanism by which our view of the world as an organized, non-random place is 
maintained, there are other means of achieving this state of explanatory homeostasis. 
Specifically, compensatory control theory posits a cognitive substitutability between feelings 
of internal and external control. That is, when personal agency is left wanting, people 
nevertheless imbue the world with order and structure by relying on external systems. 
Believing that such outside forces are responsible for events beyond the self’s control enables 
the individual to satisfy their higher-order need for structure and non-randomness, by 
providing the sense that “someone is in control”.  
Much research has confirmed the general hypotheses generated from compensatory 
control theory. For example, when personal control is experimentally threatened, participants 
are more likely to believe in a controlling God vs. a “creator” God (Kay et al., 2008; Kay, 
Shepherd, Blatz, Chua, & Galinsky, 2010), to believe in precognition (Greenaway, Louis, & 
Hornsey, 2013), to perceive patterns in noisy images (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), to show 
support for the government (Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008), and to prefer 
structured scientific theories (e.g., to prefer the idea that moral development is staged rather 
than a continuum; Rutjens, van Harreveld, van der Pligt, Kreemers, & Noordewier, 2013).  
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Although this theoretical framework has been applied to conspiracy theory beliefs 
(e.g. Kay & Eibach, 2013; Kay, Sullivan & Landau, 2015), it is not clear whether such beliefs 
should be an effective means of restoring control. For example, as will be argued in Chapter 
3, the theory states that people seek to optimize order, not to maximize it, and it could be 
argued that conspiracy theories provide “too much” order and structure by accounting for 
errant data, connecting seemingly unconnected events and leaving nothing unexplained 
(Clarke, 2002; Keeley, 1999). Further, even if conspiracy theories represent an effective 
means of restoring order and structure, they would seem, on their face, a means of last resort. 
While compensatory control theory does not require that sources of control or meaning be 
benevolent, people theoretically favour control systems that are both “culturally accessible” 
and  “socially acceptable” (Kay et al., 2008; Kay & Sullivan, 2013). In most—if not all—
conspiracy theories, however, the alleged conspirators are malevolent (van Prooijen, 2018), 
thus making them poor candidates for compensatory processes when numerous effective and 
socially sanctioned alternatives exist (Kay, Gaucher, Mcgregor & Nash, 2010; Kay, Gaucher, 
Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008; Kay, Whitson, Gaucher & Galinsky, 2009; Landau, Kay & 
Whitson, 2015). Complicating matters further, as argued in Chapter 3, “belief in conspiracy 
theories,” is not an easily defined construct, and the validity of some attempts to 
operationalize it is questionable.   
The goal of this thesis, therefore, is to revisit the causal relationship between control 
and conspiracy beliefs, via an analysis of existing evidence, the development and validation 
of a new measure of conspiracy ideation, and a series of novel laboratory and field studies. 
The results have the potential not only to inform and broaden the scope of compensatory 





The structure of the thesis and rationale for studies.  
Before examining the role of compensatory control in conspiracy beliefs I required an 
appropriate and validated measure of the latter. Currently, researchers usually measure 
conspiracy beliefs in one of two general ways: as endorsement of generic, content-free beliefs 
about the world; or as endorsement of specific conspiracy theories. However, as I argue in the 
next chapter, existing instruments have a number of shortcomings, including content validity 
issues and dubious factor structures. Thus, as a first step in the research programme, I sought 
to develop in Chapter 2 a validated measure of generic conspiracy beliefs: the Conspiracy 
Mentality Scale (CMS; Stojanov & Halberstadt, 2019). Next, in Chapter 3, I present a series 
of studies to test the hypothesis that lack of control increases conspiracy beliefs as measured 
on the CMS, as well as on other measures of conspiracy beliefs to establish the robustness of 
the findings.  
To foreshadow, the studies in Chapter 3 revealed little evidence for the compensatory 
control hypothesis. Consequently, I return in Chapter 4 to the literature to provide a 
systematic meta-analysis of all experimental manipulations, published or unpublished, of 
control, in order to assess the robustness of my findings in the context of the entire literature. 
The results from the meta-analysis mainly supported the conclusion in Chapter 2: there is 
little evidence for the control – conspiracy beliefs link, at least as these constructs are 
manipulated and measured in the laboratory. 
In Chapter 5, I consider the possibility that control threats are inherently difficult to 
invoke (or observe) under laboratory conditions. Therefore, in this chapter, I present a novel 
pair of naturalistic studies in which I compared participants’ conspiracy beliefs during periods 
of political crisis or natural disaster, when sense of control should be low (Afifi, Afifi, & 
Merrill, 2014), to periods when  their control was not threatened (or had been restored). The 
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results provided some evidence that the control-threatening event caused belief in at least a 
subset of conspiracy beliefs.  
Finally, in Chapter 6, I integrate the findings from Chapter 2-5 and tentatively 
conclude that perceived lack of control may indeed affect conspiracy beliefs, but only under 
certain conditions, such as when one experiences intense threat in the presence conspiracy 
claims that relate directly to it. This domain specificity is discussed in terms of its 
implications for compensatory control theory, and for future research opportunities. Finally, I 
speculate about the possibilities for reducing conspiracy beliefs, such as by promoting faith in 
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Belief in conspiracy theories, generally considered to be a unidimensional construct, is 
associated with negative outcomes. The existing measures of conspiracy theory beliefs have 
number of shortcomings. We present the development of a novel measure of the tendency to 
believe in conspiracy theories and report the discovery of a second factor that reflects rational 
skepticism. In Study 1(N=500) we use item response theory to devise the final items. In Study 
2 (N=202) we demonstrate the predictive validity of the two factors for different types of 
conspiracies. In Study 3 (N=308) we demonstrate convergent/divergent validity. In study 4 
(N= 800) we demonstrate construct validity in three countries. Implications for the concept of 
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A powerful secret elite with a sinister agenda is ruling the world. Billionaires have the 
presidents of the United States on their payroll so that they do exactly what they want them 
to. Global warming is made up and is a way to channel money to scientists.  Such claims of 
powerful groups working together in secret, which a significant minority of people believe, 
are prototypical examples of “conspiracy theories.” 
Studying conspiracy theory beliefs is important, among other reasons, because people 
act on them, sometimes with tragic consequences. For example, people who were exposed to 
the conspiracy theory that “Big Pharma” produces harmful vaccines were less likely to 
express intention to vaccinate their children (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a), and those who were 
made to believe that global warming is a hoax were less willing to reduce their carbon 
footprint (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b). Similarly, belief in the secret Islamization of Europe has 
been cited as partial motivation for Breivik’s massacre in Norway (e.g. Fekete, 2011; Uenal, 
2016), and the belief in authorities conspiring to remove federal rights has been cited as a 
reason for the Oklahoma bombing (e.g. Knight, 2000).  
Studying conspiracy theory beliefs is also important from a theoretical perspective. In 
particular, given the wide appeal of conspiracy theories (e.g. Jensen, 2013, 2016) it is 
important to examine what psychological function they may serve. Although there is not yet 
consensus on what those functions are – some studies suggest that fulfilling the need for 
uniqueness (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017; Lantian, Muller, Nurra & Douglas, 2017) or coping 
with existential threat (Newheiser, Farias & Tausch, 2011) are important factors – it is clear 
that understanding why people gravitate to conspiracy theories is a key to reducing their 
harm, and to a broader understanding human motivation.  
However, not all conspiracy claims are conspiracy theories, and not all have the same 
potential for societal harm, or for psychological insight. Indeed, many conspiracy claims, 
such as allegations of bribery among public officials, are mundane and widely accepted as 
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plausible (and illegal). Even some extreme claims, such as the Watergate conspiracy, are true, 
and their acceptance unremarkable. Thus, some operational definitions of “conspiracy theory” 
used in the literature, such as Dentith’s (2014)  – “any explanation of an event that cites the 
existence of a conspiracy as a salient cause” (p. 30) – are too broad, covering both theories of 
interest (e.g., that the 9/11 terror attacks were orchestrated by the United States Government) 
and theories widely accepted as true and of no particular psychological import (that 9/11 was 
carried out by Al Qaeda operatives).  Our interest is consequently in the former. Specifically, 
we define conspiracy theories as implausible explanations of significant social or political 
events that postulate powerful agents working together in secret to achieve a malevolent goal 
which often contradict the official explanations made by the relevant epistemic authority, and 
which are embedded into a particular tradition of explanation (Brotherton, 2013; Byford, 
2011; McCauley & Jacques, 1979; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009; Uscinski & Parent, 2014).      
However, to study a construct, one first must quantify it, and existing measures have 
been inadequate for the task, due to problems with factor and content validity. This paper 
describes the development of a new scale to measure “conspiracy mentality” as an underlying 
trait that predicts belief in specific conspiracy theories as we have defined them, and that is 
distinct from “healthy scepticism,” which predicts qualitatively different kinds of 
conspiracies. 
Conspiracy theory beliefs as a distinct construct 
Conspiracy theories can be theoretically and empirically distinguished from other, 
superficially similar beliefs that have received attention in the literature. For example, the 
similarity of conspiracy beliefs and paranoid ideation led Hofstadter (1966) to identify a 
“paranoid style in American politics”, and Robins and Post (1997) to discuss conspiracy 
theories in term of “political paranoia”. However, unlike paranoia, where the individual feels 
personally persecuted and interprets events as personally threatening (Feningstein & Vanable, 
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1992), conspiracy beliefs have an intergroup dimension (Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec de 
Zavala & Olechowski, 2015; 2016; Duran, Nicholson & Dale, 2017; Leone, Giacomantonio 
& Lauriola, 2017; Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2015; van Prooijen & van Lange, 2014). The 
paranoid person believes “they are out to get me”; the conspiracy theorist believes “they are 
out to get us.” Moreover, conspiracy theories, but not paranoia, can be considered a form of 
political attitude (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014). Furthermore, paranoia is related to suspicion of 
people in general, while conspiracy beliefs to suspicion of powerful others (Imhoff & 
Lamberty, 2018). In addition, as an empirical matter, studies have found only low to 
moderate correlations between these two constructs (Brotherton & Eser, 2015; Darwin, Neave 
& Holmes, 2011; Wilson & Rose, 2014).  
Likewise, although both conspiracy theories and paranormal beliefs involve 
unsubstantiated and counter-normative belief systems, there are important differences 
between the two. For example, while conspiracy theories usually arise as a response to a 
conventional explanation, paranormal beliefs arise as a result of lack of conventional 
explanations (Wood, 2017). Furthermore, the two types of beliefs are associated with 
different cognitive biases; for example the conjunction fallacy predicts conspiracy beliefs, 
while perception of randomness predicts paranormal beliefs (Dagnall, Denovan, Drinkwater, 
Parker & Clough, 2017). And while paranormal beliefs are often considered a way to resolve 
ambiguity, conspiracy theorists tend to endorse multiple theories about the same 
phenomenon, thereby increasing uncertainty about any one of them (Wood, 2017).  As with 
paranoia, the correlation between conspiracy theories and paranormal beliefs is only moderate 
(Dagnall et al., 2017; Darwin et al., 2011; Drinkwater, Dagnall & Parker, 2012; Lobato, 
Mendoza, Sims & Chin, 2014; Swami et al., 2011). 
Finally, and more subtly, conspiracy theories differ from real conspiracies. For 
example, conspiracy theories are often linked to a single, all-encompassing plot that goes far 
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beyond the immediate evil being explained and is indeed seen as a moving force in history 
(Bale, 2007; Byford, 2011; Pipes, 1997).  The conspirators are not merely guilty of local 
wrongdoing, but also of causing societal problems or committing unimaginable evil deeds 
(Jane & Flemming, 2014).  A conspiracy theory portrays the conspirators as monolithic, 
faultless and sinister agents (Bale, 2007; Pipes, 1996; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009) whose 
goal is to “destroy a way of life” (Hofstadter, 1966 p.29). 
 In contrast, real conspiracies (e.g., bribery corruption), while often heinous, are 
typically limited in scope and revolve around a local issue (Bale, 2007). Furthermore, real 
conspiracies "involve banality and institutional disorganization" (Jane & Fleming, 2014 p.28) 
usually lacking in conspiracy theories. Moreover, the conspirators in real conspiracies are 
seen as human, with both positive and negative traits and complex, conflicting motives (Bale, 
2007; Uscinski & Parent, 2014).   
Previous measures of conspiracy theory beliefs 
As noted, one of the defining features of individuals who believe conspiracy theories 
is that they tend not to believe just one. Beliefs in conspiracy theories are interrelated (e.g. 
Goertzel, 1994), even if they are contradictory (Wood, Douglas & Sutton, 2012) or fictitious 
(Swami et al., 2011), which suggests that a common trait, which we might call conspiracy 
mentality (Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah & Imhoff, 2013), underlies beliefs in specific 
conspiracy theories.  
The first attempts to measure this general tendency to believe in conspiracy theories 
consisted simply of posing a variety of conspiracy theories and asking participants to indicate 
their agreement or disagreement with them (e.g. Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, 
Craig, Gregory, 1999; Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2010). There are problems 
with this approach, however. Although in general conspiracy beliefs are correlated, 
sometimes they are not (e.g. van Prooijen & Acker, 2015), and so the degree of belief 
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recorded by conspiracy theory lists depends on the particular conspiracy theories included. 
Relatedly, the content specificity of these measures may limit their generalizability to certain 
geographical regions and/or historical periods (Brotherton, French & Pickering, 2013; Bruder 
et al., 2013). For example, the allegation that the Smolensk crash (Cichocka et al., 2016) was 
a result of a Russian conspiracy might be the issue of choice for researchers conducting their 
study in Poland, but not much elsewhere. A third drawback of these scales is their 
transparency. Participants can immediately categorize most items as conspiracy theories, 
which many scholars have noted have negative connotations (Bjerg & Presskorn-Thygesen, 
2017; Coady, 2007a, 2007b; de Haven-Smith, 2010; de Haven- Smith & Witt, 2012) and are 
considered a source of stigma (Lantian et al., 2018). Thus, people will be motivated to 
distance themselves from conspiracy theories, resulting in socially desirable answers (but see 
Wood, 2016 for findings that the labelling a statement a conspiracy theory does not affect its 
perceived veracity). Finally, it is unclear to what extent these scales measure the generalized 
tendency to believe in conspiracy theories vs. belief in specific conspiracy theories. Belief in 
any specific conspiracy theory is mainly driven by the underlying tendency to believe in 
conspiracy theories, but there are other factors that may contribute, such as political ideology 
(Duran et al., 2017) or the need to feel unique (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017). Thus, asking 
about a belief in specific conspiracy theories may not be a good reflection of the underlying 
conspiracy mentality.  
Another approach to measuring conspiracy beliefs was recently suggested by Wood 
(2017). Instead of measuring beliefs in specific conspiracy theories, Wood (2017) proposed 
measuring the underlying suspiciousness of official stories, which could be adapted to 
measure belief in conspiracy theories regarding almost any topic. The questionnaire consists 
of generic statements with blanks to be filled in with specific topics by the researcher (e.g. 
The real truth about _____ is being kept from the public).  For example, both someone who 
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believes that Princess Diana was murdered by the MI6 and someone who believes that she 
was murdered by the Royal Family are likely to agree with this statement.  Thus, in this 
sense, Wood's scale is improvement upon previous scales as it reduces the chance that 
participants will be unfamiliar with a particular theory. However, the scale is nevertheless 
limited to measuring conspiracy thinking regarding particular events and may not be suitable 
for measuring conspiracy mentality per se.  
In an attempt to overcome the drawbacks of the content-specific scales, researchers 
have begun to develop measures of generic conspiracy beliefs, without tying the beliefs to 
any particular content. Currently, there are two such scales available - the Generic 
Conspiracist Beliefs scale (Brotherton et al., 2013) and the Conspiracy Mentality 
Questionnaire (Bruder et al., 2013). The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale is a 15-item 
instrument that measures beliefs in specific conspiracy theories framed as generic statements. 
For example, belief in the 9/11 conspiracy theory is assessed with the question, “The 
government permits or perpetrates acts of terrorism on its own soil, disguising its 
involvement.”  The scale includes five categories of items, which Brotherton et al. (2013) 
named government malfeasance, extra-terrestrial cover-up, malevolent global conspiracies, 
personal wellbeing and control of information, with each factor represented by three items. 
But despite its attempt to abstract conspiracy thinking from specific beliefs, the scale has 
shortcomings: its “generic” nature is belied by the existence of five content factors (whose 
validity has in any case been called into question; Swami et al., 2017), and by its explicit 
identification of the conspirators (e.g., “the government” or “scientists”). Furthermore, it is 
quite likely that participants see through the items’ generalized framing to map them onto 
salient current events.  
The second measure, the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire, is a five-item, 
theoretically unidimensional measure of the general tendency to believe in conspiracy 
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theories. Unlike the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale, its items are truly abstract statements 
that do not identify a conspirator as such (e.g., “….many very important things happen in the 
world, which the public is never informed about”). Nevertheless, this measure, too, has 
shortcomings. Swami et al. (2017) have criticized some of the items for reflecting “rational 
beliefs about the current state of the world” (p.22) rather than conspiracy mentality. Indeed, it 
is very likely that the items reflect not only belief in conspiracy theories but also broader, 
diffuse, rational suspiciousness as well. For example, the item “Politicians usually do not tell 
us the true motives for their decisions”, arguably measures the awareness that a lot of political 
negotiations take place behind closed doors, and that the outcome of these negotiations might 
be “spun” when presented to the public, and in this sense it represents rational suspicion that 
is more or less warranted. It may be argued that the scale is unidimensional because it 
consistently shows high reliability (e.g. Lantian, Muller, Nurra, Douglas, 2016; Leone, 
Giacomantonio, Williams & Michetti, 2018; Orosz, Krekó, Paskuj, Tóth-Király, Bőthe & 
Roland-Lévy, 2016; Swami et al., 2017;). However, reliability is not an indicator of the 
unidimensionality of a scale (Cortina, 1993; Schmitt, 1996; Sijtsma, 2009).  Indeed, using 
confirmatory factor analysis, Swami et al. (2017) did not find evidence that the items loaded 
on one factor as hypothesized.  With the items of this scale supposedly measuring a one 
dimensional construct, but in fact reflecting more than one dimenstion, the question of 
construct validity is brought into question.  
In sum, despite increasing interest in the nature of conspiracy theories and of the 
people who believe in them (e.g., Green & Douglas, 2018; Hagen, 2018; Imhoff & Lamberty, 
2018; Swami, Wais, Lay, Barron & Furnham, 2016), and gains in measurement validity 
notwithstanding, there still exists no validated measure of the general tendency to believe in 
conspiracies, abstracted from both the content of specific conspiracy theories and from the 
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rational scepticism that serve democracies well. This paper presents the development of such 
a scale.   
 
Study 1: Scale construction 
Method 
Participants. Five hundred American participants were recruited via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk; 187 males; 311 females; 2 “other”) and were paid 60 US cents for 
their participation. The mean age of the sample was M = 38.03 (range 18-75 years, SD = 
12.94). The education demographics were as follows: 2.6% did not have a degree, 36.4% had 
high school degree, 36.6% had bachelor's degree, 14.8% had master's degree , 3.2% had 
doctoral degree and 6.4% had "other" educational qualifications. The number of participants 
was based on Field’s (2009) recommendation for at least 300 participants for a factor 
analysis. Thirty-five participants who failed the attention check, and two additional 
participants who indicated that their data were not reliable, were excluded from the analyses.  
 
Item pool. In order to get as diverse aspects of the concept of “conspiracy theory” as 
possible, we asked an independent sample of 210 MTurk participants with a similar 
demographic profile to write their definition of conspiracy theory. Specifically, participants 
were told, “People have different ideas about what a conspiracy theory is. We are interested 
in your opinion. What is your definition of a conspiracy theory?” and were provided with text 
box to write their answer. There were no time or space constraints on their answers. 
These 210 definitions (for full list of the definitions see Electronic Supplementary 
Materials, ESM 1) were reduced to a set of 64 usable test items via the following process. 
Upon careful reading and paraphrasing, 113 potential scale items were derived from the 210 
definitions (e.g., “A belief that something ‘covert’ is happening behind the scenes and under 
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our noses” was converted to the item, “Something covert is happening behind the scenes and 
under our noses”.).  Next, we screened these 113 items to identify redundancy (e.g. Major 
events did not happen as they are believed to vs. Important events did not happen as they are 
generally believed), retaining only one version of each of redundant set, leaving 64 items in 
the initial item pool. The items covered all three characteristics of conspiracy theories 
postulated by Barkun (2003): the beliefs that nothing is as it seems, that everything is 
connected, and that nothing happens by chance.  
Procedure. The survey was presented in the online platform Qualtrics. After 
providing written informed consent, participants were given the following instructions:  
 
On the next pages you will find 652 beliefs about the state of affairs in the 
world. People agree or disagree to various extents with these beliefs. Indicate 
your agreement or disagreement with each statement on a 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. Do not overthink your answers; go with 
your initial hunches.   
 
The statements were presented in nine blocks, seven blocks consisting of seven items and two 
blocks consisting of eight items, including one item serving as an attention check (“Select 
strongly agree so that we are sure you are reading attentively”). The blocks, and the 
statements within blocks, were presented randomly. Finally, before being debriefed, 
participants were asked to assess the quality of their data with the following question “Did 




2 The 64 conspiracy theory definitions and one attention check question. 
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Factor analysis. The 64 items were subjected to Principal Component Analysis. The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy verified that the 64 items had adequate 
common variance for factor analysis, KMO=0.984 and all KMO values for individual items 
were >0.963, above the acceptable limit of 0.5 (Field, 2009). A preliminary analysis was run 
to explore the data with the default settings in SPSS v. 24 for extraction of factors with 
eigenvalues > 1. Based on this criterion five factors, explaining 66.89% of the variance, were 
extracted. Visual inspection of the scree plot revealed an “elbow” between the second and 
third factors, suggesting a two-factor solution. Thus, we conducted parallel analysis (Horn, 
1965) using Stata and the package Fapara (Ender, n.d.), which confirmed that two factors 
should be retained (Figure 1.).  Thus, we re-ran the analysis again, this time forcing a 2-factor 
solution and applying an oblimin rotation (=0) to improve the interpretability of the factors. 
The first factor, which accounted for 1.5 times more variance than the second, was most 
heavily influenced by items that reflected beliefs about a malevolent agent responsible for 
negative events (see Table 1). Thus, we named this factor conspiracy theory ideation, as it 
reflects the belief that a powerful entity lies behind significant social or political events and 
that the conventional (official) truth is not the “real” truth.   The second factor, in contrast, 
appeared to reflect skeptical beliefs about the limits of human knowledge, such as the fact 
that humans can know things only indirectly, and a more general, and arguably more rational 
suspicion. Thus, we named this factor skepticism.    
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Table 1. The Pattern Matrix of Factor Loadings for the two factors extracted with Principle Component Analysis 
 Component 
1 2 
1. A secret, covert group is responsible for tragic events. .979 -.183 
2. The circumstances we are in are a result of a covert plan. .976 -.213 
3. There is an unknown entity exerting secret control over events. .961 -.243 
4. When one digs deep enough it is obvious that behind many events there is a conspiracy. .956 -.127 
5. Many events are a result of a plot by covert groups. .949 -.114 
6. The truth is known only to a secret powerful group that actively disseminates false information or misleads the 
public. 
.931 -.091 
7. There are forces at work we don’t understand that are trying to get us. .920 -.227 
8. A small group of people are influencing the events taking place in the world and are trying to hide it. .845 .000 
9. Many events can be explained as an “inside job” that few people know about. .842 -.004 
10. The government or covert organizations are responsible for events that are unusual or unexplained. .833 -.011 
11. Behind many events, there is a plan to pull something off and attempt to make it look like something else. .803 .087 
12. The alternative explanations for important societal events are closer to the truth than the official story. .803 -.070 
13. Many so called “coincidences” are in fact clues as to how things really happened. .797 -.013 
14. The public is misled in order to hide great evil. .787 .070 
15. Powerful entities are controlling matters behind the scenes. .758 .049 
16. The outcomes of medical, political and social events are manipulated and controlled. .752 .105 
17. Events throughout history are carefully planned and orchestrated by individuals for their own betterment. .751 .014 
18. A secret of great magnitude is being kept from the public. .750 .128 
19. There is secret planning and manipulation going on to make bad things happen. .739 .078 
20. Powerful agents work together to suppress the truth about what really happens. .737 .170 
21. Many situations or events can be explained by illegal or harmful acts by the government or other powerful 
people. 
.734 .076 
22. Some things that everyone accepts as true are in fact hoaxes created by people in power. .722 .087 
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23. Covert, influential individuals or organizations are responsible for many circumstances and events. .720 .179 
24. We are being made to believe something other than reality. .719 .142 
25. The truth regarding important events is available only to a few. .717 .120 
26. Individuals or organizations are secretly operating to exert power over society on a large scale. .695 .170 
27. If one digs deep enough, one will see that the commonly believed truth is wrong. .681 .178 
28. Important events did not happen as they are generally believed. .679 .150 
29. It is impossible that important events happen purely by chance. .659 -.198 
30. Events can easily be explained by seeing how seemingly unrelated facts and coincidences are in fact linked 
together. 
.651 .000 
31. Many controversial events involve some kind of cover up. .647 .239 
32. The true facts about important events are being kept secret. .643 .277 
33. Oftentimes, the official explanations for events are cover-ups to hide the true cause of the event. .637 .282 
34. Many illegal acts with publicly known consequences are a result of cooperation between people out of public view. .632 .167 
35. Events on the news may not have actually happened. .627 .058 
36. Events are portrayed to the public as one thing, when those in power know that the truth is something else entirely. .610 .280 
37. Many tragic events have hidden causes behind them. .606 .236 
38. Something secretive is happening right under our noses. .581 .317 
39. The mainstream beliefs about history are wrong. .567 .140 
40. Some events happen differently from the way scientists claim. .522 .106 
41. The government is trying to control and manipulate people. .512 .357 
42. People are presented with incorrect explanations for the happenings in the world. .503 .404 
43. There are usually alternative explanations of why things happened. .500 .224 
44. The truth is covered up by the authorities. .497 .421 
45. Information is being suppressed for the benefit of a few. .489 .346 
46. The real truth about many events differs from what we think is the truth. .486 .395 
47. The truth differs from what the media tries to get us to believe. .486 .280 
48. Important events happen as a result of more than just coincidences. .397 .370 
49. All important events have some reason behind them. .360 .074 
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50. Many things happen without the public’s knowledge. -.072 .839 
51. People try to manipulate the facts in order to suit their own agenda and motives. -.101 .783 
52. There are people who don’t want the truth to come out. .035 .756 
53. Information is being hidden from the public. .144 .738 
54. Some things are not as they seem. .057 .701 
55. Some events did not actually transpire in the way the history books tell us. .056 .676 
56. People will do crazy things to cover up the truth. .089 .648 
57. People are often misled into believing something that isn’t true. .258 .579 
58. The government secretly conducts illegal activities. .277 .516 
59. In order to find out what really happened one has to peel back the many layers of the story. .255 .506 
60. Throughout history, fake public narratives have been used as explanations to hide the truth. .313 .490 
61. Powerful entities like government and corporations are keeping the truth from the public for self-serving purposes. .406 .475 
62. The public is being overtly lied to. .415 .474 
63. Facts and events are often not as they are reported. .342 .467 
64. Harmful events are being carried out by the government. .351 .429 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. Items are sorted based on 










 Item response theory analysis. To construct a scale that would be informative 
across the widest possible range of  (the underlying psychological construct), we used the 
graded response model, suitable for polytomous (more than two response options) Likert type 
questions (Samejima, 1969) to examine the information function for each item, for each 
factor separately.  Only the items that loaded distinctly on their respective factors (i.e., 
greater than 0.3 on conspiracy theory ideation and less than 0.1 on skepticism, and vice versa 
- indicated in bold in Table 1) were analysed in IRTPRO, in order to isolate the factors as 
clearly as possible.  
Analysis of the conspiracy theory ideation subscale. None of the items exhibited 
local dependence (i.e., no relationship between the items existed once the underlying 
subconstruct was accounted for as evidenced by all LD 2 <10 (Cai, Thissen, & du Toit, 
2017). The M2 goodness of fit statistic (Cai, Maydeu- Olivares, Coffman, & Thissen, 2006; 
Maydeu-Olivares & Joe, 2005, 2006;) indicated some lack of fit ( M2=43.41, df=24, 
p=0.0091), however as RMSEA indicated good fit (RMSEA=0.04), the M2 value may be due 
to a limited amount of model error inherent in any model (Cai et al., 2017). 
However, as evidenced by the S-2  item-fit statistic (Orlando, & Thissen,  2000, 
2003) one item demonstrated misfit at p<0.05 after controlling for type 1 error with the 
Benjamini-Hochberg adjustment (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). After dropping this item, all 
items fitted the model, no item exhibited local dependence (all LD 2 <10) and the model had 
good fit (M2=26.97, df=15, p=0.02, RMSEA=0.04).  
Next, we examined the item information function values to select the items that would 
comprise the final subscale.  Because this full subscale provided the least information at the 
low and high end of the underlying construct (see Table 2), in the selection process we gave 
priority to items that provided high information at the ends: at least 0.3 at both 2.8SD of .  
Based on these criteria items #10, 12, 13, 17, 21, 22, 30 and 35 were selected. Item 30 
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however, provided low information overall and its content was substantially overlapping with 
the content of item 13. Thus, the final subscale consisted of seven items (see Table 1 in ESM 
3). 
 
Analysis of the skepticism subscale. No pair of items exhibited local dependence as 
evidenced by all the LD 2 <10 . In addition, the model was good fit for the data 
(RMSEA=0.04). After the Benjamini-Hochberg adjustment was applied item 55 exhibited 
model misfit as evidenced by the S-2 . Thus, the procedure was run again. The revised 
model exhibited good fit (M2=363.212, df=212, p=0.0001, RMSEA=0.04), and as the four 
items exhibited good fit it was decided to retain them all. Although the range of 
discrimination for this subscale is far from perfect (see Table 3), it should be noted that the 
nature of this dimension may be such that it may not be possible to make fine distinction at 
the high level of the dimension.  
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Table 2. Item Information Function Values at 15 Values of θ from -2.8 to 2.8   for conspiracy theory ideation 
 
    θ 
Item #  -2.8 -2.4 -2.0 -1.6 -1.2 -0.8 -0.4 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8 
Item 6  0.03 0.12 0.51 1.76 3.53 3.88 4.16 4.23 3.92 3.90 3.89 3.34 1.49 0.42 0.10 
Item 8  0.11 0.42 1.34 2.84 3.33 3.52 3.64 3.58 3.29 3.35 3.23 2.78 1.29 0.39 0.11 
Item 9  0.23 0.71 1.75 2.64 2.70 2.95 3.05 3.00 2.84 2.82 2.68 2.56 1.54 0.59 0.19 
Item 10  0.36 1.00 2.06 2.52 2.56 2.76 2.81 2.79 2.64 2.63 2.60 2.56 1.96 0.92 0.32 
Item 11  0.20 0.77 2.24 3.43 3.34 3.77 3.90 3.89 3.66 3.70 3.59 2.76 1.09 0.30 0.07 
Item 12  0.52 0.94 1.33 1.48 1.53 1.57 1.56 1.54 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.47 1.39 1.08 0.63 
Item 13  0.45 0.93 1.46 1.67 1.73 1.83 1.87 1.84 1.76 1.74 1.70 1.67 1.51 1.00 0.50 
Item 14  0.22 0.62 1.43 2.19 2.33 2.46 2.55 2.59 2.50 2.48 2.44 2.20 1.37 0.58 0.20 
Item 15  0.46 1.06 1.79 2.10 2.18 2.25 2.26 2.12 2.09 2.13 2.07 1.64 0.89 0.37 0.13 
Item 17  0.46 0.92 1.40 1.58 1.62 1.71 1.76 1.76 1.69 1.66 1.68 1.64 1.43 0.94 0.47 
Item 19  0.21 0.54 1.17 1.81 2.00 2.10 2.20 2.20 2.16 2.12 2.07 1.97 1.48 0.77 0.31 
Item 21  0.56 1.23 1.90 2.04 2.14 2.27 2.26 2.22 2.15 2.16 2.09 2.04 1.58 0.82 0.33 
Item 22  0.30 0.69 1.28 1.73 1.88 1.94 1.96 1.92 1.87 1.84 1.77 1.72 1.36 0.77 0.34 
Item 30  0.72 0.84 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.86 0.74 0.53 
Item 35  0.33 0.54 0.76 0.91 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.84 0.63 0.40 
Item 49  0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.19 
                                  
Test Information: 6.38 12.57 22.55 30.87 34.01 36.16 37.15 36.89 35.29 35.21 34.48 31.42 21.29 11.51 5.84 
Expected s.e.: 0.40 0.28 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.29 0.41 
 





Table 3. Item Information Function Values f at 15 Values of θ from -2.8 to 2.8  for skepticism 
 
  θ 
Item #  -2.8 -2.4 -2.0 -1.6 -1.2 -0.8 -0.4 -0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8 
Item 50  1.91 2.03 2.08 2.08 1.96 1.89 1.85 1.72 1.78 1.53 0.89 0.39 0.15 0.06 0.02 
Item 52  1.68 2.06 2.15 2.12 1.95 1.80 1.90 1.90 1.87 1.56 0.89 0.39 0.15 0.05 0.02 
Item 54  1.68 2.11 2.19 2.13 1.88 1.77 1.88 1.76 1.77 1.75 1.20 0.57 0.23 0.08 0.03 
Item 56  1.53 1.70 1.73 1.71 1.62 1.52 1.55 1.52 1.50 1.41 1.00 0.54 0.24 0.10 0.04 
    
               
Test Information 7.78 8.89 9.14 9.05 8.42 7.98 8.18 7.90 7.92 7.25 4.99 2.90 1.77 1.30 1.11 
Expected SE 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.45 0.59 0.75 0.88 0.95 





We set out to develop a scale for measuring conspiracy mentality, a general approach to the 
world in which significant social or political events are explained as the workings of a 
powerful agents with malevolent goal, and the official truth is regarded as an illusion. By 
factor analyzing a large set of spontaneously generated descriptions of conspiracy theories, 
we abstracted one primary factor that appears to capture this construct. A second factor also 
emerged, which appeared to tap into a more rational or healthy skepticism about the world. 
 Studies 2 and 3 aim to distinguish the two dimensions empirically and to provide data 
on their validity.  In particular, if conspiracy theory ideation is distinct from skepticism, the 
two dimensions should predict beliefs in qualitatively different kinds of claims (once shared 
variance is accounted for), with the former associated with traditional conspiracy theories, 
and the latter with plausible allegations (e.g., of bribery or corruption). 
Study 2. Predictive validity and confirmatory factor analysis 
Method 
Participants. Two hundred and two American MTurk participants filled an online 
survey in exchange for 50 US cents. Here and throughout the thesis none of the participants 
have taken part in previous studies reported in the thesis, unless explicitly stated. The mean 
age of the sample was 34.75, (SD=11.92; range 19 – 70 years). The other demographics were 
as follows: 108 said they were female, 93 male, 1 other; 2% did not have a degree, 31.2% had 
high school degree, 45% had bachelor's degree, 10.4% had master's degree, 3.5% had 
doctoral degree and 7.9% reported "other" as their highest degree. To detect a significant 
slope of B=0.2 with 80% power at alpha 0.05 we needed 191 participants. We slightly over 




Stimulus development. The conspiracy theories used in this study were developed in 
two phases. In the first phase 210 MTurk participants were asked to write five conspiracy 
theories they have read or heard about, from which we extracted 112 unique conspiracy 
theories. In the second phase these 112 conspiracy theories were given to a new sample of 
MTurk participants (N=233) who were asked to rate each theory in terms of "how good an 
example" it was of a conspiracy theory, using a 9 point scale.  The 15 items with the highest 
prototypicality ratings were planned to be included as stimuli, however due to an 
administrative error when creating the survey the 15th conspiracy theory was accidentally 
replaced by another (ranked 36th).  We included this conspiracy theory in all further analysis. 
The mean prototypicality rating for these fifteen statements was 6.36.  
The corruption and bribery scenarios were taken and adapted from the United States 
Internal Revenue Service’s Examples of Public Corruption Investigations for the fiscal year 
2016 and 2015 (Internal Revenue Service, 2017a, Internal Revenue Service, 2017b). By 
choosing scenarios of bribery and corruption we ensured that the statements in question 
would involve conspiracy by definition. The complete list of statements used is given in 
Electronic Supplementary Materials 2. 
For the conspiracy theories and corruption and bribery scenarios the participants 
needed to indicate how likely each is on a 7 – point scale (1=Very unlikely, 7= Very likely). 
Procedure. Participants completed an online questionnaire in Qualtrics in return for a 
payment of US$0.50. The conspiracy theory and corruptions statements were presented in 
one block in randomized order. The conspiracy mentality scale developed in Study 1 was 
presented in a separate block, with the order of presentation of the two blocks 
counterbalanced. Within each block there was one attention check question. 
Results and Discussion 
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Seventeen participants failed one or both of the attention check questions, leaving 185 
participants for analysis.  
Confirmatory factor analysis. Using AMOS v. 23 and the maximum likelihood 
method we run confirmatory factor analysis for the scale, allowing the two factors to 
correlate. All items loaded on the respective factors as hypothesized (see Table 1 in ESM 3). 
In addition, the two-dimensional model was good fit for the data (χ2/df =1.87, CFI=0.972, 
TLI= 0.964, RMSEA=0.069, PCLOSE=0.092). 
Predictive validity. An exploratory factor analysis of the conspiracy theories and the 
corruption cases initially indicated the presence of four factors, but parallel analysis 
suggested only two. Furthermore, the two factor solution showed distinct loadings for the 
conspiracy theory statements on one factor and corruption cases on the other (reliability 
coefficients = .93 and .94 respectively). Thus, we decided to analyze a composite (average) 
score for both types of statements. In addition, we ran separate regressions to test whether the 
pattern of results we hypothesized would hold even for individual items.  
Results for the composite score as dependent variable. When conspiracy theory 
ideation and skepticism were simultaneously entered as predictors and the composite score 
for the conspiracy theories as dependent variable, the model explained 67% of the variance. 
However only conspiracy theory ideation was significant predictor (B=0.832, SE=0.055, p 
<0.0001); skepticism was not (B=0.051, SE=0.076, p = 0.50).  
When the analysis was repeated with the composite score for the corruption cases 
instead of the conspiracy theories as a dependent variable, the opposite pattern emerged. The 
model could explain 15% of the variance. Conspiracy theory ideation was not significant 
predictor (B=0.070, SE=0.062, p=0.26), but skepticism was (B=0.331, SE=0.086, p<0.001). 
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Results for the individual items as dependent variable. Thirty one multiple 
regressions were run. In each conspiracy theory ideation and skepticism were entered as a 
predictor variable and one of the conspiracy theories or corruption cases as outcome variable. 
The results for the conspiracy theories are presented in Table 4. and for the corruption 
allegations in Table 5. 
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Table 4. Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, standardized coefficients and p values for the conspiracy theories as outcome variables. 
 
 Conspiracy theory ideation  Skepticism  
 BCM SE βCM p (corrected p)  BSK SE βSK p (corrected p) R
2 
1. Princess Diana's death  0.870 0.109 0.583 0.000 (0.000)  0.059 0.151 0.028 0.698 (0.73) 0.360 
2. Murder of JFK 0.656 0.107 0.450 0.000 (.000)  0.416 0.148 0.207 0.005 (0.012) 0.356 
3. Aliens in Roswell  0.802 0.122 0.506 0.000 (0.000)  0.128 0.169 0.058 0.450 (0.55) 0.294 
4. Suppressed cures 0.927 0.118 0.573 0.000 (0.000)  0.121 0.163 0.054 0.460 (0.55) 0.368 
5. Marilyn Monroe's death 0.798 0.108 0.544 0.000 (0.000)  0.169 0.149 0.083 0.259 (0.363) 0.357 
6. The Clintons killed people 0.933 0.118 0.576 0.000 (0.000)  0.118 0.163 0.053 0.470 (0.56) 0.370 
7. 2017 elections rigged 0.430 0.132 0.275 0.001 (0.003)  0.345 0.182 0.160 0.059 (0.11) 0.153 
8. TWA Flight 800 shot down 0.926 0.088 0.721 0.000 (0.000)  -0.199 0.122 -0.112 0.105 (0.179) 0.438 
9. Cameras on phones spy citizens 0.799 0.107 0.557 0.000 (0.000)  0.067 0.148 0.034 0.650 (0.707) 0.334 
10. Powerful, secret elite rules 1.089 0.094 0.740 0.000 (0.000)  -0.085 0.130 -0.042 0.513 (0.589) 0.513 
11. Government kills people 0.890 0.091 0.645 0.000 (0.000)  0.155 0.125 0.081 0.219 (0.323) 0.484 
12. Government involved in 9/11 0.918 0.103 0.638 0.000 (0.000)  -0.042 0.142 -0.021 0.766 (0.77) 0.391 
13. Media used to control minds 0.916 0.110 0.593 0.000 (0.000)  0.138 0.151 0.065 0.362 (0.464) 0.401 
14. Faked moon landing 0.710 0.099 0.574 0.000 (0.000)  -0.288 0.136 -0.169 0.036(0.074) 0.243 
15. Sandy Hook shootings faked 0.820 0.098 0.642 0.000 (0.000)  -0.335 0.135 -0.190 0.014(0.032) 0.304 




Table 5. Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, standardized coefficients and p values for the corruption cases as outcome variables. 
 
 Conspiracy mentality  Skepticism  
Statement BCM SE βCM p (corrected p)  BSK SE βSK p (corrected p) R
2 
1. City council official abuses power 0.088 0.086 0.090 0.309 (0.407)  0.296 0.119 0.218 0.014 (0.032) 0.079 
2. CEO bribes UN official 0.127 0.090 0.121 0.159 (0.243)  0.400 0.124 0.276 0.001 (0.003) 0.130 
3. Executive director abuses power 0.045 0.088 0.046 0.606 (0.670)  0.323 0.121 0.236 0.008 (0.01) 0.071 
4. School principal receives kickbacks  0.169 0.106 0.143 0.111 (0.181)  0.157 0.146 0.097 0.282 (0.38) 0.046 
5. Employee solicits money  0.032 0.083 0.035 0.697 (0.733)  0.254 0.114 0.199 0.027 (0.059) 0.049 
6. A man pays to conceal misconduct  -0.049 0.081 -0.053 0.547 (0.616)  0.419 0.112 0.328 0.0002 (0.0006) 0.090 
7. President of Airport Authority abuses power  0.112 0.100 0.100 0.264 (0.363)  0.270 0.138 0.173 0.053 (0.106) 0.060 
8. Senator abuses power  -0.081 0.089 -0.079 0.367 (0.464)  0.478 0.123 0.339 0.0001 (0.0003) 0.090 
9. A man solicits kickbacks 0.028 0.087 0.028 0.747 (0.77)  0.370 0.120 0.273 0.002 (0.005) 0.084 
10. Building Manager abuses power 0.024 0.081 0.026 0.770 (0.77)  0.204 0.111 0.165 0.068 (0.124) 0.033 
11. A director bribes officials 0.147 0.083 0.150 0.080 (0.14)  0.352 0.115 0.261 0.003 (0.008) 0.137 
12. An employee offers favor for cash  0.189 0.103 0.162 0.068 (0.12)  0.230 0.142 0.143 0.107 (0.179) 0.074 
13. Utility authority boards accepts bribes  -0.061 0.093 -0.057 0.511 (0.589)  0.510 0.129 0.345 0.0001 (0.0003) 0.099 
14. A chief of staff abused his position 0.147 0.101 0.128 0.147 (0.233)  0.303 0.139 0.191 0.031 (0.066) 0.082 
15. A former official abused his position  0.086 0.074 0.098 0.248 (0.357)  0.377 0.102 0.313 0.0002 (0.0006) 0.144 
16. A director accepts money 0.114 0.081 0.121 0.161 (0.243)  0.344 0.112 0.265 0.002 (0.005) 0.122 
Note: B= unstandardized coefficients, β= standardized coefficients. 
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As can be seen from Table 3. and Table 5., after applying the Benjamini-Hochberg 
adjustment, the conspiracy theory ideation predicted beliefs in conspiracy theories, but not 
belief in the corruption cases, while the skepticism predicted belief in most of the corruption 
cases, but positively predicted only one conspiracy theory.  
In sum, Study 2 confirmed the factor structure uncovered by our initial analysis of the 
scale items and, equally important, illustrated the predictive and discriminant validity of the 
two factors.  A challenge for social scientists has been identifying an underlying construct 
that predicts the particular category of beliefs we know as conspiracy theories, as opposed to 
beliefs that also qualify as conspiratorial claims but would be considered rational or 
plausible. The difference, in theory, is not merely in what is socially acceptable; conspiracy 
theories have distinct assumptions implicit in them, such as a Manichean worldview of 
struggle between good (the people) and evil (the conspirators),  (Bale, 2007; Barkun, 2003; 
Oliver & Wood, 2014; Cubitt, 1989; 1993; Brotherton, 2015), conceiving the conspirators as 
omnipotent, omnipresent and monolithic (Bale, 2007) or seeing the conspiratorial plot as all-
encompassing and the moving force in history (Bale, 2007; Byford, 2011; Pipes,1997).  Our 
conspiracy theory ideation factor appears to tap into those assumptions, and not into the 
rational skepticism that underlies beliefs or suspicions about actual conspiracies or 
conspiracies more generally, while our skepticism factor does the opposite. At the same time, 
it does not appear that the skepticism factor adds predictive validity, so while it may well be 
useful for assessing doubt and suspicion regarding mundane abuses of power, its usefulness 







Study 3a. Convergent and divergent validity  
  
Overview and rationale 
If our two factors do indeed measure and distinguish conspiracy theory ideation and 
skepticism, they should be associated with other established measures that relate to these 
constructs, and also unassociated with others that are theoretically independent. In particular, 
as argued in the Introduction, we expected conspiracy theory ideation to be positively related 
to paranormal beliefs and paranoid ideation and, based on previous work (Goertzel, 1994, 
Abalakina – Paap et al., 1999,  Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2014) to be negatively related to trust, 
and independent of death anxiety (Bruder et al., 2013) and emotional intelligence (Brotherton 
et al., 2013). Research on personality and conspiracy theory beliefs (Swami & Furnham, 
2012; Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2013) also suggests a positive relation with openness to 
experience, a negative relation with agreeableness, and no relation with conscientiousness, 
neuroticism and extraversion. Skepticism, on the other hand, should be correlated with 
rational thinking style (as opposed to conspiracy theory ideation which previous studies have 
found to be positively correlated with intuitive thinking style and negatively with analytic 
thinking style (e.g. Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran & Furnham, 2014) and with other 
measures of skepticism such as skepticism towards advertisement and electronic word of 
mouth skepticism. 
We also included a new set of specific conspiracy theories to replicate the predictive validity 
findings from study 2 in relation to specific conspiracy theories.  
Method 
Participants. Three hundred eight American MTurk participants (189 female, 118 
male, 1 “other”)  filled in an online survey in Qualtrics in exchange for US$ 1.00. The mean 
age of the sample was M=36.30 years ( SD=11.52, age range 18 to 77 years). The education 
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demographics were as follows: 0.6% did not have a degree, 27.6% had high school degree, 
46.8% had bachelor's degree, 18.2% had master's degree, 3.6% had doctoral degree and 3.2% 
selected "other" as their highest degree.  To detect a significant slope of B=0.2 with 80% 
power at alpha 0.05 we needed 191 participants. We significantly overrecruited, anticipating 
a number of attention check failures due to the length of the questionnaire.  
Measures and procedure. After providing informed consent, participants were 
presented with the instruments in the following order. 
Personality was assessed on the ten item personality inventory (TIPI), used and 
validated in many previous studies (e.g. Gosling, Rentfrow & Swann, 2003). Participants rate 
the degree to which each of five pairs of traits (two for each of the Big Five dimensions, with 
one of each pair reverse scored) applies to them, using a 7-point scale anchored at “disagree 
strongly” and “agree strongly.” The scores from each pair of items are averaged to arrive at a 
single score for each dimension. Higher scores indicate higher presence of the trait.  
Trust was assessed using three items previously used by Goertzel (1994) in research 
on beliefs in conspiracy theories. Participant rated their agreement or disagreement on a five -
point scale (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) with statements about whether they can 
trust the police, their neighbors or their relatives. Answers across the three items were 
averaged to arrive at a single score.  
Paranormal beliefs were measured on the Revised Paranormal Beliefs Scale (R-PBS; 
Tobacyk, 2004), a 26-item scale that measures seven dimensions of paranormal beliefs: 
traditional religious beliefs, psi, witchcraft, superstition, spiritualism, extraordinary life forms 
and precognition. Participant rate their agreement with statements relating to each dimension, 
using a 7 point scale anchored at 1 (=strongly disagree) to 7 (= strongly agree). Scores for 
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each subscale are averaged (one item from the psi subscale is reverse coded) with higher 
scores indicating stronger beliefs on a dimension.  
 Belief in specific conspiracy theories was measured on the 15-item Conspiracy 
Theories Belief Inventory (CTBI; Swami, et al., 2010; Swami et al., 2011). Participants rate 
their agreement with specific conspiracy theories [e.g.,  "The Coca Cola company 
intentionally changed to an inferior formula with the intent of driving up demand for their 
classic product, later reintroducing it for their financial gain", 1 (= completely false), 9 (= 
completely true)], and a total score is calculated by averaging ratings across all items, with 
higher scores indicating stronger overall belief in the theories.  
Death anxiety was measured with the Death Anxiety Questionnaire (DAQ; Conte, 
Weiner & Plutchik, 1982), a 15 item scale that measures attitudes towards death and dying, 
including subfactors relating to fear of the unknown, fear of suffering, fear of loneliness and 
fear of extinction. Participants rate their agreement with statements relating to each 
dimension using a three point scale anchored at 0 = not at all and 2 = very much.  Scores are 
averaged across items to arrive at a total score, with higher scores indicating higher death 
anxiety.  
Paranoid ideation was measured with the Paranoia scale (Feningstein & Vanable, 
1992), a 20-item measure that was designed to assess paranoid thinking in non-clinical 
population (e.g., “Some people have tried to steal my ideas and take credit for them”). 
Participants rate the degree to which each statement applies to them on a 5-point scale 
anchored from 1 (= not at all applicable to me) to 5 (= extremely applicable to me). The 
answers are averaged across the items to obtain a total score with higher scores indicating 
higher paranoid ideation.  
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Analytic thinking style was measured with the analytic subscale of the Rational-
Experiential Inventory (REI-40) developed by Pacini and Epstein (1999). Its questions tap 
into rational ability (e.g. “I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people”) 
and rational engagement (e.g. “I enjoy thinking in abstract terms”). Participants rate the 
degree to which the items are true of themselves on a 5 point scale anchored from 1 (= 
definitely not true of myself) to 5 (= definitely true of myself). After reverse scoring several 
items, scores are averaged across all items with higher scores indicated greater rational ability 
and engagement.   
Skepticism was assessed with two instruments. First, the 9-item Electronic Word of 
Mouth (eWOM) (Zhang, Ko & Carpenter, 2016) was used to measure three dimensions of 
skepticism about online claims: truthfulness (e.g. “We can hardly depend on getting the truth 
from most online reviews”), motivation (e.g. “Online reviewers care more about getting you 
to buy things”), and identity (e.g. “People writing online product reviews are not necessarily 
the real customers”). Participant rate their agreement with statements relating to each 
dimension on a 7 point scale anchored from 1 (= strongly disagree) to 7 (= strongly agree). 
The answers are averaged across the items to obtain total score with higher scores indicate 
greater levels of skepticism.  
Second, the nine item SKEP scale (Obermiller & Spangenberg, 1998) was used to 
measure skepticism toward advertising claims (e.g., "We can depend on getting the truth in 
most advertising”). Participants rate their agreement with each statement on a five point 
scale, anchored from 1 (= strongly agree) to 5 (= strongly disagree). Answers are averaged 
across all items with higher scores indicating greater skepticism.  
Finally, emotional intelligence was measured with the 16 item Wong-Law Emotional 
Intelligence Scale (Wong & Law, 2002) developed to measure four facets of emotional 
intelligence: self emotional appraisal (e.g. "I always know whether or not I am happy"), 
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other’s emotional appraisal (e.g. "I always know my friends’ emotions from their behavior"), 
regulation of emotion (e.g. "I can always calm down quickly when I am very angry") and use 
of emotion (e.g. "I always set goals for myself and then try my best to achieve them").  
Participants rate their agreement on a 7- point scale anchored from 1 (= strongly disagree), to 
7 (= strongly agree).  Scores are averaged across items, with higher scores indicating greater 
emotional intelligence.  
One attention check item was included within each of the following scales: skepticism 
subscale of the Conspiracy Mentality scale ("To make sure you read attentively please select 
strongly agree"), Revised Paranormal Beliefs Scale ("If you read attentively select strongly 
agree"), Paranoid ideation scale ("I am reading attentively - select extremely applicable to me 
if you read this") and SKEP ("To make sure you read attentively select strongly agree"). 
Failure to select the requested response on any of these was grounds for exclusion from the 
analyses.   
Results and Discussion 
Seventy-nine participants failed one or more of the attention checks, leaving 229 
participants for analysis. 
A series of multiple regressions, using the conspiracy theory ideation and skepticism 
dimensions simultaneously to predict each dependent variable in turn, were used to assess 
convergent and divergent validity. The Benjamin-Hochberg correction was used to keep the 
overall type 1 error rate to .05. The results are shown in Table 6.  
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Conspiracy theory ideation  Skepticism 
Dependent variable   B SE ß  p (corrected p) Expected 
relationship 
 B SE ß  p (corrected p) Expected 
relationship 
Paranormal beliefs 0.95 0.473 0.067 0.483 0.000 **(0.000**) positive  0.032 0.074 0.029 0.671 (0.782) N/A 
Paranoid ideation 0.92 0.163 0.043 0.284 0.000** (0.000**) positive  0.053 0.047 0.083 0.264 (0.462) N/A 
Trust 0.62 -0.097 0.043 -0.173 0.026* (0.091+) negative  -0.024 0.048 -0.039 0.613 (0.782) N/A 
Death anxiety 0.86 -0.004 0.025 -0.014 0.863 (0.87) none  0.012 0.028 0.035 0.657 (0.782) N/A 
Rational thinking style 0.93 -0.111 0.043 -0.198 0.011* (0.0513+) negative  0.099 0.048 0.159 0.040* (0.101) positive 
Ad skepticism 0.94 -0.126 0.053 -0.183 0.018* (0.072+) N/A  0.158 0.059 0.207 0.008** (0.044*) positive 
eWOM skepticism 0.93 0.212 0.069 0.230 0.002** (0.014*) N/A  0.094 0.077 0.092 0.222 (0.414) positive 
Emotional intelligence 0.92 -0.024 0.052 -0.036 0.641 (0.782) none  0.125 0.057 0.169 0.030* (0.093+) N/A 
Extraversion 0.76 0.059 0.101 0.046 0.561 (0.782) none  -0.067 0.112 -0.047 0.549 (0.782) N/A 
Agreeableness 0.60 -0.024 0.078 -0.024 0.762 (0.827) negative  0.131 0.087 0.118 0.132 (0.308) N/A 
Conscientiousness 0.62 0.013 0.078 0.013 0.870 (0.870) none  0.069 0.087 0.062 0.428(0.704) N/A 
Emotional stability 0.76 0.026 0.089 0.023 0.768 (0.827) none  -0.065 0.099 -0.052 0.511(0.782) N/A 
Openness to experience 0.57 0.105 0.078 0.103 0.180 (0.387) positive  0.185 0.087 0.162 0.034* (0.095+) N/A 
Belief in specific CT 0.93 0.884 0.074 0.666 0.000** (0.000**) positive  0.102 0.082 0.069 0.216 (0.414) N/A 
Note: **  p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1 ., eWOM= electronic word of mouth, B= unstandardized coefficient, β= standardized coefficient. 
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The results are summarized in Table 6. As predicted participants scoring higher on the 
conspiracy theory ideation scale also tended to hold paranormal and paranoid belief and to 
endorse specific conspiracy theories.  Further, as expected, there was no relationship between 
our measure of conspiracy theory ideation and death anxiety, emotional intelligence, 
conscientiousness, neuroticism and extraversion. Also, the scale’s relationship with trust and 
rational thinking style were marginally significant (p<0.1) and in the expected (negative) 
direction.  
We did not find any relationship between conspiracy theory ideation and openness to 
experience or agreeableness, perhaps not surprisingly given that the correlation in previous 
studies has been rather low (e.g. Swami et al, 2011), inconsistent (e.g., Galliford & Furnham, 
2017; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014), and may stem due to shared variance with skepticism and not 
conspiracy theory ideation per se.   
Moving on to skepticism, as expected, there was a positive relationship between our 
measure of skepticism and ad skepticism and a marginal relationship with rational thinking 
style. However, while we expected positive relationship with electronic word of mouth 
skepticism, we did not find support for this hypothesis. There was also a marginally positive 
relationship with emotional intelligence and openness to experience. Furthermore, there was 
no association with paranormal beliefs, paranoid ideation or trust.  
Unexpectedly, some measure predicted to correlate with the skepticism dimension 
were also associated, inconsistently, with conspiracy theory ideation (word of mouth 
positively, and advertisement skepticism negatively). While the negative correlation with 
advertisement skepticism is less surprising, the correlation with electronic word of mouth 
skepticism is more puzzling. One speculative account is that the focus and the prescribed 
agency in the items of the eWOM scale might have presented the claims in a way that easily 
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tap into conspiracy theory ideation. For example "people writing online reviews are not 
necessarily the real customers" perhaps implies a larger ongoing plot.   
Study 3b. Test – Retest reliability 
All participants in Study 3a were invited to complete the scale again (along with a 
second, unrelated measure that appeared after it) 11 weeks after their initial participation. The 
survey was open for two weeks, by which point 109 participants (71 females, 38 males, mean 
age at T2= 41.11, range 20 to 74) had taken part.  After the participants that failed the 
attention check at either time 1 or time 2 were removed, the final sample consisted of 86 
participants (56 females, 30 males, Mage 39.97, range 18-74). The correlation between the 
conspiracy theory ideation factor at time 1 and time 2 was r=0.714, p<0.001 (one tailed), and 
between the skepticism factor r=0.710, p <0.001 (one tailed). Paired samples t-tests showed 
no significant difference between time 1 and 2 for the conspiracy theory ideation factor 
t(84)=1.204, p=0.232 (Mtime1= 3.96,  SDtime1=1.32; Mtime2=4.08, SDtime2=1.17 or for the 
skepticism factor t(84)=-0.062, p=0.951 (Mtime1=5.70, SDtime1=1.23 Mtime2=5.70, SDtime2=1.03. 
Thus, the results indicate that the scale can be used as a reliable measure of conspiracy theory 
ideation and skepticism. 
 
Study 4. Construct validity across three nations 
In order to demonstrate construct validity beyond MTurk samples, in Study 4 we 
collected data from two additional countries, New Zealand and Macedonia, focussing 
specifically on the invariance of the factor loadings and the underlying latent structure.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. The New Zealand sample consisted of 132 students (27 
males, 102 females, 1 other; 2 did not disclose their gender) who participated in exchange for 
extra course credit. Participants filled in the questionnaire on a computer running PsychoPy 
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software (Peirce, 2007). Up to four participants were tested in a single session. Participants 
were seated in the same laboratory room but separated by dividers.  
The Macedonian participants comprised a representative sample (N=311; 145 males, 
166 females). Data were collected by a local market research company, along with other 
measures for an unrelated correlational study. The questionnaire was in Macedonian and the 
scale was translated into Macedonian by two individuals fluent in both languages. 
Disagreements were settled by discussion about the most appropriate wording. The 
conspiracy mentality scale was administered last.  
A new sample of MTurk participants (N= 357; 168 males, 188 females, 1 other) was 
pooled from three different experimental studies. Only the data from the participants that 
were allocated to the control group in these studies was used. 
None of the participants had been subject to any effective experimental manipulation.  
Results and Discussion 
To test for the factorial equivalence of scores from the Conspiracy Mentality Scale we 
used AMOS v. 23 and followed the procedure outlined by Byrne (2009). We first established 
configural invariance by demonstrating that the items loaded on the respective factors in the 
three groups as expected (see Table 2, in Electronic Supplementary Materials 3). The results 
indicated that the two-factor structure is excellent fit for the data across the three groups (see 
Table 7.). 
Next, we tested for metric invariance by constraining the regression weights to be 
equal across the groups, and compared the constrained model fit indices with the ones from 
the configural model.  A  significant Δχ2 indicates nonequivalence.  Given that, Δχ2 is 
dependent on sample size and in large samples is almost always significant, changes in other 
fit indexes were also considered:  ΔCFI and  ΔTLI greater than 0.01 (Cheung & Rensvold, 
2002), ΔRMSEA values greater than 0.015 (Chen, 2007) indicate measurement 
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nonequivalence.  As can be seen from Table 7. all indices apart from the Δχ2 indicated metric 
equivalence.  
Finally, we tested for structural invariance by constraining the factor variance and 
covariances to be equal and comparing this constrained model fit to the configural model. 
Again, all indices except Δχ2 argued for invariance.  
Thus, we concluded that across the three cultural contexts examined, there is support 
for cross-cultural equivalence of the relations among the factors of the Conspiracy Mentality 
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0.951 M1 74.251 (4) 0.009 0.003 0.002 Equivalence 
Note: CFI= Comparative Fit Index, RMSEA= Root mean square error of approximation, TLI= Tucker Lewis Index. 
   
 




Studying the psychological underpinnings of belief in conspiracy theories is important 
because they are associated with negative social, health and political outcomes. Previous 
measures of beliefs in conspiracy theories have either focused on belief in specific conspiracy 
theories or have measured the general tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. However, the 
first approach has limited use and may not adequately capture the underlying construct, while 
existing scales taking the second approach have either not been sufficiently generic, or have 
confounded the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories with other variables such as 
knowledge about the current state of the world. Our goal in this paper was to develop and 
validate a scale that measures the general tendency to believe in conspiracy theories and to 
improve on previous efforts.  
In Study 1 we explored the factor structure of the initial item pool, generated by 210 
MTurk participants who gave their definition of a conspiracy theory, and discovered two factors, 
which we termed conspiracy theory ideation and skepticism. After maximizing the information 
value of each dimension, we settled on an 11-item scale, which subsequently showed good test-
retest reliability, as well as convergent, divergent, and predictive validity. In particular, 
conspiracy theory ideation correlated positively with paranoia, paranormal beliefs, and 
marginally negatively with trust, and, equally important, did not correlate with emotional 
intelligence, death anxiety, extraversion, consciousness, or emotional stability. Skepticism, 
meanwhile, correlated with advertisement skepticism. Further, once the shared variance was 
accounted for, both dimensions predicted different types of conspiracies. Finally, in study 4 we 
demonstrated construct validity in two other national contexts.  
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We argue that these two dimensions represent two sides of the conspiracy mentality 
construct (the general tendency to believe in any conspiracy)– the “rational” and the “irrational”, 
which become especially evident once their shared variance is controlled. We have evolved to be 
suspicious because it is adaptive – higher sensitivity to deception means that we are less likely to 
miss potential threats (Kreko, 2015) and this suspiciousness is captured by the “rational side” of 
conspiracy mentality – our skepticism dimension. Meanwhile, the “irrational side” reflects the 
point at which rational suspicion morphs into nihilism and becomes maladaptive, for example by 
dedicating one's life to "uncovering" the conspiracy or enlightening the "sheeple".  
We acknowledge that our treatment of conspiracy theories, and particularly our 
distinction between plausible and implausible theories, involves some subjectivity. Who are 
psychologists to judge what is plausible or rational to believe? And haven’t some “implausible” 
theories, such as allegations of widespread government surveillance, turned out to be true? 
Fortunately, the plausibility of a particular claim is also an empirical matter, and can be 
quantified as a claim’s acceptance in the population. That acceptance may well change over time 
as evidence accumulates or social attitudes shift, and if they do, some conspiracy theories will no 
longer qualify as such, and new, perhaps contradictory conspiracy theories will emerge. (Today, 
someone who denies government surveillance has a better claim to the title of “conspiracy 
theorist.”) However, the fact that norms change does not prevent a meaningful distinction 
between beliefs that contradict those norms, and those that are consistent with them.  
We recommend the use of the skepticism dimension as a control variable in situations 
where researchers wish to establish the unique relationship between conspiracy theory ideation 
and a construct of interest, in order to distinguish such ideation from general skepticism that is 
not specific to conspiracy theory beliefs. For example, in Study 3a the relationships between 
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conspiracy theory ideation and some variables (openness to experience, trust) was accounted for 
by shared variance with skepticism; failure to control for skepticism in these cases would lead to 
spurious conclusions about conspiracy theorists’ beliefs. In addition, our skepticism dimension 
may prove useful in its own right. Current literature on skepticism as a psychological construct is 
fractionized in specific areas. For example, academics are interested in auditors’ professional 
skepticism (Hurtt, 2010), consumer skepticism (Ford, Smith & Swasy, 1990; Forehand & Grier, 
2003), investor skepticism (Demerens, Pare & Redis, 2013), skepticism towards environmental 
claims (Mohr, Eroǧlu, & Ellen, 1998), media skepticism (Tsfati, 2003) or psychiatric skepticism 
(Swami & Furhnam, 2011). There has also been some interest in epistemic vigilance - skepticism 
in broader communication context (Mercier, 2017; Sperber et al.,2010). However, there is no 
work on, or measure of general, dispositional scepticism, with items that are context-free. The 
skepticism subscale may serve as a stepping stone for research on dispositional skepticism as it 
offers context free items that tap into the tentative doubt that characterizes this construct.  
Apart from constructing a psychometrically sound measure of the general tendency to 
believe in conspiracy theories, the results from our study also contribute towards conceptual 
clarity regarding the construct of conspiracy theories. Some scholars (e.g. Pigden, 2006) have 
suggested that real historical conspiracies are not psychologically distinct from conspiracy 
theories, but others reserve the latter term for claims that are normatively considered to be 
irrational and implausible (Bjerg & Presskorn-Thygesen, 2017). The current research is more 
consistent with the second view; participants were not equally prone to believe in all kind of 
conspiracies. While they believed behaviors such as soliciting kickbacks are likely, they rated the 
scenarios pretest participants termed “conspiracy theories” to be unlikely.  Furthermore, the 
intercorrelations among ratings of conspiracy theories were very high, just like the 
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intercorrelations among the corruption cases, but correlations between conspiracy theories and 
corruption cases were small to nonexistent, and factor analysis suggested that these two sets of 
claims cluster on different dimensions.   
While some psychologists have had negative view of conspiracy theories (e.g. Swami et 
al. 2014), authors from other fields, have tended to take a more sympathetic view. For example, 
Fenster (1999) argues that conspiracy theories unfairly tend to be delegitimized as a form of 
political or intellectual disagreement. Others suggests that they should be seen as a form of 
legitimate skepticism arising as a result of the increasingly secretive world or knowledge about 
real life conspiracies, and thus are not unfounded (e.g. Olmsted, 2009). Yet other authors suggest 
that conspiracy theories might encourage a useful, critical attitude towards authorities and 
promote transparency (e.g. Basham, 2003; Husting & Orr, 2007); some even consider them vital 
to a functioning democracy (Bjerg & Presskorn-Thygesen, 2017). Our findings indicate that 
psychologists and cultural studies scholars may be talking about different phenomena, which 
perhaps map on to our two dimensions of conspiracy mentality, with skepticism underlying the 
healthy suspicion which some scholars applaud, of more mundane abuses of power. Indeed, 
Byford (2011) remarks that what some scholars include under the category "conspiracy theory" 
differs from its conventional meaning. At the very least, our results suggest that “conspiracy 
theory” as a psychological construct encompasses only a subset of the beliefs that tend to be 
labeled as conspiracy beliefs by the academic community.  
It should be noted however, that while we interpret the two dimensions of our scale in 
terms of “plausible” and “implausible” claims, plausibility is neither assessed nor manipulated in 
our work; that distinction is based on the claims’ a priori subjective likelihood. For example, the 
claim that the government was involved in the 9/11 terror attacks is distinct from the claim that a 
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CEO bribed a UN official, not because the former is less likely to be true, but because people are 
less likely to believe it to be true. We chose claims that, on their face, differ greatly in subjective 
plausibility, but there will of course be other claims that are more ambiguous, as well as claims 
that vary in their plausibility over time. Our hypothesis, ripe for test in future research, is that the 
predictiveness of conspiracy ideation and skepticism will track the subjective plausibility 
between and within claims. 
The current work has limitations, of course. Most obviously, our studies relied largely 
(but not exclusively) on American on MTurk participants, and one might question the 
generalizability of the results despite our demonstration of metric and structural equivalence in 
two other countries.  Indeed, some authors have stressed the unique place of conspiracy theories 
in American culture (e.g. Knight, 2000). However, other authors stress the unique place of 
conspiracy theories in the Middle East (e.g. Pipes, 1996), and in Russia (Ortmann & 
Heathershaw, 2012), and it is an empirical question whether such theories are “unique” to any 
subset of cultures. Given the fundamental motivations proposed to underlie conspiracy mentality, 
however, and absent evidence to the contrary, we suggest that conspiracy ideation is a cultural 
universal. However, cross-cultural work on belief in conspiracy theories is sorely lacking, and 
we hope that the current measure – designed to be generic enough to be applicable in any context 
– will provide a tool for researchers to test for similarities and differences across cultures. 
Electronic Supplementary Material 
The electronic supplementary material is available with the online version of the article at  
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ESM 1: Conspiracy theory definitions.sav 
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This file contains the 210 definitions of conspiracy theories used to develop the initial item pool.  
ESM 2: Predictive Validity Items.doc 
This file lists all the items that were used in Study 2.  
ESM 3: Standardized regression coefficients.doc 
This file contains the standardized regression coefficients obtained in Study 2 and Study 4.  
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It is widely believed that conspiracy theory beliefs are the product of perceived lack of 
control. However, to date there is mixed evidence, at best, to support this claim. We consider the 
reasons why conspiracy theory beliefs do not appear to be based in any straightforward way on 
control beliefs, interrogating existing findings and presenting new data that call the relationship 
into question. Across six studies, we observed no effect of control manipulations on conspiracy 
theory beliefs, while replicating previously reported correlational evidence of their association. 
The results suggest that conspiracy beliefs are not suitable for compensating for threats to 
control, although the discrepancy between experimental and correlational effects opens the 
possibility that the causal link may run in the opposite direction. 
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The world is ruled by a secret cabal. The US government was involved in the 9/11 
attacks. HIV is a man-made virus. Such statements, which are promoted on the internet and 
elsewhere, are examples of conspiracy theories: implausible, unwarranted claims that important 
social events are caused by malevolent clandestine groups, that usually run in contradiction to 
the explanations offered by the relevant epistemic authorities, and that are embedded in a more 
general worldview (Stojanov & Halberstadt, 2019).  
Although researchers have tried to understand conspiracy theory beliefs – which to 
nonbelievers appear unwarranted by evidence, if not entirely irrational – from many 
perspectives, including personality theory (Green & Douglas, 2018; Swami et al., 2011), 
intergroup identity (Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala & Olechowski, 2016; Mashuri & 
Zaduqisti, 2014; 2015), and cognitive bias (e.g., Brotherton & French, 2014, 2015; Douglas, 
Sutton, Callan, Dawtry & Harvey, 2016), arguably the most frequent accounts rely on some 
notion of “control.”  The claim that perceived lack of control is the natural breeding ground for 
conspiracy theory beliefs is a recurring theme in popular science (e.g. Brotherton, 2015; 
Oaklander, 2015; Pichaske & Alpert, 2018; Shermer, 2014; Yong, 2008), and many academics 
agree (e.g., Douglas, Sutton & Cichocka, 2017; Kossowska & Bukowski, 2015; Marchlewska, 
Cichocka, & Kossowska, 2018; Wood & Douglas, 2019).  
However, on closer inspection, neither the theoretical role of control in conspiratorial 
thinking, nor the empirical relationship between the two constructs, is entirely convincing. 
Although specific accounts differ in their emphasis, control accounts of conspiracy theories 
generally assume that the perceived loss of personal control is threatening to one’s need for order 
(e.g.,  Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009) or one’s schemas about the world (e.g., Heine, 
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Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). Conspiracy beliefs help compensate for these threats by ascribing control 
to external entities or organizations (e.g. Kay & Eibach, 2013; Kay, Sullivan & Landau, 2015; 
Rutjens & Kay, 2016), or by creating new meaning frameworks via novel connections among  
unrelated events (van Prooijen, in press). For example, perceiving a connection between a 
tornado and the unusually long contrails observed the previous day, provides a basis for 
believing that the government (or some other entity) has deliberately sprayed chemicals in the 
sky to cause the tornado.  
However, it seems equally plausible that conspiracy theories would have the opposite 
effect on the perception of control and order. A common theme among conspiracy theories is that 
reality is not what it seems; they are counter-normative narratives that suggest institutions and 
explanations that we take for granted are illusions – a revelation that, if taken seriously, seems 
bound to challenge the larger meaning-making systems individuals have come to rely on. 
Furthermore, although people desire order, they seek to optimize, not to maximize it, and it could 
be argued that conspiracy theories provide “too much” order, structure, and meaning by 
accounting for errant data, connecting seemingly unconnected events and leaving nothing 
unexplained (Clarke, 2002; Keeley, 1999). Finally, even if conspiracy theories represent an 
effective means of restoring order and structure, they are not the only means (Kay, 
Gaucher, Mcgregor & Nash, 2010; Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008; Kay, 
Whitson, Gaucher & Galinsky, 2009; Landau, Kay & Whitson, 2015), and, it would seem, a 
means of last resort. While control accounts do not require that sources of control or meaning be 
benevolent, people theoretically favour control systems that are both “culturally accessible” and  
“socially acceptable” (Kay et al., 2008; Kay & Sullivan, 2013). In most—if not all—conspiracy 
theories, however, the alleged conspirators are malevolent (van Prooijen, 2018), thus making 
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them poor candidates for compensatory processes when numerous effective and socially 
sanctioned alternatives exist. 
The experimental evidence for conspiracies as compensatory sources of personal control 
is as ambivalent as its theoretical rationale. In a typical experiment, researchers ask participants 
to write about a time they did not have control, and to compare these participants’ conspiracy 
beliefs with a control group that is asked to describe an event when they felt in complete control 
(or about a neutral event). Some studies report stronger conspiracy beliefs in the low/neutral 
control group compared to the high control group (e.g. Whitson & Galinsky, 2008; van Prooijen 
& Acker, 2015), but others report weaker ones (e.g. van Elk & Lodder, 2018), and yet others 
(e.g.  Hart & Graether, 2018; Nyhan & Zeitzoff, 2018) report no effects of control on conspiracy 
beliefs at all.  
One factor in the variability of results is the corresponding variability – and sometimes 
dubious validity – of how belief in conspiracy theories is operationalized and measured. For 
example, Whitson and Galinsky (2008, Study 4) found that participants recalling uncontrollable 
situations were more likely to perceive patterns in ambiguous stimuli (e.g., images in visual 
noise) and links between events (e.g., an increase in e-mail correspondence and a lack of a 
promotion). However, while conspiracy theories are related to illusory pattern perception (van 
Prooijen, Douglas & de Inocencio, 2018), they are not reducible to it. And while novel 
connections between seemingly unrelated events can, of course, be the building blocks of 
conspiracy theories, such theories tell a more complex story that taps into a broader worldview. 
For example, seeing a connection between the “umbrella man” (a man who opened and lifted an 
umbrella when Kennedy’s limousine approached) and the assassination of Kennedy is a starting 
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point for building a conspiracy theory, but it is not a conspiracy theory per se (e.g., that 
Kennedy’s assignation was an organized Soviet-backed plot carried out for political purposes).   
In another operationalization of conspiracy belief, Van Prooijen and Acker (2015) asked 
participants about the construction of the North-South metro line in Amsterdam, by posing 
situations that were technically conspiracies, but also plausible abuses of power warranting 
legitimate skepticism. Accusations such as, “The city council transferred parts of the budget to 
the bank accounts of others”, and “Members of the city council received money from 
construction companies to set this plan in motion,” describe political corruption, which differ 
from “conspiracy theories” in scope, plausibility, official endorsement, and psychological 
interest. Indeed, recent evidence indicates that belief in conspiracy theories and belief in 
corruption are two distinct psychological constructs, predicted by different aspects of a larger 
construct (“conspiracy mentality”; Stojanov & Halberstadt, 2019).  
Even studies that explicitly ask about beliefs in specific conspiracy theories may not be 
well suited for assessing the construct of conspiracy theory belief. For one, participants can 
easily recognize such items as “conspiracy theories,” whose negative connotations are likely to 
produce socially desirable responses (Stojanov & Halberstadt, 2019). Moreover, using specific 
conspiracy beliefs limits the generalizability of the findings to very particular and culturally 
specific claims, and may say little about a person’s general tendency to employ conspiratorial 
logic. More relevant, we argue, is an individual’s tendency to engage in conspiracy thinking, 
rather than their belief in any particular claim.  
Given the significance and potential consequences of widespread conspiracy beliefs 
(Douglas & Sutton, 2018; Douglas, Sutton, Jolley & Wood, 2015), and the plausible but largely 
unsubstantiated role of control in their appeal, we here report three studies (see Table 3) to test 
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the effects of lack of control on conspiracy theory beliefs using a standard priming paradigm and 
a validated measure of conspiracy ideation, which reflects the belief that a powerful entity lies 
behind significant social or political events and that the conventional (official) truth is not the 
“real” truth. A fourth study confirms the results with a measure of specific claims, and two final 
studies examine two of the most likely moderators of control effects: the degree of control that a 
particular conspiracy claim affords; and the effectiveness of alternative means of restoring 
control. Although we conceptually replicate previous correlational work – lower control beliefs 
were associated with stronger conspiracy ideation – we find no evidence for a causal effect. 
 
 
Study 1  
Method 
Participants. In this and subsequent studies, sample size was determined a priori. 
Detecting an effect of  f = 0.2, the average effect size reported in psychology research (Richard, 
Bond & Stokes-Zoota, 2003) with alpha = 0.05 and power of 80%, required 246 participants. 
Expecting some attrition, we recruited 301 Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers (105 male, 195 
female, 1 other), who completed an online questionnaire designed and presented in the Qualtrics 
survey environment. The mean age of the sample was M = 36.20 (range 18-79 years, SD = 
12.24). The majority had Bachelor’s degree (41.2%), while 27.9% had a high school degree, 
16.6% Master’s degree, 3% Doctoral degree, 2.7% no degree; 8.6% reported their education 
level as “other”.   
Materials and Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants were informed 
that, as part of a study on memory,  they would be asked to recall and describe an event twice, 
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once at the beginning of the study and once “after a break interval,” during which they 
completed the key dependent variables. Following Whitson and Galinsky (2008), we used the to-
be-recalled event as our manipulation of control. The low control group described an event in 
which they “did not have any control over a situation,” while the high control group described an 
event in which they “were in complete control of the situation.” Both groups were instructed to 
include “what happened, how you felt, etc.,” and to write at least six lines of text. A neutral 
group was asked to recall and write about their dinner the previous night. The wording of the low 
and high control manipulation was taken verbatim from Whitson & Galinsky (2008) with the 
exception of the instruction for the length of the text.   
To assess the effectiveness of the manipulation we measured participants’ feelings of 
control on Pearlin and Schooler’s (1978), Mastery Scale. It consists of seven items ( e.g., I have 
little control over the things that happen to me) that capture the extent to which people see 
themselves as being in control over their life (Pearlin, Menaghan, Lieverman & Mullan, 1981), 
and which has been used in numerous studies as a measure of perceived control (e.g. Goode, 
Keefer, Branscombe & Molina, 2017; Ma & Kay, 2017). The scale was anchored at 1 (strongly 
disagree) and 4 (strongly agree). Five items were reverse scored, such that higher scores indicate 
higher levels of control. In the current study Cronbach’s alpha was 0.84. 
Conspiracy beliefs were measured on the conspiracy theory ideation subscale of Stojanov 
and Halberstadt’s (2019) Conspiracy Mentality Scale.  The subscale consists of seven items 
capturing the abstract premises of conspiratorial thinking, such as the belief in a powerful entity 
that controls significant social or political events. (A second dimension of the scale, measuring 
rational scepticism, is not relevant to the current study.)  The subscale has good psychometric 
characteristics (in the current sample Cronbach’s alpha was 0.91) and convergent, divergent and 
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predictive validity, and its construct validity has been confirmed in United States, New Zealand 
and North Macedonia populations (Stojanov & Halberstadt, 2019). Participants rated their 
agreement with each statement on a 1-to-7 scale anchored at “strongly disagree” and “strongly 
agree.”  Each subscale was presented in a separate block, always in the same order (with the 
dimension of interest, conspiracy theory ideation, presented first). An attention check item (“To 
make sure you read attentively please select strongly agree”), was included in the second block.  
After completing the dependent measure, participants were asked, in line with the cover 
story, to describe their event a second time (memory was not analyzed). Finally, they were asked 
to speculate about the study’s hypotheses, to answer basic demographic questions, and to assess 
the quality of their data (“Did you honestly answer the question in this survey? You’ll be paid 
regardless of how you answer”), before being debriefed.  
 
Results and Discussion 
We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions in this and subsequent studies. 
Twenty-nine participants were excluded from the analysis: sixteen because they failed the 
attention check question (low control = 5, neutral = 4, high control =7); two because they 
assessed their data as unreliable (high control =2) and 11 ( low control = 7, high control = 4) 
because they expressed suspicion about the research aims3 leaving 272 participants in total4.  A 
sensitivity analysis indicated that the study was able to detect a minimum effect size of f = 0.18. 
The effectiveness of the control manipulation was tested with a one-way ANOVA on 
mastery scores, which revealed a significant effect of experimental condition F (2, 269) = 7.69, p 
 
3 In studies 1-5, two research assistants coded whether the participants were naïve to the research aims. The inter-
rater reliability was high (ranged from 0.8 to 0.97) and disagreements were settled by the first author. 
4 Including such participants does not change the pattern of results in any of the studies reported in this paper.  
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< 0.001, f = 0.23. Post hoc Bonferroni comparisons indicated that the low control group (M = 
2.64, SD = 0.50, N = 79) differed from both the neutral (M =2.96, SD =0.58, p < 0.001, N = 108) 
and the high control group (M =2.89, SD = 0.58, p = 0.02 , N = 85), but the high control group 
did not differ from the neutral group (p = 1.0 ). This is in line with other unsuccessful attempts to 
induce higher feelings of control compared to baseline levels (e.g. Cutright, 2012; Cutright, 
Bettman, & Fitzsimons, 2013). 
Contrary to the primary hypothesis, an ANOVA on conspiracy ideation indicated that the 
low control group (M = 3.66, SD = 1.17) had descriptively lower conspiracy beliefs than both the 
neutral (M = 3.99, SD = 1.27) and high control groups (M = 3.84, SD = 1.35), although the effect 
was not significant, F (2, 269) = 1.55, p = 0.215, f = 0.11.  Excluding the high control group (in 
which the manipulation was ineffective), revealed a marginally significant difference t (185) = -
1.815, p = 0.07, d = 0.27; the low and high groups did not differ, t (162) = - 0.925, p = 0.36, d = 
0.14.  
Finally, we calculated the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between conspiracy beliefs 
and the mastery score, finding a significant negative relationship, r = -0.237, p < 0.0001. 
In sum, despite using a standard and empirically successful manipulation of personal 
control (e.g. Chen, Lee, & Yap, 2017; Shepherd, Kay, Landau, & Keefer, 2011; Whitson & 
Galinsky, 2008), we did not find that those whose control was threatened expressed greater 
conspiracy ideation; if anything, the tendency was for the opposite to be true. However, weaker 
feelings of control (independent of experimental condition) predicted stronger conspiracy 
ideation, as in previous research (e.g., Imhoff, 2015; van Elk & Lodder, 2018; van Prooijen & 
Acker, 2015).  
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In Study 2, we attempted to replicate the results of Study 1 with a conceptually similar 
but arguably stronger manipulation of control. 
Study 2  
Method 
Participants. Three hundred MTurk participants (137 male, 163 female) completed a 
questionnaire in the online survey platform Qualtrics. The mean age of the sample was 37.28 
years (SD= 11.66, age range 18-71 years). The majority had an undergraduate degree (45%), a 
third (30.3%) had a high school degree, 14.4% had a graduate degree, 9.7% other and 0.7% no 
degree. None of the participants had taken part in Study 1. 
Procedure and Materials. After providing informed consent, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three groups. Those in the high control group were informed that we 
were interested in the types of situations that people experience as controllable (or in the low 
control group, as uncontrollable). For additional clarity, the instructions defined the construct of 
control, noting that “a person is ‘in control’ of something to the extent that they are able to direct 
or influence it if they want to.” Participants were asked to take a moment to think about some of 
the situations in their life where they have control (or no control), and to briefly describe ten such 
situations in a separate box. After providing ten examples they were administered the Mastery 
Scale as a manipulation check (see Study 1). The neutral group proceeded immediately to this 
scale without engaging in any recall activity. As in Study 1, after completing the dependent 
measures, participants were invited to speculate about the experimental hypothesis before 
providing demographics and assessing their data quality. 
 
Results and Discussion 
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Twenty-nine participants were excluded from analysis: nine (low control = 2, neutral = 2, 
high control = 3) because they failed the attention check question, one (low control) because they 
self-assessed their data as unreliable and 19 (low control = 4, high control = 14,  neutral =1) 
because they were not naïve to the research aims. A sensitivity analysis indicated that the study 
was able to detect a minimum effect size of f = 0.19. 
Next, we checked the effectiveness of the manipulation. A one-way ANOVA revealed a 
marginally significant effect, F (2,268) = 2.610, p = 0.075, f =0.14. A post hoc Bonferroni test 
showed that the low control group (M =2.67, SD = 0.54, N = 72) differed marginally (p = 0.086)  
from the high control group (M = 2.87, SD = 0.55, N = 83) group, but that neither of these 
differed from the neutral (M = 2.82, SD = 0.56, N = 116). Testing the primary hypothesis, an 
ANOVA did not indicate a difference in conspiracy beliefs between condition (low control M = 
3.96, SD = 1.12; neutral M = 3.77, SD = 1.29; high control M = 3.94, SD = 1.32), F(2,268) = 
0.707, p=0.494, f= 0.08. As in Study 1, there was significant negative correlation between the 
mastery and conspiracy beliefs scores, r = - 0.217, p < 0.001. 
In sum, despite successfully (albeit weakly) manipulating control and using a 
conceptually strong measure of conspiracy thinking, neither of two well-powered studies 
detected any causal evidence for the compensatory hypothesis, though both revealed a 
correlational relationship.   
It is worth considering, however, whether the manipulation check itself might be 
contributing to the null findings, by providing an opportunity to restore control, and thereby 
eschewing participants’ need for further efforts in the form of conspiracy belief change. Hauser, 
Ellsworth and Gonzalez (2018) argue that manipulation checks as simple as asking participants 
about their feelings of control may serves the purpose of restoring their control. We note that, if 
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this were true, it supports our contention that there are far easier ways to restore control than to 
endorse extreme, counter-normative belief systems. Nevertheless, we considered this possibility 
in Study 3. If the presence of the self-report measure of control was responsible for the null 
effect of the control manipulation on conspiracy ideation, then removing the manipulation check 
should produce the hypothesized relationship. 
 
Study 3  
Method 
Participants. Two hundred and two MTurk workers (79 males, 123 females) 
participated. Half (51.5%) had undergraduate degree, a third (28.7%) high school degree, an 
eighth (12.9%) had a graduate degree, while 5.9% selected “other” as their highest level of 
education, and 1% reported they did not have a degree. The mean age of the sample was 39.14 
years (SD= 12.62, range 20-71 years). No participants had taken part in previous studies reported 
in this paper. 
Procedure and Materials. The procedure was identical to Study 1, except that the 
manipulation check was omitted from the procedure, and that control was only manipulated 
downward.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Seven participants were excluded from the analysis: one (neutral group) because they 
self-assessed their data as unreliable, four (neutral =3, low control =1) because they failed the 
attention check question and two (both low control group) because they were not naïve to the 
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research aims. A sensitivity analysis, indicated that the study is able to detect a minimum effect 
size of f = 0.2. 
The low control group scored numerically higher on the conspiracy theory ideation (M = 
3.33, SD = 0.96, N = 86) than the neutral group (M = 3.19, SD = 1.09, N = 109), but the 
difference was not significant, t (193) = 0.936, p = 0.350, f = 0.06. Thus, it does not appear that 
the inclusion of the manipulation check interfered with participants’ hypothesized motivation to 
restore control via conspiratorial thinking. 
Studies 1-3, using a novel (but, we argue, more theoretically appropriate) 
operationalization of conspiracy beliefs, revealed no empirical support for the control hypothesis. 
To explore whether similar results would be obtained with a more typical operationalization of 
conspiracy beliefs (i.e. as specific claims),  and therefore exclude the possibility that the null 
effects are unique to the conspiracy ideation scale, we replicated the studies again, this time 
using the Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (Swami et al., 2011).  
 
Study 4  
Method 
Participants.  Two hundred MTurk workers (72 male, 126 female, 2 other) participated. 
A third had an undergraduate degree (39.5%), a third a high school degree (29.5%), while 19.5% 
had a graduate degree, 1.5% did not have a degree, and 9% had an “other” degree. The mean age 
of the sample was 40.85 years (SD=13.44, range 20-82 years). No participant had taken part in 
the previous studies reported here. 
Procedure and Materials.  The procedure was identical to Study 3 with the exception of 
the dependent measure. Instead of conspiracy ideation, we measured belief in fifteen specific 
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conspiracies (e.g., A powerful and secretive group, known as the New World Order, are planning 
to eventually rule the world through an autonomous world government, which would replace 
sovereign government), using the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (BCTI), developed 
and later modified by Swami and colleagues (Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010; 
Swami et al., 2011).5 Participants rated the conspiracy theories on a 1 (completely false) to 9 
(completely true) scale, with higher scores indicating higher conspiracy theory beliefs.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Eight participants (all low control group) were excluded from the analysis, one because 
they self-assessed their data as unreliable and seven because they were not naïve to the research 
aims.  A sensitivity analysis indicated that the study was able to detect a minimum effect size of f 
= 0.20. 
The neutral group scored numerically higher on conspiracy theory beliefs (M = 3.31, SD 
=1.57, N = 109) than the low control group (M = 3.27, SD =1.65, N = 83), but the difference was 
not significant t (190)= 0.157,  p = 0.88, f = 0.01. Ostensibly, then, the null effects in Studies 1-3 
do not appear to be due to the instrument used to measure conspiracy theory beliefs.  
Although our four studies show little evidence for a main effect of control priming on 
conspiracy beliefs, it is entirely possible that additional factors moderate the effects of control --
that control motivates conspiracy beliefs in some circumstances but not others. In the final two 
studies, we explore two of the most plausible possibilities: the degree to which a conspiracy 
theory itself implies a controlling entity (Study 5); and the availability of other means of 
restoring control when it is threatened (Study 6).  
 
5 We used the modified version (Swami et al, 2011). 
   
 





Study 5  
If people turn to conspiracy theories as a compensatory control mechanism, it may be that 
some theories are more effective at restoring perceptions of order than others. In particular, 
threats to control may only prompt belief in conspiracies involving a controlling entity (e.g., the 
theory that the U.S.S.R. started the “hippie” movement in the United States in order to 
undermine and weaken America’s traditional values), because the belief that someone is in 
control is sufficient to satisfy the higher order need for structure and meaning. Other theories in 
which a controlling entity is absent or only implicit (e.g., the theory that Osama bin Laden died 
prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks but was used as a scapegoat) may not restore control, or do so to 
a lesser extent. Consistent with this proposal, Kay et al. (2008) found that participants whose 
control was threatened increased their belief in God, but only when God was described as 
controlling, rather than as a creator. Thus, in Study 5, we developed a new stimulus set to test the 
hypothesis that participants whose control was threatened would be inclined to vest more belief 
in specific conspiracy theories about controlling entities, but not in other conspiracy theories.   
Method 
Participants.  The participants were three hundred MTurk workers (108 males, 192 
females, M = 37.52, SD =12.001). The majority (44%) had an undergraduate degree, while 29% 
had a high school degree, 13% had a master’s degree, 2% a doctoral degree and 1% did not have 
a degree. The mean age was 37.54 years (range 18 to 73 years). None had taken part in our 
previous studies. 
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 Materials. The dependent measure was developed in several stages. First, an 
independent group of MTurk participants (N = 210) were asked to write five conspiracy theories 
that they had heard before, from which we identified 112 unique exemplars. Next, two research 
assistants were asked to code these theories on a 9-point scale anchored at 1 (“the goal of this 
conspiracy is NOT control”) and 9 (“the goal of this conspiracy is control”). The intraclass 
correlation coefficient was r = 0.84. The final rating comprised the average of the ratings of the 
two research assistants. Next, a second group of 85 MTurk participants was asked to rate the 
conspiracy theories in terms of their prototypicality, using a seven point scale anchored at 1 (“a 
bad fit” with their idea of a conspiracy theory) and 9 (an “excellent fit” with their idea of a 
conspiracy theory). A third group of 96 MTurk participants was asked to rate the same 
conspiracies for likely veracity, using a nine point scale anchored at 1 (“definitely false”) and 9 
(”definitely true”). The intraclass correlation coefficient for prototypicality ratings was r = 0.89 
and for the veracity r = 0.96. The prototypicality and veracity scores for each conspiracy theory 
were obtained by averaging ratings, respectively across all participants.   
These extensive pretest data were used to create seven pairs of conspiracy theories that 
were equated on veracity ( t (95) = 0.604, p=0.55, d=  0.06) and prototypicality (t (84) = 0.439, p 
= 0.66, d= 0.05), but that each differed by at least 5 scale points in terms of control (Ms = 8.21 
vs. 1.71). For the full list of the selected conspiracies, along with their control, prototypicality 
and veracity rating (obtained from the pre-test) see Table 1, for the full list of all pretest 
conspiracies see the online supplementary materials.  
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Table 1. Conspiracy theory pairs 
 Low control  
theory 










High control  
theory 










1 Lyme disease is a 
cross between 
aids and syphilis 
that escaped the 












Soy is being used 
to feminize men.  










2 There is a secret 












The USSR only 
appeared to 
collapse to cause 
a false sense of 












3 Bigfoot, a human-































4 There are aliens 













planted cocaine in 
black 
neighbourhoods 











   
 




and helpless.  
5 Russia sent 
numerous humans 
into space before 
Yuri Gagarin, but 











Russia started the 
hippie movement 
in the US because 















6 President Obama 
is secretly a 
Muslim who 




























7 Osama Bin Laden 
dies just before 
9/11 but was used 














pets are being 












Note: C = average control rating during pre-test, V = mean veracity rating during pre-test (and its standard deviation), P = 
mean prototypicality rating during pre-test (and its standard deviation). Each pair is matched on prototypicality and veracity but differs 
on control rating. M (SD) = the mean rating and its standard deviation for the current study.  
  
   
 




Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of Study 3, except for the use of two 
types of specific conspiracy theories, varying in the control they imply, and the addition of a 
high control group as additional comparison group.  Participants rated their agreement with 
the 14 conspiracy statements, presented in a random order, on a 7-point scale (1=strongly 
disagree, 7=strongly agree). Mixed among these statements was an attention check question 
(i.e., “As a response to this question select strongly agree.”). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Nineteen participants were excluded from the analysis: nine (low control =3, neutral 
=6) participants due to failures of attention and ten (low control = 4, high control = 6) 
because they were not naïve to the research aims. A sensitivity analysis (α= 0.05, 1 - β = 0.8, 
correlation among repeated measures = 0.8) indicated that the study is able to detect a 
minimum effect size of f = 0.06. 
A mixed ANOVA with control manipulation (low control vs. neutral vs. high control) 
as between subject factor, and type of conspiracy theory (control related theory or non-
control related theory) as a repeated measure,  revealed no main effect of the manipulation F 
(2, 278) = 0.250, p = 0.779,  f =0.03, (low control: M = 2.03, SD =1.11, N = 92; neutral: M = 
2.03, SD = 0.98, N = 115; high control: M = 2.13, SD = 1.12, N = 74), but a significant effect 
of conspiracy theory type F (1, 278) = 7.40, p = 0.007,  f = 0.16,  with participants expressing 
stronger belief in conspiracy theories that did not involve control (control related CT: M = 
2.00, SD = 1.09; control non related CT: M =2.12, SD =1.14). Crucially for our purposes, 
there was no conspiracy theory type x control manipulation interaction F (2, 278) = 1.144, p 
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= 0.32, f =0.086. We also analysed each pair separately. The interaction was not significant 
for any individual pair.  
In sum, we found no support for the hypothesis that control threat motivates belief in 
theories that hypothesize a controlling entity. In addition, participants rated the theories as 
more believable when they did not afford control, an unexpected result given that the two 
types of theories had been matched for believability in pretesting. To explore this discrepancy 
further, we compared our participants to the pretest sample on key demographic variables: 
age, gender, education and political ideology. The analyses indicated a marginal difference in 
the gender distribution, χ2 = 4.98 (2), p = 0.08; there were a greater proportion of women in 
the main study compared to the pretest. In addition, women rated the control unrelated 
conspiracy theories as more believable than the control related, t(159) = -2.77, p<0.01, 
d=0.21. When we re-ran the repeated measures ANOVA, with gender as a covariate, the 
main effect of conspiracy theory type was not present, F (1, 277) = 0.045, p =0.83, f = 0.01 
and neither were the main effect of group, F (2, 277) = 0.225, p = 0.8, f = 0.04, nor the 
interaction effect F (2, 277) = 1.15, p = 0.318, f = 0.09. Thus, the significant effect of 
conspiracy theory type was most likely due to the higher proportion of women in the main 
study.    
 
Study 6  
Another plausible moderating factor determining the value of conspiracy theories for 
restoring threatened control, is the availability of alternative means of control. As noted 
above, while compensatory control processes do not require that sources of control be 
benevolent, people unsurprisingly favour sources of control that are not themselves 
threatening in other ways.  Furthermore, there is a plethora of alternative control and 
 
6 The pattern of results was unchanged when we analyzed the low control vs. neutral groups only.  
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meaning-making systems that are proven substitutes for personal control, such as God 
(Laurin, Kay, & Moscovitch, 2008), government institutions (Shepherd et al., 2011), 
scientific theories (Rutjens, van Harreveld, van der Pligt, Kreemers & Noordevier, 2013), and 
even more abstract beliefs such as in meritocracy (Goode, Keefer, & Molina, 2014) and 
societal progress (Rutjens, van Harreveld & van der Pligt, 2010, 2013) . Even if these 
alternatives are not all equally effective at establishing a sense of control, conspiracy theories 
would seem to be an option of last resort, given the essentially malevolent worldview they 
imply, and the social stigma that can accompany their endorsement (Lantian, Muller, Nurra, 
Klein, Berjot & Pantazi, 2018).  Consequently, conspiracy theorizing may be a secondary 
strategy for restoring control, avoided when one has other means of affirming that the world 
is ordered (Rutjens, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2010).  
Thus, in Study 6, we tested the hypothesis that threats to control would increase belief 
in conspiracy theories to a greater degree (or only) when the effectiveness of a second salient 
source of control – the government (Kay & Sullivan, 2013) – was called into question.  
 
Method 
Participants. Six hundred and five MTurk volunteers participated (267 male, 337 
female, 1 “other”). The majority (42.6 %) had an undergraduate degree, 24.5% had a high 
school degree, while 21.3% had a graduate degree, 9.3% an “other” degree and 2.3% had no 
degree. The mean age was 33.96 years (SD= 11.11 age range 18 – 78). None had participated 
in our previous studies. 
Materials and Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to a low control or a 
neutral group, as described in previous studies, and, independently, to a “competent 
government” or “incompetent government” condition. In the former, participants read a 
passage (about which they expected to answer questions) describing the U.S. government’s 
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response, generally considered competent and effective (Kluger & Sweetland Edwards, 
2017), to Hurricane Irma which most severely struck Florida, Georgia and South Carolina in 
2017; in the latter, they read a similar passage about the government’s response to Hurricane 
Katrina, generally considered incompetent and ineffective (Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs, 2006), which struck Florida and Louisiana in August 2005. For 
example, Hurricane Irma’s response was described as “timely, well managed, planned and 
coordinated. Residents were ordered to a shelter of last resort with sufficient provision of 
food, water, security and sanitary conditions. No one was thirsty, exhausted or victim to 
violence.” Hurricane Katrina’s response was described as “delayed, mismanaged, unprepared 
and uncoordinated.  Residents were ordered to a shelter of last resort without provision of 
adequate food, water, security or sanitary conditions. Several citizens died of thirst, 
exhaustion and violence, days after the storm had passed.” (The full text of both scenarios 
appear in the Appendix.) 
Afterwards, consistent with the cover story, participants answered several multiple 
choice questions about the scenario (which were not analyzed).  Afterwards, all participants 
completed the Conspiracy Mentality Scale, as described in Study 1, including an attention 
check, followed by demographic questions and self-assessment of data quality.  
Results and Discussion 
One hundred and four participants were excluded from the main analysis: 74 due to 
failures of attention and 30 due to failure to following instructions. This left a total of 501 
participants. A sensitivity analysis (α = 0.05, 1 - β = 0.8) indicated that the study is able to 
detect a minimum effect size of f = 0.12. 
A 2 (control priming: low vs. neutral) x 2 (government competence: competent versus 
incompetent) ANOVA on conspiracy theory ideation revealed no main effect of priming, F 
(1, 497) = 0.161, p = 0.689,  f = 0.02 or of competence, F (1, 497) = 0.243, p = 0.623, f = 
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0.02. Importantly, there was no interaction F (1, 497) =1.301, p = 0.255, f = 0.05, (see Table 
2 for descriptive statistics). Thus, the study, again, provides no evidence that control priming 




Table 2.  Descriptive statistics by recall task and scenario type. 
 
Control priming Scenario Mean SD N 
Low control 
Incompetent 4.16 1.23 109 
Competent 3.98 1.39 125 
Neutral 
Incompetent 4.08 1.25 133 
Competent 4.15 1.07 134 
Total 
Incompetent 4.11 1.24 242 






Although Studies 1-6 varied somewhat in methodology, their consistent inclusion of 
low control and neutral conditions permitted a meta-analysis of the effects of control on 
conspiracy beliefs, which maximizes both power and accuracy of our effect size estimates. 
Because in Study 2 the low control manipulation did not lower perceived control compared to 
the neutral group we excluded Study 2 from the analysis. For Studies 5 (low control 
compared to neutral) and 6 we looked at the effect at each level of the moderator.  Because 
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the effect sizes in Studies 5 and 6 were not independent we used the robumeta (Fisher & 
Tipton, 2015) package in R, which takes the dependency into account, to conduct the meta-
analysis. A test of heterogeneity suggested consistency between the studies, I2 = 11. The 
cumulative effect size did not suggest effect of condition, d = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.20, 0.13], p 
= 0.60 (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Forest plot of analysed effect sizes from Studies 1and 3-6 (squares) and the 
cumulative effect size (diamond). 
Bayesian analysis 
To investigate support for the null hypothesis relative to the alternative hypothesis 
that control priming influences conspiracy theory beliefs, we used a Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC), using the calculator by Masson (2011), based on Wagenmakers (2007). The 
analysis requires transformation of the sum of squares generated by an ANOVA output and 
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provides graded level of evidence for the null and alternative hypothesis. According to 
Raftery (1995), the strength of evidence for the posterior probability of a hypothesis given the 
data (pBIC(H1|D) within the range of 0.50-0.75 is “weak”, between 0.75-0.95 is “positive”, 
between 0.95-0.99 “strong” and above  0.99  “very strong”.  
For those studies containing three groups we analysed the low and neutral (Study 1 
and 5) or low and high (Study 2). For studies 5 and 6 we looked at each level of the 
moderator.  
 Table 3. shows the posterior probability of the null hypothesis given the data, 
pBIC(H0|D), and the probability of the alternative hypothesis given the data, pBIC(H1|D). There 
is positive evidence for the null hypothesis in five out of the six studies. In Study 1, there is 
only weak evidence for the null hypothesis, but the support for the alternative hypothesis is 
even lower (unsurprisingly, given that the effect is in the “wrong” direction).  
 
Table 3. Overview of study design and posterior probabilities for H0 and H1.  
 Manipulation Manipulation 
check 
DV  pBIC(H0|D)  pBIC(H1|D) 
 
Study 1 Recall task  ✓ CTI 0.60 0.40 
Study 2 Modified recall task ✓ CTI 0.93 0.07 
Study 3 Recall task   CTI 0.90 0.10 
Study 4 Recall task   BCTI 0.93 0.07 
Study 5 Recall task (Control related)  Specific theories 0.93 0.07 
Study 5 Recall task (Control non 
related) 
 Specific theories 0.93 0.07 
Study 6 Recall task (Irma Scenario)  CTI 0.90 0.10 
Study 6 Recall task (Katrina scenario)  CTI 0.93 0.07 
Note:  CTI =  The Conspiracy Theory Ideation Subscale from the Conspiracy Mentality 






Six studies tested the hypothesis that lack of control motivates belief in conspiracies. 
As argued in the Introduction, while the hypothesis is plausible, there is in fact little support 
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for it in the (small) literature on the subject. The current research offers no further evidence, 
and some positive evidence for the null hypothesis, at least when the most common 
experimental manipulation of control is used. Participants who were asked to recall instances 
in which they felt out of control were no more likely to endorse either general conspiracy 
beliefs, or specific conspiracy theories, relative to participants who recalled neutral 
memories, or nothing at all. Plausible moderating variables – the extent to which conspiracies 
provide evidence of control (Study 5), and the effectiveness of an alternative means of 
control (Study 6) – had no effect, and a meta-analysis of the studies determined a cumulative 
effect size not statistically different from zero.  On the contrary, a Bayesian analysis indicated 
that the null hypothesis (i.e., that there is no causal relationship between lack of control and 
conspiracy theory beliefs) should be retained.  
How to explain the inconsistency between previous positive results and our null 
findings? One explanation, of course, is that previous “positive” findings were simply Type 1 
errors, which is not farfetched given social psychology’s historical inattention to power 
(Clark‐Carter, 1997; Cohen, 1962). Another possibility, however, is that some previous 
studies measured constructs other than “pure” conspiracy ideation (e.g., pattern perception, 
paranoid beliefs, corruption beliefs), which are susceptible to control threats. Indeed, studies 
that examine more typical conspiracy theories and have larger samples tend to report null 
results. For example, Hart and Graether (2018), found no effects of control on the Generic 
Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (another psychometrically validated measure of conspiracy beliefs, 
with items such as, “Experiments involving new drugs or technologies are routinely carried 
out on the public without their knowledge or consent”). Similarly, Nyhan and Zeitzoff (2018) 
found no effect of control priming on Middle Eastern and North African participants’ 
conspiracy beliefs, using a list of conspiracy theories consisting of items such as “Jewish 
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leaders are secretly conspiring to achieve world domination.” Thus, it seems that overall there 
is little empirical evidence causally linking lack of control and conspiracy beliefs.  
Although there was no evidence in the current studies for a causal effect of control on 
conspiracy beliefs, Studies 1 and 2 provided evidence for a correlational  relationship, 
consistent with previous research (e.g., Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1998; 
Imhoff, 2015; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; van Elk & Lodder, 2018; van Prooijen & Acker, 
2015), suggesting that chronic, rather than acute feelings of control are related to conspiracy 
theory beliefs. While longitudinal studies may help shed light on the effects of chronic lack 
of control on conspiracy beliefs, it is also possible that the link is spurious. There are any 
number of co-variates of both lack of control and conspiracy theory belief, including stress 
(Swami, Furhnam, Smyth, Weis, Lay & Clow, 2016; Seligman, 1975), self-esteem 
(Cichocka, Marchlewska, & de Zavala, 2016; Ledrich, & Gana, 2013), anxiety (Lachman, & 
Agrigoroaei, 2012; Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013 ) or uncertainty (van Prooijen & Jostmann, 
2013) that could account for their association. Also, the correlation may be due to conspiracy 
beliefs’ shared variance with paranoia (see for example Imhoff & Lamberty, 2018). 
Alternatively, the causality may run in the opposite direction: conspiracy theories themselves 
may reduce feelings of control. Jolley and Douglas (2014), for example, found that 
participants exposed to conspiracy theories about vaccines reported greater feelings of 
powerlessness compared to participants exposed to anti-conspiracy material, suggesting that 
conspiracy beliefs threaten rather than satiate one’s sense of control. In any case, it is clear 
that presence of correlational evidence in absence of experimental evidence is not a strong 
foundation for claiming that lack of control is precursor to conspiracy beliefs.  
Even if these null results are confirmed in further research, however, it is important to 
acknowledge their limitations. Priming is only one method of threatening (or bolstering) 
control, and while we found no evidence for changes in conspiracy beliefs, stronger or 
   
 
   
 
126 
qualitatively distinct manipulations could conceivably produce effects that we were unable to 
detect here. Furthermore, we could not assess the effects of chronic lack of control: It may be 
that prolonged periods of control deprivation do indeed produce reliance on other, even 
malevolent sources of control, including conspiracy theories. Another unexplored area is 
whether lack of control in a specific domain, will lead to belief in conspiracy theory in that 
domain. For example, people diagnosed with HIV, might be particularly inclined to believe 
in conspiracy theories involving that virus, rather than conspiracy theories in general.   
To conclude, no evidence in our studies supports the casual link from lack of control 
to conspiracy theory beliefs. Future studies could use alternative manipulations, measures, 
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These scenarios were adapted from information available at Wikipedia and 
https://www.cato.org/blog/hurricane-katrina-remembering-federal-failures 
 
Hurricane Katrina scenario 
The government has come under intense criticism in recent years for its ability to 
carry out its key functions. Nowhere was this better exemplified than by its response to 
Hurricane Katrina.  
The government response to hurricane Katrina was delayed, mismanaged, unprepared 
and uncoordinated.  
Residents were ordered to a shelter of last resort without provision of adequate food, 
water, security or sanitary conditions. Several citizens died of thirst, exhaustion and violence, 
days after the storm had passed.   
Indecision plagued government leaders in the deployment of supplies, in medical 
personnel decisions, and in other areas. In places that desperately needed help, it took days to 
deliver medical supplies. Even the grisly task of body recovery after Katrina was slow and 
confused. Bodies went uncollected for days.  
Further, federal agencies were unfamiliar with their roles and responsibilities. There 
was general confusion over mission assignments, deployments, and command structure. 
 Agencies could not communicate with each other due to equipment failures and a 
lack of system interoperability. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was 
not able to coordinate its efforts with other federal agencies.  
To conclude, the response to hurricane Katrina nicely illustrates government 
inefficiency at all levels, and serves as a reminder of its chaotic functioning.  
 
   
 





Hurricane Irma Scenario 
The government has come under intense criticism in recent years for its ability to 
carry out its key functions, but in fact the government has shown remarkable competence 
when it is needed. Nowhere was this better exemplified than by its response to Hurricane 
Irma.  
The government response to hurricane Irma was timely, well managed, planned and 
coordinated. 
 Residents were ordered to a shelter of last resort with sufficient provision of food, 
water, security and sanitary conditions. No one was thirsty, exhausted or victim to violence.  
 Government leaders were decisive in deployment of supplies, in medical personnel 
decisions, and in other areas. In places that desperately needed help, medical supplies were 
quickly delivered. The body recovery after Irma was fast and organized.  
Further, federal agencies were familiar with their roles and responsibilities. Mission 
assignments, deployments, and command structure were clear.  
System interoperability and effective equipment allowed agencies to communicate 
with each other. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) effectively 
coordinated its efforts with other federal agencies.  
To conclude, the government response to hurricane Irma nicely illustrates government 
efficiency at all levels, and serves as a reminded of its orderly functioning.  
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A family friendly entertainment site that serves pizza is a cover 
up for Hillary Clinton's child sex ring 1.94 2.03 4.89 3.19 
A powerful secret elite with a sinister agenda is ruling the world 3.71 2.83 6.24 2.64 
Acts that victimize members of a minority race are specifically 
planned and targeted 4.14 2.7 5.02 2.73 
Aliens are behind the world problems and disasters 1.49 1.11 4.89 3.04 
An alien race of lizard shapeshifters actually controls the top 
government positions 1.81 1.72 5 3.26 
An alien spacecraft crashed in Roswell, New Mexico and the 
government covered it up 3.47 2.74 6.47 2.85 
Animal advocates fabricate the factory farming industry's 
mistreatment of animals to try to sway people into not getting the 
nutrients they need from animal products 2.29 1.96 4.88 2.76 
Bigfoot, a human animal hybrid, is a scientific experiment gone 
wrong 1.73 1.37 4.98 2.94 
Billionaires have the presidents of the US on their payroll so that 
they do exactly what they want them to 4.09 2.84 6.48 2.5 
Companies purposely products that do more harm than good and 
create a vicious cycle for consumers to buy more and more 4.36 2.84 5.81 2.33 
Corporations and superrich oil dynasties are buying up water 
rights, controlling nations and populations 4.94 2.71 6.02 2.63 
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Cures for diseases such as Cancer and AIDS exist, but are not 
made public so that the population can be controlled 3.75 3.1 6.28 2.81 
Dangerous chemical trails are left in the air by jets in the sky to 
purposely harm people and keep them sick and docile 2.59 2.44 5.73 3.03 
Democrats are spreading rumours that Trump has interests and 
ties to Russia as an attempt to stop Trump from undoing Obama's 
policies 3.33 2.84 5.55 3.13 
Dinosaurs never existed Carbon dating doesn't exist God did this 
to test our faith 1.73 1.91 4.15 3.26 
Donald Trump only ran for president because it would boost his 
media presence and allow him to gain more money out of his TV 
show, but he never thought he would actually win 5.43 2.91 4.75 2.91 
Edward Snowden is actually a part of complicated NSA plot, and 
the US spy programme was purposely exposed so that citizens 
would fear the NSA 2.42 2.02 5.51 3.05 
Evidence supporting the safety and benefit of genetically 
modified food crops is fabricated, while evidence suggesting the 
dangers of these crops is suppressed 4.09 2.94 5.94 2.46 
George W Bush is a robot 1.4 1.29 3.55 3.14 
Global warming is made up and is a way to bring money to a 
certain group of people 2.07 2.03 5.46 3.11 
Governments use "vaccinations" as disguises to put microchips 
into citizens so they can track their movement 1.92 1.74 5.66 3.14 
Hillary Clinton is a spy for other governments and stole secret 
information via email 1.97 2 5.18 2.99 
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HIV was manmade in order to control the population 2.7 2.53 5.89 3.09 
In the 1969 IsraeliArab war, the Israelis attacked USS Liberty on 
purpose, and not, as they claimed, by accidentally mistaking it 
for an Egyptian ship 2.84 2.29 6.04 2.64 
Iran is the actual money and muscle behind Al Qaeda 3.57 2.33 5.55 2.61 
Jews poisoned wells and consumed the blood of Christians 1.56 1.23 3.74 3.01 
Jews secretly control the banking system and conspire for 
nefarious purposes 2.21 2.24 5.44 3.15 
Kale is pushed to be marketed over other more nutritious 
vegetables, resulting in the hype 3.44 2.61 4.4 2.91 
Kim Jung Un doesn't bleed, and can't actually die 1.35 1.22 3.31 3.09 
Lyme disease is a cross between aids and syphilis that escaped 
the lab via an infected tick 1.92 1.83 4.69 2.98 
Marilyn Monroe was murdered because she knew too much due 
to her affair with President Kennedy 4.1 2.86 6.62 2.57 
Michael Jackson was the same person as La Toya Jackson 1.52 1.45 3.78 3.03 
Michelle Obama is a transgender woman who started out as a 
man 1.73 1.73 4.18 3.16 
NASA faked the 1969 moon landing 2.17 2.17 6.13 3.04 
New age belief systems are trying to debunk God's existence 3.84 2.76 4.18 2.99 
O.J. Simpson was framed for the murders of his ex-wife and her 
friend. 2.04 1.94 4.66 2.96 
Obama wanted to attack and start a Texas civil war during the 
summer of 2015 1.64 1.39 4.21 3.14 
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Osama Bin Laden died just before 9/11 but was used as a 
scapegoat 2.27 2.11 5.28 3.12 
Paid operatives cast votes for the dead people. 3.55 2.73 5.55 2.75 
Paul McCartney died and was replaced by a look alike 1.65 1.52 4.31 3.17 
People that have knowledge of illegal government activities are 
being killed and disposed of. 4.57 2.82 6.13 2.53 
Planned Parenthood encourages abortions so they can make 
money off of selling body parts of dead babies. 2.74 2.69 4.95 3.18 
Planned Parenthood is seeking to destroy the black population by 
injecting them with lethal drugs 1.67 1.54 5 3.28 
Pop star Katy Perry is really JobBenét Ramsey, the sixyearold 
beauty pageant queen who was murdered in the 90s 1.36 1.07 4.12 3.19 
President Obama is secretly a Muslim who wasn't born in Hawaii 2.14 2.33 5.39 3.14 
President Obama was wiretapping President Trump's phone lines 
in the days prior to the election 2.82 2.53 5.6 2.86 
President Roosevelt knew that Pearl Harbor was going to be 
bombed by the Japanese, but did not stop it because he knew it 
would force the United States to enter World War II 3.42 2.64 5.54 2.81 
Princess Diana was not killed in an ordinary car crash; it was an 
assassination 3.66 2.75 6.65 2.59 
Public schools teach specifically to indoctrinate and brainwash 
students with the desired culture 4.08 2.92 5.25 2.87 
Queen Elizabeth died at age 12 and was replaced with a boy That 
is why the queen never married nor appeared in public without 
makeup 1.67 1.34 4.86 3.31 
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Russia sent numerous humans into space before Yuri Gagarin, 
but they died there 2.61 1.94 5.18 2.63 
Russia started the hippie movement in the US because it wanted 
to undermine and weaken America's strong traditional values 2.23 2.23 5.18 3.08 
Russians believe that only Americans can assassinate the 
American way of life 3.27 2.18 3.68 2.83 
Shakespeare didn't write his works; they were written by another 
author 2.72 2.11 4.76 2.96 
Some foods are too big as a result of overgrowing them by the 
use of steroids 4.07 2.96 4.24 2.48 
Some gamblers and some members of the Indianapolis Colts 
were paid to lose the 1969 Superbowl 2.73 2.04 5.68 2.72 
Soy is being used to feminize men 1.97 1.87 4.74 2.99 
Stevie Wonder has been faking his disability 1.58 1.48 4.28 3.09 
Supreme Court Justice Scalia was murdered so that Obama could 
nominate a liberal leaning replacement 2.07 1.93 5.71 2.88 
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was intentionally caused by a 
nuclear weapon detonated in a strategic position under the ocean 1.93 1.71 5.21 3.13 
The 2017 elections were rigged 4.49 3.1 6.31 2.63 
The cameras on phones, TVs, computers and laptops are 
accessed by third party government agencies that monitor 
citizens and watch for illicit activity 4.2 2.83 5.98 2.56 
The Clintons have had people killed to keep them quiet or to tie 
up loose ends for some of their activities that are extremely 
illegal 3.3 2.85 6.14 2.89 
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The criminal charges against Hilary Clinton were all due to a 
conspiracy from the right to make her look bad 3.92 2.88 5.25 2.96 
The Democrats and the Republicans really have the same secret 
agenda and only appear as two choices so the American people 
think they have a choice 3.67 2.84 5.61 2.8 
The development of alternative fuel solutions has been 
suppressed in order to avoid huge monetary losses from 
decreased use of fossil fuels 5.2 2.85 6.25 2.42 
The events in the Bible didn’t really happen but were made up 4.29 3.04 3.54 2.72 
The fat/oil/sugar manufacturers push nonnutritious food and 
poison an ever bloated, waddling public to pharmaceuticals 4.17 2.79 5.09 2.65 
The government and NASA trick people into thinking the Earth 
is round when it's actually flat 1.44 1.4 4.59 3.28 
The government deliberately flooded Louisiana to save the 
homes of the wealthy 2.31 2.22 5 3.27 
The government planted cocaine in black neighbourhoods to 
keep black society addicted and helpless 3.27 2.71 5.11 3.13 
The government possesses a machine that can generate natural 
disasters 2.19 2.09 4.86 3.06 
The government puts fluorine into our water supply in order to 
make us subordinate 2.4 2.26 5.74 2.9 
The government uses media and the entertainment industry to 
control minds 4.35 3.03 6.24 2.54 
The Holocaust is made up just so Jewish people get better 
treatment from society 1.56 1.49 4.31 3.27 
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The identification chips implanted into household pets are being 
used to spy on citizens 2.26 1.94 5.58 2.84 
The Jews in Israel are fake Jews  The true Jews are the Black 
Americans 1.48 1.49 3.36 2.92 
The Mafia Killed Jimmy Hoffa to cover up their influence over 
the Unions 4.45 2.81 5.94 2.52 
The media falsely reports the demographics of the population to 
push an agenda for homosexuals 2.68 2.52 4.85 2.96 
The media is covering up that the Father of Ted Cruz is linked to 
Kennedy assassination 2.49 2.23 5.29 3.07 
The media is steering the narrative against the current 
Washington administration by deliberately faking news stories 3.23 2.87 5.89 2.74 
The moon is actually a large spaceship projecting a "matrix "to 
appear like a rocky surface 1.51 1.36 4.54 3.25 
The Muslims are taking over the world 2.7 2.28 4.34 3.03 
The push for all cable to be broadcast digitally and for analog to 
be done away with was a conspiracy to get everyone properly 
hooked up with the necessary equipment for the government to 
spy on citizens 3.02 2.6 5.86 2.98 
The pyramids in Egypt were built by aliens 2.08 2.06 5.18 3.23 
The rapper Tupac Shakur is still alive and wasn't shot and killed 
in the 90's 2.02 2 5.18 3.15 
The Sandy Hook shootings did not really happen; it was a hoax 
designed by the Government to gather support for stricter gun 
control laws 2.22 2.47 5.66 3.3 
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The taxes are not going completely to the people but for 
politicians’ own personal gain 5.11 2.96 5.47 2.65 
The US didn’t attack Saddam Hussein because they suspected 
weapons of mass destruction but to eliminate a rival power to 
Israel 3.32 2.7 5.71 2.63 
The US economy is really controlled by the Russians and 
Chinese 2.85 2.21 5.71 2.72 
The US Government hid the existence of soldiers left behind 
during the Vietnam war They were then taken to labour camps in 
Russia 3 2.33 5.73 2.81 
The US Government was complicit in the 9/11 terrorist attacks 3.36 2.6 6.42 2.69 
The US wants Assad gone in order to put a gas pipeline through 
Syria 3.4 2.63 5.39 2.76 
The USSR only appeared to collapse to cause a false sense of 
safety in the West 2.32 1.97 4.92 2.83 
The weather is controlled by multiple governments to help 
various industries and hurt others 1.86 1.8 4.99 3.12 
The Y2K bug was just a scheme by computer programmers and 
businesses to make money 3.68 2.87 5.66 2.72 
There are aliens walking among us right now 2.81 2.49 5.07 3.03 
There are magical forces that make ships disappear in the 
Bermuda triangle 2.41 2.1 4.6 3.02 
There are people that are time travellers who can often be seen in 
old photos 2.24 2.15 4.46 3.16 
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There are secret tunnels connecting Denver International Airport 
to NORAD 3.33 2.37 5.21 2.9 
There is a pit on Oak island, off the coast of Canada, that people 
have been digging for centuries but the hole is boobytrapped 
with tunnels that let in water from all over the island the further 
down you dig 3.11 2.42 4.27 2.95 
There is life on Mars, but the Government wants us to believe 
there isn’t 2.5 2.1 5.31 3 
There is secret alien  base on antarctica 2.21 2.04 4.89 3.24 
There was a conspiracy behind the murder of JFK 5.08 2.78 6.84 2.44 
Through several shell companies, the Clinton Foundation 
acquired and supplied Iran with Uranium in exchange for funds 2.94 2.51 5.88 2.71 
Timothy McVeigh didn't blow up the Oklahoma buildings. He 
was a government patsy and instead of receiving the death 
penalty lives in some island far away 2.01 1.74 5.38 3.09 
Trump is conspiring with Russia to start a war 3.61 2.77 5.47 2.88 
TWA Flight 800 was actually shot down mistakenly by a missile 
from a US warship and did not crash – as official reports claim – 
as a result of an explosion of flammable fuel/air vapors in the 
fuel tank 3.09 2.32 6.29 2.51 
Vaccines are a giant conspiracy by "Big Pharma" to stifle 
children and make them easily pliable so that the government can 
mold them into soulless automatons 2.74 2.65 5.75 3.08 
Walt Disney hid immoral subliminal messages in his films 2.92 2.55 5.16 3.03 
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Wars are started and maintained by those who benefit from them 
(ie arms manufacturers, oil companies etc) 4.94 2.88 5.91 2.74 
World War II never occurred, it was simply a fiction planned by 
world leaders to keep their citizens in line 1.3 0.92 4.22 3.38 
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Chapter 4: Does lack of control lead to conspiracy beliefs? A 
meta-analysis 
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Does lack of control lead to conspiracy beliefs? A meta-analysis 
Ana Stojanov, 1 Jamin Halberstadt 1 




Perceived lack of control is widely believed to motivate, at least partly, belief in 
conspiracy theories. We question the theoretical foundations of this belief and meta-analyze 
existing published and unpublished studies to assess the overall effect of lack of control on 
conspiracy beliefs. The overall effect was small and not statistically significant (d = - 0.05), 
and was not moderated by comparison group (baseline vs control affirmation), type of 
manipulation used to threaten control, inclusion of a manipulation check, or sample type. 
However, the predicted effect of control was more likely to be observed when beliefs were 
measured in terms of specific conspiracy theories, rather than as general or abstract claims. 
Overall, the present studies to date offer limited support for the hypothesis that conspiracy 
beliefs arise as a compensatory control.  
 
Keywords: conspiracy theories, compensatory control, lack of control, meta-analysis  
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Conspiracy theories, such as the belief that a secretive organization called the New 
World Order is ruling the world from the shadows, or that the sky is sprayed with harmful 
chemicals, are becoming increasingly prominent (Collins, 2018). The reasons are multiple: 
the Internet has vastly increased the ease with which information can be spread, without a 
corresponding increase in the vetting of information for accuracy (Sharma, Yadav, Yadav & 
Ferdinand, 2017); the structure and business models of many social media companies limit 
exposure to disconfirming information; popular books and movies have shifted fringe 
theories to the mainstream and increased their social acceptability (Kelley-Romano, 2008); 
trust in authority and expertise has eroded (Stevens, 2019; Tsipursky, 2018).  
Conspiracy beliefs’ migration from the periphery to the mainstream has, however, 
been accompanied by a growing awareness among researchers of their potentially harmful 
effects, both for individuals and societies (Jolley, Douglas, Leite, & Schrader, 2019; Jolley, 
Meleady & Douglas, 2019; Douglas & Sutton, 2015; 2018; Bilewicz, Winiewski, Kofta & 
Wójcik, 2013), and a growing interest in understanding them. Some researchers have 
explored the motivational roots of conspiracy theory beliefs (Douglas, Sutton, & Cichocka, 
2017), proposing links, for example, with the need to see the world as structured and ordered 
(Landau, Kay & Whitson, 2015), an idea crystalized in compensatory control theory (Kay, 
Gaucher, Napier, Callan & Laurin, 2008). According to the theory, when personal control, 
people’s primary means to perceive the world as ordered and non-random, is frustrated, they 
will resort to compensatory means of re-establishing order, such as believing in a controlling 
God (Laurin, Kay, & Moscovitch, 2008), a highly competent government (Shepherd, Kay, 
Landau, & Keefer, 2011), or even more abstract beliefs such as in meritocracy (Goode, 
Keefer, & Molina, 2014). From this perspective, despite their often malevolent assumptions, 
conspiracy theories are an effective means of making sense of events that threaten order  
(Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).  The idea has gained traction among researchers and even in 
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popular culture, featuring recently in documentary series (Pichaske & Alpert, 2018), books 
(Brotherton, 2015; van Prooijen, 2018) and articles on conspiracy theory beliefs (Shermer, 
2014; Oaklander, 2015, Yong, 2008). It is timely to consider formally the strength of the 
experimental evidence for this claim, especially as it does not follow straightforwardly from 
compensatory control theory.  
 
Control and conspiracy beliefs 
An argument can be made that conspiracy theory beliefs are not, in principle, well 
suited to function as a compensatory control mechanism. First, conspiracy theories, by 
accounting for errant data, connecting seemingly unconnected events, and leaving nothing 
unexplained (Clarke, 2002; Keeley, 1999) provide too much order and structure. According 
to compensatory control theory people seek an optimal sense of control, not a maximum, and 
Kay and Sullivan (2013) suggest that too much structure is just as aversive as too little.  
Second, because the conspirators are malevolent by definition (van Prooijen, 2018) 
and belief in conspiracy theories is accompanied by social stigma (Lantian, Muller, Nurra, 
Klein, Berjot & Pantazi, 2018), they are neither “socially acceptable” nor “culturally 
accessible” – two important criteria for an effective compensatory control mechanism (Kay 
& Sullivan, 2013). The reliance on conspiracy theory beliefs is particularly dubious given the 
multitude of alternative, benevolent, non-stigmatizing, proven substitutes for personal 
control, such as belief in social progress or in competent authorities (Shepherd, et al., 2011). 
Even if these alternatives are not all equally effective at establishing a sense of control, 




   
 
   
 
153 
The current study 
Although the claim that conspiracy theories compensate for threatened control has 
dubious theoretical validity, does it have empirical support? In the current study, we review 
and meta-analyze the currently available evidence. In addition, we examine potential 
moderators such as operationalization of conspiracy beliefs, type of experimental 
manipulation, presence or absence of manipulation check, comparison group, and participant 
sample. We also examine publication bias by comparing the overall effect of published and 





Literature search and selection criteria. 
We conducted our literature search in February 2019, and updated it in June 2019. In 
line with the recommendations of Card (2011), we searched both discipline-specific 
databases (PsychInfo) and larger, cross-disciplinary databases (Web of Science, Scopus),  
using the following keywords: (conspir*  OR  (conspir*  AND (ideation OR belief* 
OR theory)))  AND (control OR power*).  To locate unpublished papers, we searched 
ProQuest Dissertations and Thesis (using the same search keywords), Open Access Thesis 
and Dissertations ( keywords: (conspir* AND control) AND (ideation OR belief OR theory)),  
and sent e-mails inquiring about any unpublished data to authors who have previously 
published on this topic. Finally, a call for unpublished data was sent to the list serv of the 
Society for Personality and Social Psychology, the Society of Experimental Social 
Psychology, and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.  
   
 
   
 
154 
The search yielded 2360 unique records. Figure 1. presents a PRISMA flowchart of 
the selection process (Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, Altman, & The PRISMA Group, 2009).  The 
first author screened the abstracts of these records to find studies that both manipulated 
participants’ feelings of control and also measured conspiracy beliefs, after which 25 items 
remained for full text consideration. Of those, studies were included if they both represented 
original research (i.e. were not previously reported), and whose manipulation check, when 
reported, was successful.  
Based on these criteria we included 15 reports that contained 23 studies, and 45 effect 
sizes (16 published, 29 unpublished) for meta-analysis. 
 
  
   
 








Figure 1. PRISMA-style flowchart showing selection of studies for meta-analysis on 
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Type of experimental manipulation. Control has been experimentally manipulated 
in a variety of ways, such as recall priming, in which participants recall and describe an event 
in which they felt out of control (e.g. Whitson & Galinsky, 2008; van Elk & Lodder, 2018), 
biased questionnaires, in which participants indicate agreement with statements designed to 
threaten their control (e.g. Sullivan, Landau & Rothschild, 2010), and concept identification, 
in which participants receive noncontingent feedback (e.g. Imhoff, 2015, Study 3). It is 
possible that some of these tasks are more effective at eliciting the desired state (i.e. lack of 
control) than others; consequently, if the hypothesized effect of lack of control on conspiracy 
beliefs exists, it may be moderated by the type of manipulation used.  
Operationalization of conspiracy beliefs. Conspiracy beliefs have also been 
measured in a variety of ways, for example via judgments of coincidences (Whitson & 
Galinsky, 2008), ratings on the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire or variants of it (van Elk 
& Lodder, 2018; Imhoff, 2015 Study 1), or by asking about the likelihood of a conspiracy in 
an ambiguous scenario (Whitson, Kim, Wang, Menon & Webster, 2018). These measures can 
be more abstractly classed as specific (i.e. having to do with particular events or groups) or 
generic (the tendency to think in conspiratorial terms). Imhoff (2015), for example, implies 
that lack of control should only increase belief in specific conspiracies, but not the general 
tendency to believe in conspiracy, which is more or less stable. Thus, the way conspiracy 
beliefs are measured may be source of variation in effect sizes. We examine this possibility 
by looking at operationalization of the dependent variable as a potential moderator.  
Comparison group. The condition to which threatened control is compared could 
likewise account for variance in results. For example, some studies use control affirmation 
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(asking participants to recall an event in which they were in control) as a comparison (e.g. 
Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), while others use a baseline group (no reference to control; e.g. 
Hart & Graether, 2018 study 2). Indeed, all studies that support the compensatory control 
hypothesis appear to have compared the low control to control affirmation group. To 
formally test possible differences between these research designs, we include comparison 
group as a moderator in our analysis.  
Manipulation Check. Another, nonobvious source of variability may be the use of a 
manipulation check. Some researchers have charged that manipulation checks in 
experimental designs in general are unwise because, among other things, they may undo the 
effect of the manipulation (Hauser, Ellsworth & Gonzales, 2018). In the case of 
compensatory control theory specifically, it may be that the opportunity to assert control via 
self-report is sufficient to undo the (presumably weak) threat posed by the experimental 
manipulation, which might account for some null findings.  
Sample. Participants in majority of the studies were either students or Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk) workers. To assess if the effect is more or less strong depending on the 
population the sample was drawn from, we included sample as potential moderator.  
Publication status. Publication bias may lead to larger estimates of an effect size 
(Rothstein, Sutton, & Borenstein, 2006). As 64% of the effect sizes were drawn from 
unpublished studies, we used publication status as a potential moderator. Along with other 
tests of publication bias, this allowed us to examine whether the published literature in this 
area systematically differs from the unpublished studies.   
 
 
   
 




The title, publication year, authors, sample, dependent measure operationalization, 
type of experimental manipulation, presence or absence of manipulation check, comparison 
group, publication status, and effect sizes were extracted from the studies that met the 
inclusion criteria. When group sample size was not reported, and the authors did not respond 
to our inquires, equal sample size was assumed across experimental groups. Cohen’s d 
(Cohen, 1988), based on information reported in the articles (or, if necessary, on 
communication with the authors themselves) was obtained with the function escalc from the 
metafor package (Viechtbauer, 2010); negative values indicate that decreases in control 
increased conspiracy beliefs, in support of the compensatory control hypothesis.  The first 
author along with two trained research assistants coded the moderators in the studies. The 
three coders agreed 87% of the time, with disagreements resolved through discussion. Table 
1. lists the moderator coding criteria. 
Note that, where relevant, separate effect sizes were calculated for each dependent 
variable and/or each comparison group within each reported study, which introduced some 
dependency into the data. This dependency was dealt with by using meta-analysis with robust 
variance estimates (RVE), which adjusts for dependent effect sizes (Hedges, Tipton, & 
Johnson, 2010). The RVE method is implemented in R (R Core Team, 2018) in the robumeta 
package (Fisher & Tipton, 2015), which is suitable for meta-analyses with small numbers of 
studies (Tipton, 2015). Since it has been recommended to choose weighting based on the 
predominant dependency (Tanner-Smith & Tipton, 2014), we used the correlated weighting 
scheme (Hedges et al., 2010), as most of the dependency arose due to studies providing 
multiple effect sizes (66%) as opposed to studies coming from a single lab (33%).   
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Table 1. Moderator Coding Criteria and number of studies meeting each criteria 








Other    
The sample consisted of undergraduate students, or predominantly of 
students. (n = 8 studies) 
 
The sample consisted of MTurk participants (n = 10 studies) 
 










Participants were asked to recall and describe a time when they felt out of 
control. (n = 18 studies) 
 











Conspiracy beliefs were operationalized as belief in a specific conspiracy or 
set of conspiracies (e.g. Nasa faked the moon landing, Jews secretly control 
the banking system). (n = 16 studies) 
 
Conspiracy beliefs were operationalized as generic beliefs, e.g measured with 
the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (Bruder et al, 2013) or the Generic 













The comparison group was a control affirmation group (e.g. a group asked to 
recall a time when they were in control, or in other way affirmed their sense 
of control) (n = 14 studies) 
 
The comparison group was a baseline group, who either did nothing, or 
recalled and described a memory on neutral topic such as watching TV or 










The authors report using manipulation check. (n = 4 studies) 
 








The study is published in a peer-reviewed journal. (n = 9 studies) 
 
The study is from a dissertation, unpublished data, manuscript in 






   
 




Overview of studies 
The average experiment had 375 participants (total N=8618 participants; 54% 
female). In the majority of the experiments, lack of control was elicited with the recall task 
(78% of studies). In this task participants are asked to recall and describe an event when they 
felt completely out of control. The low control group was compared with a control 
affirmation group in 60% of studies, and with a baseline in 60%7 of studies. Conspiracy 
beliefs were operationalized as belief in a specific conspiracy theory or theories in 70% of 
studies, and as a generic attitude in 39%8.  A summary of the coded features of all studies 
included in the meta-analysis, including effect sizes, is given in Table 2.  
  
 
7 Some of the studies had multiple comparison groups, hence percentages do not add to 100. 
8 Some of the studies had multiple dependent variables, hence the percentages do not add to 100. 
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Whitson & Galinsky 




Recall task No Students Published 76% 25 -0.85 
Whitson & Galinsky 
(2008), Study 6, self 
affirmation 
Specific Baseline Recall task No Students Published 62% 50 0.02 
Whitson & Galinsky , 
(2008), Study 6, no 
affirmation 
Specific Baseline Recall task No Students Published 62% 50 -0.55 
Whitson and Galinsky, 





Recall task No Other Unpublished 46% 41 -0.72 
Whitson and Galinsky, 





Recall task No Other Unpublished 46% 41 -0.61 





Recall task No Students Unpublished 62% 50 0.28 
Sullivan et al. (2010), 





Other Yes Students Published 54% 59 -0.46 
Sullivan et al. (2010), 





Other Yes Students Published 54% 59 0.20 
van Prooijen & Acker 
(2015), Study 1 
Specific Baseline Recall task No Students Published 67% 119 -0.26 
van Prooijen & Acker 




Recall task No Students Published 67% 119 -0.73 
Hart & Graether 




Recall task No Mturk Published 46% 422 0.11 
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Hart & Graether 
(2018), Study 2 
Generic Baseline Recall task No Mturk Published 49% 831 0.09 
Whitson et al. (2018), 





Recall task No Students Published 51% 215 -0.49 
Whitson et al. (2018), 





Recall task No Students Published 51% 215 0.11 
Whitson et al. (2018), 




Specific Baseline Recall task No MTurk Unpublished 47% 251 -0.36 
Whitson et al. (2018), 




Specific Baseline Recall task No MTurk Unpublished 47% 251 0.32 
Nyhan & Zeitzoff 




Recall task Yes Other Published 45% 2015 -0.03 
Nyhan & Zeitzoff 
(2018b), Study 1, 
without amendment 
Specific Baseline Recall task No Other Published 52% 2170 -0.15 
Nyhan & Zeitzoff 





Recall task No Other Published 52% 2170 -0.13 
Nyhan & Zeitzoff 
(2018b), Study 1, with 
amendment 
Specific Baseline Recall task No Other Published 52% 2170 0.10 
Nyhan & Zeitzoff 





Recall task No Other Published 52% 2170 0.05 
   
 




(2015), Study 1 
Generic Baseline Other No Students Unpublished - 44 -0.20 
Imhoff Unpublished 




Other No Students Unpublished - 72 0.20 
Lamberty, unpublished 
data 
Generic Baseline Recall task No Mturk Unpublished 47% 199 -0.11 
Lamberty, unpublished 
data 
Specific Baseline Recall task No Mturk Unpublished 47% 199 -0.12 
Bukowski, 




Other No Other Unpublished - 120 -0.49 
Bukowski, 




Other No Other Unpublished - 120 0.11 
Bukowski, 




Other No Other Unpublished - 120 -0.32 
Kofta et al., 
unpublished, Generic 
Generic Baseline Other No Other  Unpublished 41% 172 -0.19 
Kofta et al., 
unpublished, Jews 
Specific Baseline Other No Other Unpublished 41% 172 -0.55 
Kofta et al., 
unpublished, Germans 
Specific Baseline Other No Other Unpublished 41% 172 -0.41 
Kofta et al., 
unpublished, Russians 
Specific Baseline Other No Other Unpublished 41% 172 -0.35 
Marques & Natoli, 
unpublished 
Specific Baseline Recall task Yes Mturk Unpublished 52% 323 -0.22 











Recall task No Students Unpublished 53% 83 0.16 
Stojanov et al. 
unpublished, Study 1 
Generic Baseline Recall task Yes Mturk Unpublished 65% 194 0.27 
Stojanov et al., 




Recall task Yes Mturk Unpublished 65% 194 0.14 
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Stojanov et al., 
unpublished, Study 3 
Generic Baseline Recall task No Mturk Unpublished 61% 197 -0.14 
Stojanov et al.,   
unpublished, Study 4 
Specific Baseline Recall task No Mturk Unpublished 63% 199 0.02 
Stojanov et al., 
unpublished, Study 5, 
control related CT 
Specific Baseline Recall task No Mturk Unpublished 64% 291 -0.03 
Stojanov et al., 
unpublished, Study 5, 




Recall task No Mturk Unpublished 64% 291 0.14 
Stojanov et al., 
unpublished, Study 5, 
control unrelated CT 
Specific Baseline Recall task No Mturk Unpublished 64% 291 0.01 
Stojanov et al., 
unpublished, Study 5, 




Recall task No Mturk Unpublished 64% 291 0.02 
Stojanov et al., 
unpublished, Study 6, 
competent government 
scenario 
Generic Baseline Recall task No Mturk Unpublished 62% 501 0.14 
Stojanov et al., 
unpublished, Study 6, 
incompetent 
government scenario 
Generic Baseline Recall task No Mturk Unpublished 62% 501 -0.07 
  




We used the robumeta package (Fisher & Tipton, 2015) to fit an intercept-only 
random effects model. The intercept can be interpreted as the precision-weighted, correlated-
effect dependencies adjusted, overall effect size. The same approached was used to calculate 
the effect sizes for each level of our moderators of interest. It should be noted, though, that 
many observations are needed to achieve high power in moderation analysis (Hedges & 
Pigott, 2004), thus non-significant interaction findings should be interpreted with caution.  
We also checked for influential cases with the function influence.measures; no 
influential cases were detected. 
Overall effect size. Forty-five effect sizes were used to compute the overall effect 
(see Figure 2.). Of these, descriptively, 26 were in the direction hypothesized by 
compensatory control theory and 19 in the opposite direction.  Effect sizes ranged from -0.85 
to 0.32 (see Figure 2.).  The overall effect size was d = -0.05 , 95% CI [ -0.11, 0.02], t (16.3) 
= -1.45,  p = 0.16. The statistic for the ratio of true heterogeneity to total variance (Higgins, 
Thompson, Deeks, & Altman 2003) (I2 = 43.13) suggested moderate heterogeneity of the 
data, justifying further tests of potential moderators. Table 3. gives the effect size estimates 
for each level of each moderator.  
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Table 3. Estimate of effect size for each level of each moderators, along with significance test 
of moderation effects 
Moderator Level s k d β F 95% CI p 
Sample   38   1.22  0.37 
 Students 8 13 -0.13   [-0.35, 0.09] 0.19 
 MTurk 10 18 0.02   [-0.06, 0.10] 0.62 
 Other 5 14 -0.12   [-0.39, 0.13] 0.21 
DV 
operationalization 
    -0.14  [-0.26, -0.02] 0.02* 
 Specific 16 34 -0.11   [-0.20, -0.02] 0.02* 
 Generic 9 11 0.03   [-0.07, 0.43] 0.48 
Comparison group     0.01  [-0.10, 0.13] 0.82 
 Baseline 14 23 -0.05   [-0.14, 0.04] 0.27 
 Control 
Affirmation 
14 22 -0.05   [-0.16, 0.06] 0.34 
Experimental 
manipulation 
    0.13  [-0.16, 0.43] 0.29 
 Recall task 18 34 -0.03   [-0.09, 0.04] 0.38 
 Other 5 11 -0.16   [-0.46, 0.14] 0.21 
Manipulation check     0.04  [-0.17, 0.26] 0.62 
 Present 4 7 -0.02   [-0.26, 0.23] 0.8 
 Absent 19 38 -0.06   [-0.14, 0.02] 0.15 
Publication Status     0.01  [-0.14, 0.15] 0.92 
 Unpublished 15 29 -0.04   [-0.13, 0.05] 0.36 
 Published 9 16 -0.07   [-0.22, 0.08] 0.29 
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Note: k = number of effect size estimates; s = number of studies;  d = Cohen’s standardized 
difference; β = coefficients from separate meta-regressions where a two level moderator was 
dummy coded and entered as a predictor; F =  Approximate Hotelling – Zhang with small 
sample correction omnibus test for moderators with more than two levels; 95% CI refer either 
to β coefficients or d values; p corresponds to β or F.  * = significant at < 0.05, + = significant 
at < 0.1 
  




Figure 2. Forest plot of the effect size for the studies in the meta-analysis. Filled squares 
indicate effect sizes of the respective studies. The white square indicates the overall effect 
size.  
Forest Plot
1. Whitson & Galinsky, 2008
2. Whitson & Galinsky, 2008
3. Whitson & Galinsky, 2008
4. Sullivan et al., 2010
5. van Prooijen & Acker, 2015
6. Hart & Graether, 2018
7. Hart & Graether, 2018
8. Whitson et al., 2018
9. Whitson et al., 2018
10. Nyhan & Zeitzoff, The Jouranl of Politics, 2018





16. Kofta et al., under review
17. Marques & Natoli, unpublished
18. Kumareswaran, 2014
19. Stojanov et al., under review
20. Stojanov et al., under review
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Moderator analysis.   
Moderators with three levels.  
Sample. Because the variable sample had more than two levels, we performed an 
omnibus test, following the recommendations by Tanner-Smith, Tipton, and Polanin (2016). 
We used the clubSandwhich package (Pustejovsky, 2016) to obtain F value from the 
Approximate Hotelling-Zhang test, which indicated that there is no reliable difference among 
the levels of this variable, F = 1.22, df = 4.77,  p = 0.37. 
Moderators with two levels. 
For the moderators with two levels, we ran separate analyses on effect size using each 
potential moderator as an independent variable in turn. These analyses revealed a significant 
effect of DV operationalization, β = - 0.14, 95% CI [-0.26, -0.02], p = 0.02, such that the 
threats to control increased beliefs in specific conspiracy theories ( d = -0.11, 95% CI [-0.20, 
-0.02], p = 0.02), but not generic conspiracy theory beliefs (d = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.14], p 
= 0.48).  Effect sizes did not differ as a function of the presence of a manipulation check, the 
comparison group used, or how control was manipulated. 
Post hoc analysis.  Given the significant effect of control beliefs on specific 
conspiracy theory beliefs, we examined, for exploratory purposes, if this effect is moderated 
by any of the other variables. None did, though it is worth noting that the effect was 
significant for studies that omitted manipulation checks (β =-0.13, 95% CI [-0.26, -0.01], p 
=0.03), but not for studies that used them (β =-0.06, 95% CI [-0.43, 0.31], p=0.37). 
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Publication bias. We tested for publication bias in two ways. First, we analysed the 
magnitude of effect sizes as a function of publication status; there was no difference between 
published and unpublished studies. Second, we aggregated the effect size for the published 
studies and estimated the adjusted effect size using the trim and fill procedure (Duval & 
Tweedie, 2000). In the trim phase of the procedure, the studies that contribute for 
asymmetrical plot are excluded and an adjusted symmetry effect is calculated. In the fill 
phase, the excluded studies are replaced along with their “missing” counterparts around the 
adjusted effect size.  The adjusted effect size was estimated to be d = -0.01, 95% CI = [-0.14, 
0.12], p = 0.87. As can be seen from the funnel plot in Figure 3., the trim and fill procedure 
identified three “missing studies”, suggesting publication bias.  
 
Figure 3. Funnel plot obtained with the trim and fill procedure. White circles indicate 
imputed studies.  
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P-curve analysis. P-curve analysis has been introduced as a method of evaluating sets of 
statistically significant results for evidential value (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014). 
If the effect in question is true, then the distribution of significant p-values follows a distinct 
pattern of greater density of low values than high values (i.e., a right skew). On the other 
hand, if the effect is non-existent (type I error), the distribution of the p-values should be 
uniform as there is equal probability to obtain any p-value within the null distribution (Hung, 
O'Neill, Bauer, & Kohne, 1997). Thus, the shape of the p-curve can help distinguish a set of 
significant findings that are likely to be replicated (right skew) or not (flat line). 
 The test has two parts. In the first part the set of p-values is tested for right skew: the 
probability of obtaining the p-value if the null hypothesis is true is calculated for each p-
value. These probabilities are then aggregated to yield a Z test of skew; significance of the Z 
test suggests a significant right skewed p-curve. In the second part, it is tested if the p-curve 
is significantly flatter than one would expect if the studies were powered at 33%; if it is, then 
the set of findings lacks evidential value: if an effect exists, it is negligible. If the distribution 
of p-values is not flatter than one would expect if the studies were powered at 33% than the 
p-curve is inconclusive, and more p-values are needed to determine whether the studies 
contain evidential value.  
As the p-curve shape is tied to the probability that a study will yield a significant 
result, p-curve can also be used to estimate the power of the studies (Simonsohn, Nelson & 
Simmons, 2014). 




Figure 4. P-curve analysis results 
 
 We subjected the studies from the meta-analysis to p-curve analysis (see Figure 4.). 
The p-curve disclosure table can be found in the Supplementary Materials. Testing for right 
skew, Z=0.34, p=0.63, did not suggest evidential value; the 33% power test was Z=-1.93, 
p=0.03, suggesting that direct replications of the examined studies are not expected to 
succeed.  The average power of the studies was 5% which is what would be expected when 
the true effect size is zero and the significance level is 0.05 (Simmons & Simonsohn, 2017). 
The 90% CI around the power estimate suggested that if the same studies were conducted 
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again it is unlikely that more than 25% would replicate (Simmons & Simonsohn, 2017) and 
the best estimate is that only 5% would be yield significant results.  
 Discussion 
 
The current study is the first attempt to systematically review and evaluate the 
available evidence for conspiracy beliefs as a compensatory control mechanism. The results 
of our meta-analysis offered very little support for that hypothesis: the overall effect size was 
-.05, not different from chance, and was not strongly moderated by any of several obvious 
contenders. The most promising moderator was the nature of the dependent variable, with a 
significant effect detected for specific theories, but not for generic conspiracy beliefs. We can 
only speculate about the cause of this difference, but one possibility is that generic conspiracy 
belief reflects a relatively stable personality trait that is insensitive to momentary threats to 
control. Another is that generic beliefs are too broad for compensatory control purposes, 
which might require a more specific wrongdoer as a focal point.  
Looking more closely at specific conspiracies only, for which the effect was 
significant, the effect appeared to be more likely observed if the design did not use 
manipulation check (though the effect was not significantly different from the effect coming 
from studies that did use manipulation check). Future studies should explore this trend 
further; if robust it could prove both methodologically and theoretically important. It is worth 
nothing, though, that even the effect observed for specific conspiracy theories is weak, 
suggesting a limited role for lack of control. Moreover, the p-curve analysis did not 
demonstrate right skew, suggesting that the significant findings are most likely due to chance. 
Overall then, the prospects for finding a significant experimental effect of control on 
conspiracy theory beliefs are not promising.  
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Although the evidence from existing research offers very limited support for the 
compensatory control hypothesis, it is too soon to reject it. Many experimental manipulations 
of control have dubious validity. The most common experimental technique – asking 
participants to recall an uncontrollable situation – is transparent and vulnerable to 
experimenter demand (Orne, 2009). Even if a change in perceived control is genuine in this 
paradigm, it is in principle unstable: if a participant’s sense of control can be altered merely 
by imagining an uncontrollable situation, it should be rectified just as easily, such as by 
spontaneously recruiting additional, compensatory cognitions. Indeed, some researchers have 
proposed that simply asking participants about their feelings of control (e.g., in a 
manipulation check) is sufficient to undo any threat their previous recall produced (Hauser et 
al., 2018), a trend evident in our data as well. Even at their best, laboratory manipulations that 
require participants to imagine past threats are likely to pale in comparison to the situations 
that actually caused the threats. To our knowledge there is no study of such “natural” threats 
to control, and such a study would be an important complement to the experimental literature.  
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the current analyses as well. 
Although we made every attempt to locate all relevant experimental data, it is possible that 
we did not identify all the existing records. Furthermore, although the number of studies in 
the analysis is well within the norm (Tipton, 2015, cites a finding that 50% of meta-analysis 
in the social sciences include fewer than 32 studies), it is still a relatively small absolute 
number, and conclusions about moderating variables in particular are limited.  
To conclude, this is the first study to systematically examine the available evidence 
for the thesis that lack of control leads to conspiracy beliefs. The current literature, both 
published and unpublished, offers very limited support for the hypothesis that conspiracy 
theory beliefs are a compensatory control mechanism, with the most promising moderator 
being the nature of the dependent measure: there was a significant (albeit weak) effect of 
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control manipulation only when conspiracy beliefs were operationalized in terms of specific 
conspiracies.  If conspiracy beliefs are indeed in part a result of compensatory control 
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 Abstract  
While lack of perceived control is plausible explanation of conspiracy beliefs, the 
experimental evidence so far has provided only mixed support, due in part, we argue, to 
limits of control manipulations in the laboratory. We present two studies in naturalistic 
settings that provide evidence that the control hypothesis has merit. In the first study, 
Macedonian participants completed a conspiracy ideation scale immediately after a national 
referendum on the country’s name change from Macedonia to North Macedonia, and one 
year after. The opposition, whose perceived control was presumably lowered after the name 
change took place, increased their conspiracy beliefs, but supporters did not. Study 2, 
conducted with American participants in the wake of a series of devastating tornadoes, 
conceptually replicated and expanded the first study: the effects were evident only for the 
threatening event-related conspiracy beliefs. Taken together these studies expand the 
inconclusive experimental literature and offer the first evidence about the causal link of lack 





Keywords: conspiracy beliefs, perceived control, compensatory control, natural disasters, 
political upheaval  
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The Food and Drug Administration is withholding the cure for cancer. The sky is 
being sprayed with harmful chemicals. Muslim immigrants are plotting to attack the country 
from within. These are prototypical examples of conspiracy theories. Although there is 
currently no agreed-upon definition used by the research community, conspiracy theories are 
generally thought of as implausible, unwarranted claims that significant events are being 
caused by malevolent, clandestine groups. Such “theories” typically contradict explanations 
provided by the relevant epistemic authorities, and tend to be embedded in a broader (often 
socio-political) explanatory framework (Stojanov & Halberstadt, 2019).  
The psychological underpinnings of conspiracy beliefs have become the subject of 
increased research interest (e.g., Brotherton & French, 2015; Cichocka, Marchlewska & de 
Zavala, 2016; Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017, 2018; Swami et al., 2011; 
van Prooijen, 2016; van Prooijen, Douglas & De Inocencio, 2018), as researchers have 
posited various motivating forces behind people’s endorsement of such beliefs. These include 
the need for uniqueness (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017; Lantian, Muller, Nurra & Douglas, 
2017), the need to see the world as ordered and structured (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), and, 
in particular, the need for personal control (van Prooijen & Acker, 2015). Several studies 
have demonstrated that when participants’ sense of control is threatened, such as by asking 
them to recall and describe an event when they lacked control (van Prooijen & Acker, 2015), 
or by reminding them about everyday uncontrollable hazards (Sullivan, Landau & 
Rothschild, 2010), they report stronger conspiracy beliefs relative to control groups.  
According to Kay and colleagues’ compensatory control theory, one of the better 
articulated treatments of the control hypothesis, conspiracy theory beliefs help those who 
have lost a sense of personal control to restore their worldview that existence is non-random, 
ordered and structured (see Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan & Laurin, 2008; Kay, Sullivan & 
Landau, 2015). Belief in nefarious, conspiring agents is not the only way that individuals can 
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regain such a worldview; other restorative “agents” include God (Laurin, Kay, & 
Moscovitch, 2008), the government (Shepherd, Kay, Landau, & Keefer, 2011), and even 
abstract constructs such as meritocracy (Goode, Keefer, & Molina, 2014). However, under 
the right conditions, explaining unsettling events as the product of coordinated, secretive 
actors can be psychologically appealing, and presumably a conspiracy theory is preferable to 
no explanation at all (Marchlewska, Cichocka & Kossowska, 2018).  
A closer look at the evidence, however, reveals that the link between personal control 
and conspiracy beliefs has not been definitively established. For practical as well as ethical 
reasons, virtually all research on control and conspiracy beliefs is conducted in the 
laboratory, using various priming techniques to challenge participants’ sense of control, or 
more often to remind them of times when their sense of control has been challenged. In a 
typical experiment, one group of participants, usually undergraduate students, is asked to 
recall and describe an incident in which they felt they did not have any control over the 
situation, while another group is asked to do the same for an event in which they were in 
complete control (or for a neutral event with no control implications). They then answer a 
questionnaire assessing their belief in conspiracy theories, operationalized as either belief in a 
specific conspiracy claims or as generic conspiracy beliefs (Brotherton, French & Pickering, 
2013; Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah & Imhoff, 2013; Stojanov & Halberstadt, 2019).  
Although many of these studies do suggest that people compensate for diminished personal 
control by endorsing conspiratorial beliefs (e.g., van Prooijen & Acker, 2015; Whitson & 
Galinsky, 2008), other studies (e.g., van Elk & Lodder, 2018) find the opposite, such that 
participants whose control is threatened report weaker conspiracy beliefs than participants 
whose control is not threatened. Still other studies report no difference in conspiracy beliefs 
at all (e.g., Hart & Graether, 2018; Nyhan & Zeitzoff, 2018; Stojanov, Bering & Halberstadt, 
under review).  
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 It is unclear why the evidence for the compensatory control hypothesis is so variable, 
but a likely component is the relatively weak effects of experimental manipulations of 
control. The standard experimental technique of asking participants to recall an 
uncontrollable situation is dubious for several reasons. Such manipulations are transparent to 
participants and subject to experimenter demand (Orne, 2009). But even assuming that 
participants truthfully and accurately report their sense of personal control, manipulations 
based on brief, abstract threats to control are in principle unstable: if a participant’s sense of 
control can be altered by imagining an uncontrollable situation, it should be able to be 
rectified just as easily. Some participants may exhibit psychological reactance (Brehm, 1989) 
and restore their sense of control without waiting for the opportunity to endorse conspiracy 
theories, potentially overcompensating for the experimental threat in the process. Indeed, 
Hauser, Ellsworth and Gonzales (2018) have argued that merely answering a manipulation 
check, such as having participants report on their sense of control after it has been 
experientially threatened, is sufficient to undo the effects of the manipulation. Moreover, 
there are some indications that the recall task may not always be effective in manipulating 
participants’ feelings of control in the first place (e.g., van Elk & Lodder, 2018). 
Even at their best, experimental manipulations in which participants imagine or recall 
threats to control pale in comparison to the situations that actually caused the threats. To our 
knowledge there is no study of conspiracy beliefs and perceived control in their “natural” 
environment. Such an approach would be an important complement to the experimental 
literature: from a methodological perspective, examining people’s conspiracy beliefs 
following a “real” threat to their perceived sense of control provides a more powerful and 
ecologically valid way to address the central claims of the compensatory control model; from 
a theoretical perspective, this approach would speak directly to the sort of social and political 
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events that appear to motivate conspiracy beliefs in the first place (van Prooijen & Douglas, 
2017).  
We examine how lack of control affects conspiracy beliefs in real contexts: a political 
crisis in North Macedonia (Study 1); and a natural disaster in North America (Study 2). 
Although the two events could hardly be less similar on the surface, they both represent acute 
and significant challenges to feelings of control among the individuals who experienced 
them. 
 
Study 1: North Macedonian Political Crisis, 2018-2019 
Background  
The state of Yugoslavia disintegrated between 1989 – 1992, and its constituent parts, 
the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Socialist Republic of Croatia, the 
Socialist Republic of Slovenia, and the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, became independent 
countries9. Of these, we were especially interested in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, 
which declared its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 to create the Republic of 
Macedonia. This name was, however, disputed by Greece on the grounds that Macedonia 
already describes a region in Greece, and that “the Republic of Macedonia” implies territorial 
claims by this state against the Greek province with the same name. Thus, Greece objected to 
the country being recognized by its constitutional name (Republic of Macedonia), which in 
turn resulted in the UN admitting membership to the country under the reference, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).  
 
9 The Socialist Republic of Serbia and the Socialist Republic of Montenegro were initially united as the State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro, but Montenegro declared independence in 2006.  
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Moreover, in the early 1990s Greece imposed a trade embargo and, until recently, 
blocked the country’s ascension into EU and NATO. After nearly three decades of conflict, 
the two countries found a mutually acceptable solution with the signing of the Prespa 
agreement in June 2018. Among other things, this agreement meant that Republic of 
Macedonia would change its name to the Republic of North Macedonia. However, the 
opposition parties in both countries found the Prespa agreement unacceptable and nationwide 
protests were initiated. The Greek opposition argued that too many concessions were made in 
the agreement, such as recognition of Macedonian nationality and language (Smith, 2019); 
and the Macedonian opposition argued that the name change threatened national identity.  
 The Prespa agreement needed Macedonian approval via a national referendum.  
However, sensing that public opinion was not supportive of the name change, the 
Macedonian government determined that the referendum would be consultative rather than 
obligatory, and framed the question in a way many considered manipulative: “Are you in 
favour of European Union and NATO membership by accepting the agreement between the 
Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece?”. In response, a movement emerged on 
social media calling on the population to boycott the referendum entirely (#bojkotiram), 
based on the belief that if the required 50% voter turnout was not met, the name change 
would not take place. Indeed, voter turnout for the referendum, which took place September 
30th of 2018, only reached 37% of the population, and although those who voted were 
overwhelmingly in favor (94%), it was the opposition who celebrated victory.  However, as it 
turns out, the opposition was wrong: despite the failure to obtain the minimum voter turnout, 
Macedonia officially changed to North Macedonia in February 2019 (see Figure 1 for 
timeline of events). 
Thus, the political situation in Macedonia created a natural experiment, in which some 
citizens’ sense of control, but not others’ was threatened by a salient and emotional political 
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event. To test the effect of this natural manipulation on conspiracy beliefs, we measured those 
beliefs at two points in time: immediately after the opposition’s apparently successful boycott 
(when their sense of control was presumably high); and one year later, after the name change 
had already been into effect for six months (when their sense of control was low).  If lack of 
control leads to conspiracy beliefs, then the opposition should endorse conspiracy beliefs to a 
greater extent at the second point than the first, but the opposite should be true for name-






















Time 1 survey 
Name changed officially 
 
Time 2 survey 




Participants. A local market research company was hired for recruiting participants. A 
representative sample of 307 ethnic Macedonians (the ethnic majority, for whom the name 
change is most relevant) were sent the survey both immediately (Time 1) and one year after 
(Time 2) the referendum. For the purposes of the current research, we present data only from 
participants who reported that they either voted in favor of the name change, or boycotted the 
referendum/voted no (i.e., excluding those who did not vote for other reasons or did not 
disclose their behavior), and who provided data at both time points (overall dropout rate was 
48%, while the dropout rate only for the participants who voted yes or boycotted/voted no 
was 37%). This left 116 participants in total, 61 opposers (boycotters or “no” voters”, 30 
females, 31 males, mean age was 42.96 years, SD= 15.31) and 55 supporters (26 females, 29 
males, mean age M=43.78 years, SD=14.34). The majority had a Bachelor’s degree (50.9%), 
followed by high school degree (33.6%), Master’s degree (6%) or Associate degree (6%). 
Only 1.7% had a doctoral degree and 1.7% had finished only primary education. Supporters 
and opposers did not differ in terms of their education level, χ2(5)=4.91, p=0.427. 
Procedure. A Macedonian market research company, GfK Skopje, was tasked with 
data collection. Participants were directed to the Qualtrics online platform to complete the 
survey, which was part of a larger study on an unrelated topic10. All materials were written 
first in English and then translated independently by two people fluent in English and 
Macedonian (one of whom was the first author); minor disagreements in wording were 
resolved via discussion.  
Participants were told that the survey concerned attitudes towards the country’s 
proposed name change. Participants first answered questions about their emotional state (how 
 
10 The larger survey was looking at identification, identity fusion and the country name as a sacred value.  
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aroused and positive they felt about the name change), interest in the issue of the name 
change, and their sociocultural identification with Macedonia. Next, they were asked to select 
which one of five options best reflected their situation: “I voted yes”; “I voted against”; “I 
boycotted”; “I didn’t vote”; “I’d rather not say”). The option “I didn’t vote” (selected by 51 
participants) was offered to distinguish those that did not vote as a political expression from 
those who did not vote for other reasons. After participants answered the voting question, 
they were asked to elaborate on their answer in a text box11. No word or time limitations were 
imposed.  
Participants’ conspiracy theory beliefs were operationalized as a score on the 
Conspiracy Theory Ideation subscale of the Conspiracy Mentality Scale (Stojanov & 
Halberstadt, 2019). This subscale consists of seven items (e.g., “Events on the news may not 
have actually happened ”; “The alternative explanations for important societal events are 
closer to the truth than the official story”; “Many so called ‘coincidences’ are in fact clues as 
to how things really happened”; etc.). Participants rated their agreement with each statement 
on a 7-point scale anchored at “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree”.    
Finally, participants completed a demographic questionnaire, including age, religious 
affiliation (Christian, Muslim, Atheist, Agnostic, None, Other), gender (male or female), and 
level of education.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 
11 Qualitative analysis of the answer is part of the larger study on the name change.  
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The descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, by voting behavior (opposers vs 
supporters) are given in Table 1.  
Table 1. Means [and 95% CI] for conspiracy theory ideation (CTI) at time 1 (2018) and time 
2 (2019).  
 Time 1 Time 2  

















4.96     
[4.79-5.14] 






Figure 2. Change in conspiracy theory ideation for the supporters and opposers (error bars 
represent 95% CI) 
 
 
To test the hypothesis that conspiracy theory beliefs increase after a loss of political 
power, we conducted a mixed measures ANOVA (voting behavior: support versus oppose) x 
survey wave: Time 1 vs Time 2), with wave treated as a within subjects factor. There was a 
main effect of voting behavior, with opposers expressing significantly stronger conspiracy 
beliefs than supporters, F (1, 114) = 18.412, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.14. There was no significant 
main effect of wave, F (1, 114) = 1.698, p = 0.195, ηp
2 = 0.015), however, there was a 
marginally significant interaction with voting behavior, F (1, 114) = 3.949, p = 0.05, ηp
2 = 
0.03 (see Figure 2). This remained true even after controlling for change in self-reported 
positivity and arousal and education, F (1,111) = 3.429, p =0.07, ηp
2 = 0.03.  Within-subjects 
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contrasts partially supported our hypothesis: comparing Time 1 and Time 2 scores revealed a 
significant increase in conspiracy theories for the opposers after the name change took effect, 
F(1, 58) = 6.613, p = 0.01, ηp
2= 0. 10, but no difference for supporters, F(1, 52) = 0.076,  p = 
0.78, ηp
2 =0.001 
The results offer some support for the idea that conspiracy beliefs increase when 
control is threatened, and represent the first test of the control hypothesis in a natural setting.  
Participants opposing the name change, whose efforts to prevent it were subsequently 
frustrated, plausibly felt that their personal, political and ingroup power had been 
compromised. At Time 2, these participants, but not the supporters of the name change, 
reported stronger conspiratorial thinking, even though they were surveyed six months after 
the control-threatening event. This is in line with reasoning of other researchers (e.g. Imhoff, 
2015) who suggest that it is chronic lack of control that elicits conspiracy beliefs, thus 
potentially explaining why one-off experimental manipulations may produce weak or 
inconsistent effects. Indeed, the effect among the control-threatened group (ηp
2= 0.10, 
equivalent to d = 0.66) far exceeded the mean effect size obtained in a recent meta-analysis of 
experimental manipulations of control on conspiracy beliefs we conducted (Stojanov & 
Halberstadt, under review) on 45 effect sizes across 23 studies (d = 0.07), hinting at a power-
based explanation for previous, uneven experimental findings. This same meta-analysis also 
revealed a moderating effect of conspiracy belief operationalization, such that control 
manipulations affected endorsement of specific conspiracy theories more strongly than more 
abstract conspiracy beliefs (as used in the current studies). In a different paper the authors 
suggested that conspiracy beliefs that are related to the control threat may be especially likely 
to be endorsed (Stojanov, Bering & Halberstadt, under review). Thus, effect observed in the 
current study may have been stronger if measured as endorsement of a specific theory 
directly related to the political crisis.  
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 Contrary to our expectation, supporters of the name change did not show the opposite 
pattern to the opposers; their conspiracy beliefs remained stable. Although we can only 
speculate about this null result, it is possible that supporters’ control was not in fact 
threatened by the ultimate outcome of the referendum. Indeed, both the opposers and the 
supporters celebrated victory at the time of the referendum – the opposers because the 
referendum did not reach the census, and the supporters because the overwhelming majority 
of those who voted found the name change acceptable. By September 2019 it was clear that 
supporters’ beliefs were justified, but supporters themselves may never have thought 
otherwise.  
Unfortunately, our dataset, which was part of a larger, unrelated study, did not include 
a direct measure of perceived control, so our mechanistic interpretation of the effects cannot 
be confirmed empirically. Although we controlled for some possible confounds, such as 
different educational backgrounds of opposers versus supporters, and differential emotional 
reactions to the name change, it remains possible that that control-threatened participants’ 
beliefs changed for other reasons, or indeed that their control was not threatened to begin 
with.  
To address the last concern, we conducted a post hoc survey to see whether people do 
indeed perceive political upheaval as a threat to personal control. We asked 97 Mechanical 
Turk workers (52 males, 45 females, mean age M= 35.77, SD=9.47) what kinds of events 
tend to influence people’s sense of control. Participants were asked to “think about some of 
the situations in your life that you have [do not have] control over” (between subjects), and to 
briefly describe ten such situations (see the Appendix for complete list of controllable and 
uncontrollable event categories). The first author classified the situations into categories, and 
a research assistant independently classified 20% of the statements. There agreement rate 
between the coders was 82%. 
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Politics, arguably the best-fitting category for the Macedonian referendum, ranked 7th 
(f = 18), suggesting that while the event we considered is a plausible context in which control 
might be challenged, there are others that produce more psychologically significant threats. 
For example, the third most frequently mentioned factor was the weather (f = 47), and victims 
of extreme weather events commonly report an acute loss of control (Afifi, Afifi, & Merrill, 
2014). In Study 2, we took advantage of this insight and examined the real-time relationship 
between perceptions of control and conspiracy beliefs immediately following a series of more 
than 500 tornadoes that struck the American Midwest in May, 2019. In addition to a new 
participant sample and a different challenge to control, Study 2 added an explicit measure of 
perceived control, and additional measures of conspiracy theory beliefs. The latter included 
weather-related conspiracies, allowing us to test the hypothesis that threats to control 
encourage the endorsement of threat-related conspiracy theories to a greater extent than 
unrelated or abstract beliefs. Finally, to implicate the tornadoes themselves as the cause of 
control threat we additionally measured the impact they had on individual participants. We 
predicted that impact would predict conspiracy theory beliefs (general and/or specific), via 
their effect on individuals’ sense of control.  
 
Study 2: Midwestern American Tornadoes, 2019 
 
Method 
Participants.  Two hundredth and sixty-six (114 males, 150 females, 2 “other”)  
MTurk workers from Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania and Texas took part in the study12 at Time 1. Their average age was 37.74 years 
 
12 Programming of the survey did not allow participants from other States to participate 
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(SD = 13.22, range 18 – 81 years); 41.7% had a Bachelor’s degree, 35.3% high school 
degree, 14.7% Master’s degree, 2.3% doctoral degree, 0.8% did not have a degree, and 5.3% 
had an “other” degree. Fifteen participants failed an attention check question and were 
removed from the final analysis in Time 1. For Time 2 (September) the retention rate was 
61%; those who agreed to participate did not differ from those who declined in terms of Time 
1 perceived control, affectedness or conspiracy beliefs.  
 
Materials. 
Impact of tornadoes.  To assess the extent to which participants were affected by the 
tornado we adapted six questions used previously by Segal and colleagues (Segal, Jong, & 
Halberstadt, 2018): “To what extent did you suffer physical harm as a result of the tornado?”; 
“To what extent did you suffer psychological harm as a result of the tornado?”; “To what 
extent was your home damaged by the tornado?”; “To what extent was the area where you 
live damaged by the tornado?”; “To what extent did you feel your life was in danger during 
the tornado?”; “Overall to what extent has your life been affected by the tornado?” 
Participants answered on a 9-point scale anchored at 0 = not at all and 8 = very much 
so. Answers were combined into one measure by averaging across all the answers. 
Conspiracy beliefs. Conspiracy beliefs were assessed in three ways.  
Generic conspiracy beliefs. As in Study 1, we used the conspiracy theory ideation 
subscale of the conspiracy mentality scale (Stojanov & Halberstadt, 2019). Among the items 
of this scale was an attention check question (“To make sure you read attentively please 
select strongly agree”).  
Specific conspiracy beliefs. To measure specific conspiracy beliefs (as opposed to a 
general tendency to believe conspiracy theories, as indicated by responses to the foregoing 
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subscale) we used the Conspiracy Theory Beliefs Inventory (Swami et al., 2011), a 15-item 
scale that measures belief in specific conspiracy theories (e.g., “The Apollo moon landings 
never happened and were staged in a Hollywood film studio.” Participants answer on a 9-
point scale (1 = completely false to 9 = completely true).  
Weather-related conspiracy theories. Finally, we measured belief in weather-related 
conspiracy theories with the following three items: “The adverse weather conditions we are 
experiencing right now are a result of a weather manipulation experiment”; “The trails left in 
the sky by planes are evidence of a technology used to change the weather”; “The weather is 
controlled by multiple governments to help various industries and hurt others.” Participants 
indicated their agreement with these statements on a 7–point scale (1= strongly disagree to 7 
= strongly agree). Cronbach alpha was 0.94 and removing any of the items lowered the 
coefficient.  
 
Perceived control. Perceived control was measured with Pearlin and Schooler’s 
(1978) Mastery Scale. The scale consists of seven items (e.g., “What happens to me in the 
future mostly depends on me”), five of which are reverse coded. Participants respond on a 
four-point scale (1= strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree), and responses are averaged such 
that higher scores indicate a higher perception of the self being in control. 
   
Procedure. Participants were surveyed on June 1, 2019. After giving informed 
consent, they were directed to the Qualtrics platform where they read about the purpose of the 
study (“investigating people’s perceptions about natural disasters and world affairs”). Those 
who agreed to participate then completed the measure of the tornadoes’ impact, the three 
conspiracy belief scales in random order, the Mastery Scale, and, finally, a series of 
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demographic questions, before being debriefed. Participants were contacted again in 
September 2019 and asked to complete the same set of measures.  
 
Results  
Time 1 analysis 
Perceptions of control were significantly related to all three measures of conspiracy 
beliefs (see Table 2), but the relationship was significantly stronger for weather related 
conspiracies than for specific (but weather-unrelated) conspiracy theories, z = -3.573, p < 
0.01, or for nonspecific conspiracy ideation, z = -2.317, p = 0.01 (correlations which did not 
differ from each other), providing some support for the idea that it is threat-related conspiracy 
beliefs that are particularly appealing.  
 
 













Generic CT 1 .74** .59** -.21** .28** 
Specific CT  1 .65** -.15* .32** 
Weather related CT   1 -.33** .52** 
Control    1 -.20** 
Affectedness     1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Path analysis using the lavaan package in R (Rosseel, 2012), with affectedness as 
independent variable, perceived control as mediator, and all three measures of conspiracy 
beliefs as dependent variables (see Figure 3), revealed mediating effect of control only for 
weather related conspiracy beliefs 95%CI [0.012, 0.074], suggesting that control specifically 
increases belief in threat-related conspiracies (the confidence intervals for the indirect effect 
for the generic, 95%CI [0.000,0.051], and specific conspiracy beliefs 95% CI [-0.009,0.048] 
crossed zero). 
 
Figure 3.  Path analysis from affectedness to conspiracy beliefs via control.  
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Time 2 analysis 
To determine the persistence of conspiracy beliefs once the immediate threat had 
subsided, we contacted participants three months later (i.e. September 2019). As expected, 
feelings of control were higher three months after the tornadoes (see Table 3). A 2 (time: 
September versus June) x 3 (Conspiracy beliefs type: Generic, Specific, or Weather-related) 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of conspiracy beliefs, F (2, 302) = 
192.910, p < 0.0001, f=1.13, such that weather related conspiracy beliefs were endorsed less 
strongly then either abstract beliefs, F (1,151) = 288.866, p < 0.001, f=1.38, or specific 
beliefs. F (1,151) = 237.099, p < 0.001, f =1.25. Importantly, there was a marginal time x 
conspiracy belief interaction, F (2, 203) = 2.832, p = 0.06, f=0.13, such that weather-related 
conspiracy beliefs were higher, but generic and specific conspiracy beliefs were lower, 
immediately after the tornadoes than three months later, although none of the three measures 
differed significantly over time (see Table 3). 
Although conspiracy beliefs were stable on average, individuals’ beliefs over time 
varied. To determine whether that change was related to changes in perceived control over 
the same period, we computed change scores for all variables (subtracting the September 
score from the June score) and regressed all three measures of conspiracy beliefs 
simultaneously on control. The analysis revealed that increases in perceived control post-
tornado uniquely predicted decreases in weather-related conspiracy beliefs (see Figure 4).  




Figure 4. Path analysis from change in perceived control to change in conspiracy beliefs 
 
Table 3. Means and standard deviations and paired samples t-test results 








t (df) p 
Specific conspiracy 
theories 
3.57 (1.89) 3.71(1.75) 3.64 (0.14) -1.73 (151) 0.09 
Generic conspiracy 
theories 
3.64(1.48) 3.76(1.46) 3.70 (0.11) -1.32 (151) 0.19 
Weather related 
conspiracies 
2.06 (1.56) 1.96 (1.43) 2.01 (0.11) 1.12 (151) 0.26 





3.09 (0.12) 3.14(0.11) / / / 
 
Perceived control 
2.81 (0.56) 2.91 (0.59) / -3.27 (151) 0.00 




Discussion and Conclusion 
Conspiracy theories continue to be strongly endorsed by the public (Jensen, 2013), 
with increasingly dangerous social consequences, including threats to health, the 
environment, and political engagement (Douglas, Sutton, Jolley & Wood, 2015). And while 
social media can legitimately be blamed for the ease of their propagation (Shao et al., 2018; 
del Vicario et al., 2016), scientific scrutiny of the underlying motivational causes is needed to 
understand their etiology and individuals’ receptivity to them. To that end, feelings of 
powerlessness and lack of control are often cited as motivating factors (e.g. Douglas, Sutton 
& Cichocka, 2017), but the experimental evidence is mixed.   
The current studies were therefore conducted to complement the existing 
experimental research on the effects of lack of control on conspiracy theory beliefs by 
examining this relationship in naturalistic settings. We conducted Study 1 against the real-
world background of a political referendum on Macedonia’s name, a polarizing and personal 
issue that touched on a complex array of pragmatic concerns, intergroup identities, and 
interstate politics. Each of these factors is apparent in many conspiracy theories (Bale, 2007; 
van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018), but they are rarely, if ever, captured in the laboratory. In 
   
 
 207 
Study 2, we examined participants’ perceptions of control and belief in conspiracy theories in 
the wake of a natural disaster.  
The results of Study 1 indicated that people who opposed the name change, who 
presumably felt lower personal control, increased their conspiracy beliefs from 2018 to 2019, 
while the beliefs of those who supported the name change remained stable. Study 2 
conceptually replicated these results, and in addition showed that effects were limited to 
conspiracy beliefs relevant to the control-threatening event.  
 It is not clear why the specificity of the effects differed between the two studies. One 
possibility is that the ambiguity and complexity of the threat in Study 1 was amenable to 
multiple interpretations, such that even “generic” conspiracies appeared relevant.  For 
example, the statement that “Events throughout history are carefully planned and orchestrated 
by individuals for their own betterment,” intended as a generic statement about vague and 
unnamed forces, might have been given specific meaning in the context of the national 
referendum, which involved so many “events” and “individuals” that anyone could find 
aspects that appeared relevant to their interpretation of events. Tornadoes, in contrast, might 
be more constrained in their interpretation, permitting only limited extrapolation. 
Alternatively, the effects of the tornadoes might have been more specific simply because 
more specific conspiracies were available for participants to use. Perhaps, that is, people 
restore control via whatever means are available, and while they gravitate toward theories 
with direct implications for the threatening events, more general claims will suffice when 
necessary.  
This research is not without limitations, of course. Most obviously, an unavoidable 
aspect of the designs was that participants could not be randomly assigned to groups, leaving 
open the possibility that some other aspect besides low perceived control, could account for 
observed differences over time. Relatedly, there was no neutral control group, so it is not 
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certain whether low perceived control increased conspiracy beliefs, or whether high 
perceived control buffered against increases in them (or some combination of the two). It is 
also possible that beliefs would have changed even if the threatening events had not occurred, 
although there is no reason to suppose that this true, and, at least in Study 2, the role of 
tornado affectedness argues against it. In any event, we believe that these sacrifices to 
internal validity are more than earned back in terms of ecological validity. The current studies 
represent a rare look at conspiratorial thinking following the kind of major social upheaval or 
traumatic events that are thought to prompt it.  
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Appendix A: Uncontrollable and controllable situations 
 
Situation that participants experience as uncontrollable  frequency 
Other people  85 
Transport problems 48 
Climate/weather  47 
Prices  30 
Sickness  21 
Emotion  19 
Loses 19 
Politics  18 
Queue /overcrowding 13 
Lotto /chance(uncertainty) 12 
Entertainment availability  11 
Outages, (e.g. internet, power) 8 
Body/bodily functions 8 
Aging  7 
Car accident  6 
Genes  6 
Space objects  5 
Work schedule 5 
Laws of physics  4 
Love 3 
Dreams  2 
Miscellaneous 70 















Situations that participants experience as controllable frequency 
Consumption 64 













Where I live 7 
Study 7 
Who I date 6 
Who I talk to on the phone 6 
Religious activities 6 
Children 6 
Home Chores 5 
Showering 5 
Life 5 
Who I vote for 4 
Dog 4 
Mode of transport 3 
Gifts 3 
Smoking 3 




Favourite things 2 









Chapter 6: General Discussion 
 
Although conspiracy theories have been present throughout history, psychologists 
have only recently expanded their interest in them, partly as a result of the growing awareness 
of the potential harm they can cause (Jolley, 2013). Researchers have focussed not only on 
the consequences of beliefs in such theories (Douglas, Sutton, Jolley & Wood, 2015), but also 
in the psychological mechanisms that produce them, including personality traits, intergroup 
dynamics, and various individual motivations. Among the latter, the need for control has 
figured prominently in both research and theory, as well as in popular science communication 
(e.g., Shermer, 2014; Oaklander, 2015, Yong, 2008).  
Despite the attention to control as an explanatory variable, the logic of its causal 
effect on conspiracy beliefs is dubious, and the empirical evidence inconclusive. As noted in 
Chapter 1, there are a number of reasons why conspiracy beliefs are unlikely candidates for 
restoring a threatened sense control, including their tendency for over-explanation and the 
social stigma that can accompany them. Moreover, “conspiracy beliefs” themselves have 
been operationalized in various ways, undoubtedly contributing to the variability in the 
observed effect of control on them. 
Thus, the primary goal of this thesis was to systematically test the hypothesis that 
threats to perceived control lead to conspiracy beliefs. As a first step towards answering this 
question, in Chapter 2, I developed and validated a scale for measuring conspiracy mentality, 
abstracted from any specific conspiracy claims (which vary in their plausibility and 
generalizability). I then used that scale, sometimes in conjunction with other measures, in 
Chapters 3 through 5, to test, using experimental, meta-analytic, and longitudinal methods, 
respectively, whether lack of control increases conspiracy beliefs.  
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The results from the experimental studies presented in Chapter 3 converged on a null 
finding: there was no evidence that lack of control, when manipulated, leads to conspiracy 
theory beliefs, even though measured control was negatively associated with the construct, as 
in previous research. This surprising result prompted a meta-analysis of all of the available 
experimental evidence, which largely supported the null findings, albeit with the caveat that 
the effect may be evident on specific rather than generic measures of conspiracy beliefs.  
Finally, Chapter 5 examined the effect of lack of control on conspiracy beliefs in two 
ecologically valid settings – political upheaval and natural disaster –which additional tests 
showed are likely to be perceived as threatening to personal control. In the first study, 
conspiracy beliefs increased among those who opposed the change to Macedonia’s name, but 
not among those who supported it. In the second, those who experienced greater direct impact 
from a series of tornadoes were more likely to experience threats to control, which in turn 
predicted beliefs, but only about conspiracies directly related to the source of the threat (i.e., 
the weather). Furthermore, change in feelings of control over time predicted change in 
conspiracy theory beliefs, again only for threat-specific conspiracies. Taken together, the 
results presented in Chapter 5 suggest that, null effects in the laboratory notwithstanding, lack 
of control can increase conspiracy beliefs, but only under certain conditions, such as when 
strong personal threats can be linked with specific explanatory theories, though there are 
other relevant differences across the reported studies that may be important. For example, 
laboratory studies (including the current studies) measure conspiracy beliefs after a very short 
delay (typically within a standard one-hour experimental session), whereas the field studies in 
this thesis measured beliefs after weeks or months. Some studies suggest that threats to 
control may be only visible after a delay (Wichman, Brunner, & Weary, 2008), perhaps 
because due to an initial reaction is to inhibit control threatening thoughts. An initial 
defensive response would be consistent with similar effects in other threatening domains, 
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such as negative feedback (Martin, Tesser & McIntoch, 1993), unpleasant cognitions 
(Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000), and death anxiety (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, 
& Breus, 1994).  
Differences in the time course of responses to threat may also explain another 
interesting finding in the current studies: the Macedonian name change produced changes in 
abstract conspiracy beliefs, but tornadoes’ effects were limited to very specific, threat-
relevant conspiracy theories. One difference between the studies was that, in the former case, 
participants were surveyed after a six month delay, while in the latter, they were surveyed 
relatively soon (i.e. few days) after the threatening event. An intriguing possibility is that, in 
the immediate wake of a threat, participants are particularly drawn to specific conspiracy 
theories, which ultimately draw them into a larger world of conspiracy theory and culture. A 
sudden, severe illness, for example, might lead to speculation about the nefarious intentions 
of the pharmaceutical industry in the short term, which in turn acts as a gateway into like-
minded others, who have “evidence” for more diverse claims along the same lines. 
 
Limitations 
Although I have focussed on discrepancies and variability in the construct and 
operationalization of conspiracy theories, the construct of “control” also has multiple 
dimensions and interpretations (Chipperfield, Perry & Stewart, 2012), and it is possible that 
different “domains” of control were examined in the experimental and naturalistic studies in 
this thesis. Bilewicz and Sedek (2015), for example, argue that the standard recall task 
manipulates control over one’s life overall, a domain about which participants tend to be 
confident (Lachman & Weaver, 1998).  They may be less confident about the control they 
have over specific domains, such as their safety or security, which the tornadoes likely 
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challenged. More generally, different threats may produce different effects depending on the 
domain they challenge, and participants’ individual resilience in those domains.  
 In addition, the experimental and naturalistic “manipulations” may not have led to the 
same experience of threat. For example, there are some indications that when people initially 
lose control, they respond energetically to restore it, but after an extended period of control 
deprivation, they experience helplessness (Greenaway, Philipp & Storrs, 2017).  Since 
recalling an uncontrollable experience is intended to create an immediate, acute challenge to 
participants’ sense of control, it may have been accompanied by a correspondingly immediate 
attempt to regain control, possibly limiting the effects of the manipulation.  After days or 
months of chronically threatened control, participants may have been more vulnerable to 
conspiracy explanations. Thus, it may be because of, rather than despite of, a six month delay 
that oppositional Macedonians found themselves entertaining thoughts of conspiracies. 
It is also worth noting that most participants in the reported studies were online 
participants, mostly Mechanical Turk workers. While there are some concerns raised in the 
literature regarding use of MTurk samples, such as familiarity with similar paradigms 
(Landers & Behrend, 2015), low compensation rates (Landers & Behrend, 2015), and the 
lack of oversight over what participants are doing simultaneously (Fleischer, Mead & Huang, 
2015),  there are also advantages, such as greater diversity and intrinsic motivation relative to 
student samples (Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). 
Furthermore, the concerns with online samples can largely be managed, as I did in the current 
studies by including attention check questions (Dance, 2015), recruiting only participants 
with high approval rates, and permitting participation in only one study in a given line of 
research. Nevertheless, it is possible that some participants had undergone the experimental 
manipulations before (e.g., if they had been involved in similar research in the past),which is 
known to attenuate the effect size (Chandler, Paolacci, Peer, Mueller, & Ratliff,  2015). 
   
 
 223 
Perhaps, then, using other or more “naïve” samples  would have produced stronger or 
different results in my experimental paradigms.  
As with all research, the current studies represented a trade off between experimental 
control and external validity, and naturalistic studies have their own vulnerabilities. Anxiety, 
for example, is an obvious potential confound when studying natural disasters (Afifi, Afifi, & 
Merrill, 2014), and, arguably, political change. Although I controlled for arousal and 
positivity in the “name change” study, those measures may not have been adequate proxies 
for the anxiety participants felt.  
Implications 
The findings may have implication for theory. If the relationship between lack of 
control and conspiracy beliefs is not domain-general, but domain-specific, as the naturalistic 
studies seem collectively to suggest, it would imply that the lack of control in a particular 
domain threatens perceptions of order in that domain, and compensatory efforts to restore 
perceptions of control and order will be focussed, and more effective, in that same domain. 
Thus, following a random, devastating weather event, believing that the pharmaceutical 
industry deliberately produces harmful vaccines may not be as appealing a source of 
compensatory order as believing that the weather is manipulated by the government. Future 
studies could systematically test these ideas about domain specificity, for example by 
depriving participants in different domains of control (e.g. health vs politics) and measuring 
belief in health and political conspiracies, or endorsement of health vs political institutions. 
Depending on the results, future instantiations of compensatory control theory may include 
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Directions for future research 
The current studies were primarily concerned with common cognitive mechanisms 
that might explain conspiracy beliefs, mostly ignoring individual differences. However, there 
are a number of personality variables that are relevant to both the control and conspiracy 
ideation constructs, which could be fruitful avenues for further research. For example, 
individuals differ in their chronic need for (and chronic feeling of) control, and examination 
of conspiracy beliefs among these individuals could provide insights into both the beliefs and 
the individuals, as well as represent an important moderator of experimental manipulations of 
control. Relatedly, some personality types (e.g., schizotypy) and clinical conditions (e.g., 
paranoid schizophrenia) are characterized by need for control or strategies to establish order 
(e.g., the tendency to see unusual patterns in the world), and individuals with these conditions 
may be more (or less) susceptible to external control threats. 
In addition to differences among individuals, there are also differences among control 
threats.  For example, the same “uncontrollable” event may have different effects if judged as 
uncontrollable by anyone (e.g., a natural disaster), versus uncontrollable only by the self. 
Further, the plausibility of a given theory, the availability of alternative explanations, and the 
availability of other means of restoring control, are all likely to contribute to a given theory’s 
success.  For example, believing that 9/11 was caused by the government, when another 
plausible explanation is available (i.e., that  9/11 was caused by Al Qaeda) seems as likely to 
threaten than to buttress (some) people’s sense of order and structure. On the other hand, 
conspiracy theories that pertain to events that appear more or less random, such as natural 
disasters, might be more attractive, especially if other external systems of control are 
unavailable.    
There are also theoretical reasons to think that the link between control and 
conspiracy beliefs is bi-directional. From the perspective of compensatory control 
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theory (Kay, Whitson, Gaucher & Galinsky, 2009), although belief in conspiracy theories 
satiates a higher order need for order and structure, it should also reduce the need to perceive 
personal control.  Additionally, to the extent that conspiracy theories imply that people are 
merely a puppet on a string pulled by the conspirators, people who endorse conspiracy 
theories should experience cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957): they cannot see 
themselves both as marionets and as agentic selves, potentially leading to a reduced sense of 
personal control. Some empirical research supports these contentions. For example, 
participants exposed to pro-conspiracy material, compared to those exposed to anti-
conspiracy material, scored higher on a measure of political powerlessness (Jolley & 
Douglas, 2014a; Jolley et al., 2014b).  Similarly, Douglas and Leite (2018) found that 
participants were more disengaged (i.e. showed higher turnover intentions) after they were 
experimentally exposed to organizational conspiracy theories.   
The possibility that conspiracy beliefs threaten personal control suggests other, more 
sinister downstream effects, as well as new lines of inquiry for researchers. Not all efforts to 
restore control are benign, particularly if other, socially sanctioned activities, such as 
demonstrations or activism, are condemned in conspiracy theories as part of a master plan to 
keep the population docile and under control (Franks, Bangerter, Bauer, Hall & Noort, 2017). 
Individuals endorsing such theories may therefore view extremism as the only way to restore 
agency.  Of course, only a small minority of even hardcore conspiracy theorists are prone to 
commit violence, and research should focus on the moderators that are likely to trigger such 
behaviour, such as anomie (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999). However, even among the peaceful 
majority, widespread propagation of control-threatening conspiracy theories would likely 
have negative effects on trust in institutions and lead to endorsing systems that promise to 
restore order, such as extremist ideologies. 
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If conspiracy beliefs indeed satiate a higher order need for structure and order, and 
function in a hydraulic fashion with perceived control and other external control systems, this 
suggests at last two mechanisms for reducing conspiracy beliefs. First, enhancing individuals’ 
perceived control could reduce individuals’ need for conspiratorial accounts (van Prooijen, 
2019). So far there is only one (underpowered) study comparing baseline to heightened 
perceptions of control (van Prooijen & Acker, 2015), but the results were promising: the 
participants in the high control condition demonstrated lower conspiracy beliefs compared to 
those in a neutral condition. However, in my own studies, as well as those of others (e.g. 
Cutright, 2012) it has proven difficult to increase perceptions of control from a baseline level, 
so it is not yet clear whether enhancing control is a feasible strategy of combatting conspiracy 
beliefs. Even if perceptions of high control are inherently difficult to evoke, restoring 
participants chronically deprived levels of perceived control to baseline might be sufficient. 
The changes over time in the “tornado” study, for example, could be seen as the result of the 
natural restoration of control, previously damaged by the traumatic effects of the storms. 
Strengthening the perception that existing institutions function effectively could be 
another avenue for reducing conspiracy beliefs. There are indeed some indications that social 
structure and conspiracy ideation may be inversely related. For example, in open societies 
that practice transparency and that are characterized by freedom of the press, an independent 
legal system, a strong civil society, and clear expectations about how society functions, 
conspiracy theories are less likely to flourish (Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff; 
Moore, 2016), compared to societies where people feel powerless, experience passivity, have 
an impaired sense of personal responsibility, and where feelings of uncertainty prevail 
(Bruder et al., 2013; Stojanov & Douglas, in preparation), possibly because in the latter 
societies conspiracy theories provide some predictability, order and a convenient framework 
for the interpretation of current events.  
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Finally, perceptions of control and order are only some of many human motivations 
that may drive conspiracy beliefs. Other potential factors that future research may explore are 
self-esteem maintenance or group identification. For example, once people start believing in a 
conspiracy theory, do they continue to believe in it for self-esteem maintenance purposes and 
belongingness to a group? Given the many different, sometimes conflicting needs people 
have (Talevich, Read, Walsh, Iyer, & Chopra, 2017), it is also important to explore under 
what conditions some of these needs take primacy over others and lead to conspiracy beliefs 
(e.g., when the need for uniqueness overwhelms the need to see the world accurately).  
New questions that expand the research horizons can also be asked. For example, 
questions such as “why people stop believing in conspiracy theories” or “what are the effects 
of writing fake news on the writer?” or “under what conditions people come up with 
conspiracy explanations spontaneously” could also provide insights about so far neglected 
aspect of conspiracy thinking. Future research can also dig deeper into the layers of 
conspiracy thinking by looking at “second order conspiracy theories” (conspiracy theory 
about a conspiracy theory e.g. “The government deliberately encourages conspiracy theories 
about 9/11 so that it can distract from the real problems”) and what factors – conspiracy 
theory ideation or scepticism will predict such beliefs.  
 
Conclusion 
Although this thesis was intended to address the question, “Does lack of control lead 
to conspiracy theories”, the results suggest that the more appropriate question is, “Under 
what conditions does lack of control leads to conspiracy beliefs”. Tentatively, the answers 
include a minimum intensity for the control-threatening event, a specific link between the 
threat and the conspiratorial explanation of it and, perhaps, a delay between the threatening 
event and the opportunity to restore control. This account suggests a more limited effect of 
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control than some theoretical accounts suggest, but a limited effect is not an inconsequential 
one. Indeed, any inclination to endorse conspiracy theories, even just to restore local and 
specific threats to control, might open the door towards a world of other conspiracy beliefs, 
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